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Preface
Global credit markets nd themselves in major upheaval since August 2007. The
current turmoil was triggered by problems on the U.S. sub-prime mortgage markets.
A year after the onset of the crisis, banks around the world have written down almost
500 billion USD and no end is in sight. Before August 2007, the sub-prime crisis was
perceived to be a local problem on U.S. markets. By July 2008, it has turned out that
European banks account for almost half of the resulting write-downs (International
Monetary Fund (2008)).
The global spread of the crisis shows the downside potential of nancial market
integration. The sub-prime crisis could only reach this global dimension because in-
vestors all over the world channeled funds into asset- (mortgage-)backed securities that
were issued by U.S. nancial institutions on a large scale.
These modern instruments of credit risk transfer have been strongly criticized in
the current debate about the sub-prime crisis. In particular, their incentive e¤ects
on the banks role as relationship lenders are questioned. Bank regulatory capital
requirements are central in this debate since they create an incentive to transfer risks
out of the banksbalance sheets. As the current crisis highlights in the context of
nancially integrated markets, national regulatory and legal settings have an impact
on nancial market participants reaching far beyond a countrys borders.
The goal of the present dissertation is to clarify how regulatory and legal settings
inuence nancial market participantsincentives and decisions. While the rst part of
the dissertation focuses on the suppliers of funds, i.e. banks and institutional investors,
the second part is dedicated to the analysis of the demand side, i.e. borrowing rms.
I develop theoretical models that take into account informational problems on -
nancial markets and investigate the interplay between incentives and the regulatory or
legal environment. Chapter 1 considers institutional investors and analyzes a banks
choice of a credit risk transfer instrument. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the borrowing
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rms nancing decisions. Chapter 2 investigates the optimal debt allocation within
a multinational corporation. Chapter 3 considers a rms cross-listing decision and
derives its impact on the rms home market competitors.
In the remainder of this preface, I present a brief overview of the three follow-
ing chapters and highlight their main contributions. Each chapter consists of a self-
contained paper and can be read independently.
Chapter 1 is directly related to the current credit crisis. Overcoming regulatory
capital requirements is a central goal in banks seeking the use of credit risk transfer in-
struments. The model developed in this chapter helps to explain how a banks primary
role as a relationship lender is a¤ected by its decision to transfer credit risks by (par-
tially) selling o¤ its existing debt. I consider both the banks monitoring incentives as
well as its incentive to liquidate non-performing loans. Furthermore, the analysis iden-
ties circumstances under which a bank might ine¢ ciently securitize its debt instead
of choosing a more traditional instrument of credit risk transfer like syndication.
Common belief among practitioners and economists is that keeping the junior part
of the debt in the securitization process, the so-called equity tranche, provides a bank
with strong monitoring incentives. In fact, I nd that, as long as markets are doing well
and the liquidation value of the debt is high, securitization entails no adverse incentive
e¤ects. In this case, keeping the equity tranche perfectly solves all potential incentive
problems associated with securitization.
However, if the liquidation value is intermediate or low, the opposite result emerges.
In this case, the originator has ine¢ ciently low monitoring incentives, even if he holds
the equity tranche. In particular, the model shows that the originators monitoring
incentives are lower than with syndication. Furthermore, for intermediate liquidation
values securitization (as opposed to syndication) generates an incentive to gamble for
resurrection, i.e. to ine¢ ciently continue non-performing loans. These results give
a possible explanation for why it was in the downturn of housing prices that banks
incentives were negatively a¤ected.
A second major result of this paper relates to the regulation of institutional in-
vestors. To increase social e¢ ciency and to protect individuals, institutional investors
like pension funds and insurance companies are made subject to restrictive invest-
ment regulations. However, as shown in the model, applying these regulations solely
to selective investor groups introduces ine¢ ciencies on debt resale markets. This in-
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sight constitutes a new aspect in the current discussion on nancial market regulation:
Rather than focusing on the tightness of capital requirements for banks only, more at-
tention should be paid to the harmonization of regulatory requirements for all nancial
market participants including banks, pension funds and hedge funds.
In an extension to the model, I investigate the e¤ects of tightening capital require-
ments for securitization under Basel II. The tightening of capital requirements adversely
inuences both the originators monitoring and liquidation incentives. On the other
side, Basel II reduces the scope of ine¢ ciently choosing securitization over syndication.
Finally, the paper conciliates two di¤ering views on the role of the bank as the
controlling debtholder: While the literature on the seniority of bank debt claims that a
bank as the relationship lender should be the most senior debtholder, the literature on
asset securitization claims that a bank as the relationship lender should keep a junior
position. In an extension of my model I, reconcile these di¤ering views on the bank as a
controlling debtholder and derive who has stronger monitoring incentives under which
circumstances. Precisely, I nd that for high liquidation values the junior debtholder
has stronger monitoring incentives but for low liquidation values monitoring should be
undertaken by the senior debtholder.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer, explores the
nancing decisions of multinational rms. Financial market integration implies the
dismantling of restrictions on international asset holdings. This, in turn, increases the
number and the importance of multinational corporations (MNCs): While in 1970 only
about 7000 MNCs existed, this number increased to 30.000 by the 1990s and reached
over 63.000 MNCs today (Gabel and Bruner (2003), p. 2).
Multinational corporations di¤er signicantly from purely national stand-alone
rms. First, they consist of several separate and often legally independent entities.
This creates agency problems on internal markets  foremost between headquarters
and subsidiary managers. Second, multinational corporations have a richer set of -
nancing options as compared to national single entity rms. With respect to credit
nancing, they can choose between centralized and decentralized borrowing for their
subsidiaries.
Only few existing papers acknowledge the possibility of substituting local borrowing
with parental funds. Moreover, the focus of these papers lies mainly on tax issues. One
notable exception is a recent paper by Desai, Foley and Hines (2004). The authors show
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empirically that a host countrys legal environment more specically the strength of
creditor rights is a key determinant of the nancing structure for multinational af-
liates. In addition, a large and growing literature on law and nance highlights the
relevance of a countrys legal environment for corporate nance. Despite this evidence,
the impact of the legal environment on the borrowing structure of multinational cor-
porations has not yet been analytically studied.
The dissertations second chapter contributes to the existing literature by introduc-
ing country-specic legal environments into a model of internal capital markets. We
identify how a multinationals choice between centralized or decentralized borrowing
is a¤ected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial
incentives and coinsurance considerations.
The model results are consistent with existing empirical evidence. Based on the
model we derive further testable implications. In particular, we nd that a partially
centralized borrowing structure is optimal when creditor rights are either weak or
strong. For intermediate levels of creditor rights, a fully decentralized (centralized)
borrowing structure is optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire-building ten-
dencies. In addition, decentralized borrowing becomes more attractive if a company
focuses on short-term protability. Finally, if the countries di¤er with respect to their
legal environment, loans tend to be taken up in the country with better creditor rights
and a more e¢ cient insolvency system.
To summarize, our paper emphasizes the importance of an integrated view on multi-
nationalsborrowing decision. Due to feedback e¤ects on internal capital markets the
borrowing choice for a subsidiary cannot be considered in isolation from the overall
borrowing structure of the multinational corporation.
A further aspect of nancial market integration, studied in Chapter 3, is the ac-
cess to global nancial markets. Liberalizing nancial markets provides rms with the
possibility to cross-list on foreign stock exchanges. Interestingly, rms from emerg-
ing countries often do cross-list even though they do not want to raise new funds.
This is due to the informational value of cross-listing: Financial markets in emerging
economies are typically characterized by strong informational problems. Cross-listing
allows rms to credibly comply with stricter and better enforced regulatory and dis-
closure requirements as compared to those in their home countries. Thereby, rms are
able to signal the quality of their projects.
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I develop an adverse selection model that takes into account this informational
value of cross-listing as a signaling device and investigate welfare e¤ects of cross-listing
in the home market. While most of the existing literature on cross-listing analyzes
the underlying reasons for and the resulting e¤ects of this decision on the cross-listing
rm, little attention has been paid to the home market e¤ects of cross-listing. Only
a few empirical papers have stressed that cross-listing entails negative cost-of-capital
and valuation spillover e¤ects on non-cross-listing rms. Welfare e¤ects have not been
analyzed yet.
I compare cross-listing in nancially integrated markets to the reference case of
a closed emerging economy. Two types of investment ine¢ ciencies in closed emerging
economies have been identied by the existing literature: On the one hand, an underin-
vestment problem can arise due to credit-rationing on informationally opaque nancing
markets (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). On the other hand, the economy might be charac-
terized by an overinvestment problem. This arises because bad investments cannot be
distinguished from good investment opportunities and therefore also obtain nancing
(De Meza and Webb (1987)). The model developed in Chapter 3 allows analyzing
the welfare e¤ects of nancial market liberalization for both types of ine¢ ciencies in a
unied framework.
My model predicts positive cost-of-capital and valuation e¤ects for the cross-listing
rm. These predictions are supported by empirical evidence.
I derive a surprising result with respect to the home market e¤ects of cross-listing:
Despite unambiguously negative spillovers on home market competitors, cross-listing
can improve local welfare. This is due to the fact that cross-listing reduces the inef-
ciency related to an under- or overinvestment problem in the closed economy. Fur-
thermore, local welfare is only reduced if the mitigation of an overinvestment problem
is more than o¤set by the costs of cross-listing and the introduction of a new under-
investment problem; or if the overinvestment problem can not be mitigated at all.
Thus, for an assessment of the home market e¤ects of cross-listing it is not su¢ cient to
consider the spillover e¤ects on competing rms. Rather, the protability and growth
opportunities of these have to be taken into account as well.
Chapter 1
Securitization vs. Syndication:
Credit Risk Transfer and the
Originators Incentives
1.1 Introduction
For a few decades modern instruments of credit risk transfer and in particular asset-
backed securities (ABS) were on the rise. There was a six fold increase corresponding
to a constant annual growth rate of 26 percent in total securitization issues on the
European market between the years 2000 and 2007. This resulted in a total issuance
volume of almost 500 billion EUR in 2007 (European Securitization Forum (2008a)).
However, since the beginning of the current subprime crisis in 2007, asset-backed
securities have come under scrutiny and securitization issues dropped dramatically.
Already in the second half of 2007 the issuance volume was down by almost 50 percent
from the rst two quarters. Also for 2008 the European Securitization Forum expects
the total issuance volume to fall by 41 percent to 272 billion EUR from 2007 (European
Securitization Forum (2008b)).1 In public as well as academic debate the focus is now
on the perils associated with the issuance of ABS. A major area of concern relates
to agency problems. Besides the rating agencies, also the originators incentives have
1This exposition is to illustrate current changes in securitization markets. Globally, the total
volume of securitization issues is much larger. The total issuance volume in 2007 amounted to about
6.5 trillion USD (including mortgage-backed securities) for the US market only (Securities Industries
and Financial Markets Association (2008)).
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recently been criticized.2 The key question is how securitization a¤ects the originators
primary function as a relationship lender, i.e. how his incentives to screen and monitor
borrowers might have been altered by the resale decision.
Interestingly, another more traditional market for debt resale, the market for credit
syndication, has not su¤ered as badly from the current turmoil in nancial markets.
According to a statistics of the Bank of International Settlement, the total global
volume of signed international syndicated credit facilities amounted to 2,134 billion
USD in 2007 as compared to 2,122 and 2,232 billion USD respectively in 2006 and
2005 (Bank of International Settlement (2008)). Only in the rst quarter of 2008 a
slight downturn is observable. Despite the magnitude of the market, syndication has
received relatively little attention in the public and academic discussion as compared
to modern instruments of credit risk transfer like securitization.
The goal of this paper is to analyze and compare the originators incentives under
these two structures, i.e. securitization and syndication. I rst discuss the originators
monitoring incentives and his incentives to liquidate non-performing loans. Comparing
these incentives to a situation without a debt resale allows me to distinguish possible
ine¢ ciencies associated with the two di¤erent instruments of credit risk transfer. Sec-
ondly, I analyze a banks choice between the two instruments of credit risk transfer and
point out potential ine¢ ciencies from an ex-ante perspective. Finally, I investigate the
impact of tightening regulatory capital requirements for ABS under Basel II. Overall,
the analysis allows for a better understanding of a banks choice of credit risk transfer
instruments and the associated incentive e¤ects. Furthermore, it highlights potential
areas of concern from a regulatory agents point of view.
I develop a simple model of a loan resale. In my model the originator can either
choose a straightforward proportionate loan sale or the sale of a senior share in his
debt, both to passive outside investors. A proportionate loan sale reects the main
characteristics of syndication: The originator sells o¤ part of his debt, on average
around 70 percent (Su (2007)), and keeps the remaining fraction. One important
feature of a proportionate sale is that the originator and the outside investor have the
same seniority and typically have a separate contract with the borrower each even
though generally only the originator has direct contact to the borrower.
Selling o¤ a senior share reects the typical structure of securitization: In a secu-
ritization process repayment claims are typically restructured such that securities of
2The originatoris the bank that makes the loans, which are then resold. In this paper I use the
originator and the bank interchangeably.
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di¤erent priorities (called tranches) are generated. As a result, the holder of the most
senior tranche is the rst to receive interest payments and debt repayments out of the
underlying loan pool, whereas the most junior tranche holder is the last to receive
payments. Often, the originator keeps the most junior tranche, which consists of about
2-4 percent of the total loan volume, and sells o¤ the more senior tranches to external
investors (Murray (2002), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)). Again, only the originator has
direct access to the borrower and therefore mostly keeps the servicing and the moni-
toring function.3 For both resale structures this (partial) separation of cash-ow rights
from control-rights introduces a problem of moral hazard between the originator and
external investors.
Following the decision on the resale structure, the originator has to choose his
monitoring e¤ort, which a¤ects the probability of obtaining a full debt repayment. If
the originator encounters repayment problems, he can decide whether to liquidate the
debt at an early stage or try to obtain a full repayment by postponing the scheduled
interest payments. The model derives how the choice of the resale structure shapes the
originators incentives to monitor and to liquidate non-performing loans.
Common intuition among many economists and practitioners is that holding the
equity tranche in an ABS issue resolves the problems associated with moral hazard.4
However, I show that this is not always the case. More precisely, the originators
monitoring incentives depend on the liquidation value of the debt pool.
If the liquidation value is very high, retaining the junior tranche in an ABS issue
is indeed su¢ cient to give the originator optimal monitoring incentives. Interestingly,
in that case, there is no free-riding in monitoring problem between the relationship
bank and outside investors at all. The underlying intuition for the result is that with
high liquidation values potential losses are relatively low and variations only a¤ect
the originators junior tranche. For these liquidation values the senior tranche is safe.
By monitoring more, the originator directly improves his own expected returns. In
contrast, syndication always entails a free-riding in monitoring problem since all re-
payments are shared proportionately.
However, if the liquidation value is intermediate or low, the originators monitoring
incentives with securitization are very weak and even lower than with a proportionate
3Recently, more and more ABS issues are also actively managed. This implies that the composition
of the underlying pool is chosen by the originator, who can decide to add or withdraw assets from
the underlying pool. With these actively managed pools, the monitoring function and the originators
associated incentives become more and more important for a closer analysis.
4See, for example, Franke and Krahnen (2005), Jobst (2002) and Buiter (2007).
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sale. In an extension of the model I show that, in case of a very low liquidation value,
senior tranche holders would have better monitoring incentives. This is due to the fact
that potential losses in case of failure are so strong that they certainly wipe out the
junior tranche and a¤ect the senior tranche as well. Hence, it is the senior tranche
holder whose expected returns might be improved by better monitoring. As I highlight
in the section on the related literature, this insight of my model relates to the literature
on the seniority of di¤erent forms of debt (bank debt vs. bonds) and allows reconciling
the di¤ering views on who should be given control to.
With respect to the liquidation decision, I show that the originator, who holds the
junior part of the debt under securitization, has incentives to "gamble for resurrection"
if the liquidation value is intermediate. "Gambling for resurrection" means that the
originator does not liquidate a non-performing loan at an early stage even though liq-
uidation would be e¢ cient. Furthermore, also if control was given to the senior tranche
holder, this would induce an ine¢ cient liquidation strategy. The senior tranche holder
would be too tough on the borrower and ine¢ ciently liquidate the loan for relatively
low values of the liquidation parameter. Surprisingly, under a proportionate sale, the
originators liquidation strategy is always e¢ cient  independent of the liquidation
value.
From an ex-ante point of view, the originator generally prefers the resale structure
that allows him to commit to a higher monitoring level and a more e¢ cient liquidation
strategy. This is due to the higher resale price and eventually higher expected prots
he can realize by doing so. However, as many institutional investors like pension funds
and insurance companies are in search of secure and liquid investment opportunities
(e.g. Du¢ e (2007)), the originator faces a stronger demand for the senior (often AAA-
rated) tranche of an ABS issue as compared to syndication. Given this higher demand
for ABS, the originator might have an interest in ine¢ ciently choosing securitization
whenever the expected liquidation value is low. This result highlights that restrictive
investment regulations for institutional investors like pension funds, which are meant
to protect individuals and increase social e¢ ciency, can lead to ine¢ ciencies on resale
markets.
Finally, I analyze the change in regulatory capital requirements under Basel II.
Even though the originators incentives in case of an ABS issue are adversely a¤ected
for low liquidation values, the shift to Basel II is expected to improve the e¢ ciency of
the originators resale structure choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next Section reviews
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the related literature. Section 1.3 gives a brief overview of the securitization process
and the institutional and regulatory environment. Section 1.4 introduces the model.
Section 1.5 discusses the benchmark case without a debt resale. Section 1.6 presents
the equilibrium outcomes of the model. Section 1.7 investigates the change to Basel II.
Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
My paper contributes to the existing literature by jointly analyzing the markets for
securitization and syndication. To my knowledge there is no empirical or theoretical
work explicitly considering the choice between the two instruments of credit risk trans-
fer by loan sale. However, there is a growing yet relatively small body of research
analyzing either the syndication or the securitization market.
Among the rst authors investigating loan resales were Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995). Based on a costly state verication model developed by Pennacchi (1988),
the authors explain how a loan resale can be realized despite a moral hazard problem
between the originator and external investors. In their model a bank has an incentive
to resell loans because of the regulatory environment and expensive internal nancing.
However, the extent of the loan resale is limited by a moral hazard problem regard-
ing the originators monitoring incentives. The authors show that the originator of a
loan resale optimally chooses to retain a fraction in the loan. The main ndings of
the model are also empirically tested. While the paper addresses the problem of moral
hazard between the originator and external investors, it only allows for a proportionate
sale. Incentive e¤ects within senior/subordinate resale structures which are typical
for ABS issues are not considered.
There are several papers that explicitly consider a senior/subordinate structure.
Boot and Thakor (1993) were among the rst to highlight the value of issuing several
tranches of di¤erent seniorities. The intuition for their result lies in an ex-ante problem
of asymmetric information between the originator and the external investor about the
value of the investment opportunity.5 By issuing informationally sensitive and insensi-
tive tranches, the originator can raise the junior tranche investors incentive to obtain
(costly) information about the investment project and hence make informed trading
more worthy. The analysis of Boot and Thakor introduces the relevance of security
5The idea of investors with di¤ering information levels exists also in other papers, e.g. by Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990), Plantin (2004) and Plantin and Parlour (2008).
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design and subordination in the context of asymmetric information. However, their
concept of informed trading contradicts the reality of ABS issues, where typically the
informationally poor senior tranches are traded and often the informationally valuable
equity tranche is kept by the originator.
Riddiough (1997) and DeMarzo (2005) have both developed theoretical models
which incorporate the idea of di¤erent informational sensitivities of the tranches in an
ABS issue. Both papers explain why the originator should keep the equity tranche.
Furthermore, both papers acknowledge risk-diversication e¤ects of pooling. Riddiough
(1997) shows that a senior/subordinate structure is the dominant resale structure for a
pool of loans in the setting of asymmetric asset value information and non-veriability
of liquidation motives. It is the originator who should own the junior piece since he
has better information and controls the renegotiation process. Therefore, he should
also be given the right incentives to maximize bargaining pay-o¤s. However, the main
results of the analysis rely on the assumption that senior tranches are completely safe.
This assumption, as the current subprime crisis made evident, might be too strong.
DeMarzo (2005) derives similar results without relying on the assumption of a secure
senior tranche. In the model of DeMarzo (2005), which is closely related to and builds
on DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), keeping the equity tranche has a signaling value. In
his model pooling does not only generate positive risk-diversication e¤ects, but has
an information destruction e¤ect. Hence, by holding the equity tranche, the originator
is able to realize the positive diversication e¤ect and to signal the quality of the
underlying pool to external borrowers. DeMarzo considers a given loan quality and
hence ignores how ex-post monitoring incentives of the originator might a¤ect the
optimal outcome.
Osano (2007) analyzes the originators ex-ante monitoring incentives before securiti-
zation and his liquidation incentives after securitization. The originator obtains better
information about asset values by monitoring. While unmonitored nancing avoids
an ex-ante adverse selection problem between the originator and external investors,
it reduces the quality of the originators liquidation strategy. A senior/subordinate
structure allows the originator to reduce the adverse selection problem associated with
a debt resale. Osano shows that, with strong liquidity requirements, the originator
might have an incentive to choose unmonitored nancing even though it is socially
ine¢ cient. With respect to the liquidation strategy this implies a soft budgeting prob-
lem (excessive continuation). While it is similar to my liquidation strategy result, the
excessive continuation in Osanos paper results from a parametric assumption which
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renders continuation optimal under unmonitored nancing. The excessive continuation
problem in my model is endogenous and arises due to the subordination of the origina-
tors junior share in the transaction. Two central but critical assumptions of Osanos
model are that monitoring is undertaken before the securitization decision, and it is
publicly observable. Therefore, Osano can only compare (completely) monitored vs.
unmonitored nance. He cannot consider a continuous monitoring variable.
Empirical literature on informational issues of the securitization process is relatively
scarce. However, there is one very recent article by Keys et al. (2008) investigating the
e¤ects of securitization on the originators incentives.6 Based on market data for U.S.
mortgage markets, the authors show that, conditional on being securitized, a portfolio
of mortgage loans is about 20 percent more likely to default as compared to another
group of mortgage loans with similar risk characteristics and loan terms but a lower
probability of being securitized. While the authors interpret their results as an adverse
e¤ect on the originators screening incentives, the analysis they employ could also be
interpreted as an adverse monitoring e¤ect.
The empirical work on syndication markets highlights the relevance of informa-
tional problems as well. However, the focus of this empirical work is mainly on the
characteristics and composition of the syndicate. As most authors conrm, syndicates
tend to be more concentrated with the lead arranger keeping a larger share whenever
informational problems are severe (Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Lee and Mullineaux
(2004), Su (2007)). Furthermore, despite the focus of the existing literature on the
adverse selection problem, "moral hazard appears to be the more prominent feature
of this market" (Su (2007), p. 635). Another insight generated by Su is that while
the reputation of the lead arranger might help to mitigate problems of information
asymmetry within the syndicate, it does not eliminate these problems.
Finally, my paper also relates to the literature on the seniority of debt contracts.
This strand of the literature investigates why bank debt is typically senior to market
debt (e.g. Longhofer and Santos (2000) and Park (2000)).7 Taking into account the
monitoring function of a bank, these papers derive that the bank should be the senior
claimholder. The underlying idea in Longhofer and Santos (2000) is that the bank has
6A few more papers conrm the relevance of informational issues for the securitization process:
Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005) highlight the relevance of information asymmetries on the structure
of the single tranches. Drucker and Puri (2008) nd that loans which are resold in the following exhibit
much more restrictive covenants. And nally, Franke, Hermann and Weber (2007) show that a lower
asset pool quality induces the originator to retain a larger subordinate position.
7There are also other closely related papers, which are not discussed into detail here. See, for
example, Diamond (1993) and Repullo and Suarez (1998).
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stronger monitoring incentives during economic downturns as compared to bondhold-
ers. Similarly, Parks results are driven by the idea that single senior lenders have the
strongest incentives to monitor as they can reap the full return from their monitoring
activities. The result of this strand of the literature i.e. the controlling debtholder
should be given a senior position seem to contradict the literature on securitization,
where the originator, as the controlling debtholder, optimally keeps the junior part
of the debt. In my model I reconcile these two views on the controlling debtholder
and explain under which circumstances the senior debtholder can be expected to have
stronger monitoring incentives as compared to the junior debtholder and vice versa.
1.3 Overview of Asset-Backed Securities
1.3.1 The Securitization Process
In a typical asset-backed security (ABS) transaction the originating bank bundles a
group of very homogenous receivables  for example mortgages, or corporate loans,
or car leases into a single pool. This pool of receivables is then sold to a so-called
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which is founded only for this specic purpose and is
legally independent of the bank. The SPV then issues securities which are backed by
the underlying receivables in the pool. The proceeds of this security issue are used to
pay for the asset pool. A very stylized overview of the securitization process is given
by gure 1.1.8
As the SPV is basically a non-substantive shell entity, the handling and servic-
ing function is typically kept by the originator in return for a servicing fee. Some of
the deals are organized as a pass-through transaction. In pass-through transactions
investors hold proportionate claims on the repayments. However, most of current
ABS-transactions exhibit a pay-through structure.9 In a pay-through transaction asset
claims are restructured and securities are issued after a seniority ranking (tranching).
8For a more detailed description see for example Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) or Jobst (2002).
9An exception are the securities issued by the three Federal Agencies which dominate the U.S.
market for Mortgage Backed Securities: The Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie
Mae"), the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mae") and the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("Fannie Mae"). These are typically backed by mortgages to prime borrowers and are
structured as pass-through transactions. However, most investors acted on the assumption that these
were backed by implicit government guarantees. This assumption was proved to be right by the
federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008. The incentive situation with
an (implicit) government guarantee is quite di¤erent from the ABS structures considered in this paper.
Therefore, I exclude these MBS from my analysis.
Securitization vs. Syndication 14
Cash payment
Bank SPV*Borrower
Borrower
Borrower
Borrower
Borrower
Credit
Investor
ABS** issue
Investor
Investor
Investor
Investor
Asset
pool
sale
Cash
payment
*  SPV = Special Purpose Vehicle
** ABS = Asset Backed Security
Repayment
Figure 1.1: Stylized ABS-Transaction
The proceeds from the underlying pool are assigned according to a so-called waterfall
principle: First, the most senior tranche receives payments (interest and repayment).
Only when their claims are fully served, the next tranche is paid o¤, and so on. Thus,
the most junior (and hence most subordinated) tranche often referred to as the "eq-
uity tranche", "toxic waste" or "rst loss piece"  is the last to receive payments.
Conversely, the equity tranche is the rst to bear potential losses. Only after this
tranche is completely wiped out, other tranches can su¤er any losses. This restruc-
turing introduces di¤erent risk-return properties for the single tranches. Hence, the
senior tranche is partially shielded against potential losses by the more junior classes
and is very safe. According to their risk proles the di¤erent tranches of an ABS issue
receive varying ratings, ranging from AA(A) for the most senior tranche to unrated
for the highly risky rst loss piece. Even though there is a lack of publicly available
data on actual shares, it is known that the rst loss piece is often kept (repurchased)
by the originator, and that it amounts to about 2-4 percent of the entire issue (Murray
(2002), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)).10 A stylized (hypothetical) structure for an ABS
issue is given by gure 1.2.
One major reason for the originating bank to issue ABS lies in its interest in at-
taining a regulatory capital relief.11 This is important for several reasons: First of
all, equity is very expensive. Thus, the originator might have an interest in reducing
the exposure to lower the internal costs of capital. Secondly, the originator might be
10Which typically corresponds to the calculated expected losses of the asset pool (see Rudolph et
al. (2007), p. 46)
11Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) empirically verify that seeking regulatory capital relief is a driving
force on the syndication market as well.
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Figure 1.2: Overview Tranching
limited in his investment opportunities if all of his equity is already used up as regula-
tory capital for his existing business. In this case the originator might want to engage
in securitization for realizing the necessary capital relief. This allows him to realize
additional positive investment opportunities.
Further potential reasons for issuing ABS arise in the context of imperfect capital
markets: better risk diversication; the separation of the assets from the banks asset
pool (bankruptcy remoteness);12 access to new investor groups like pension funds and
insurances; o¤-balance sheet nancing for realizing balance sheet arbitrage under Basel
I;13 and liquidity requirements of the originator in fully funded transactions. However,
there are several hints that the need of regulatory capital relief is (one of) the major
forces driving the issue of ABS.14
12Bankruptcy remoteness means that a SPV is not a¤ected by an insolvency of the originating
bank and vice versa.
13Before the adoption of Basel II, securitization allowed banks to realize regulatory capital arbitrage
by exploiting di¤erences in risk weighting for securitized assets. However, even under Basel II banks
will be able to realize a regulatory capital relief (Jobst (2005)). See more detailed explanations in the
next section.
14First, the increasing number of synthetic CDO transactions without a true sale of tranches
suggests that liquidity needs are not the main reason for the issue (Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi
(2007)). Secondly, the reduction in the size of the equity tranche seems to have gone hand in hand
with the shift in the regulatory risk-weighting requirements. This suggests that it is the regulatory
capital that matters. And nally, the homogeneity of typical ABS pools, which reduces the scope
of risk sharing opportunities, indicates that risk diversication might not be the single reason for
securitization. If the main motive for an ABS issue was pure risk diversication, we should expect
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It is important to understand the manifold compositions and structures of this credit
risk instrument. Asset-backed securities can be classied into three major groups:15
First, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which can be backed by commercial or resi-
dential mortgages. Second, asset-backed securities (ABS) in a stricter sense, which can
be backed by assets like credit cards, consumer or student loans and car leases. And
third, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The variation in CDOs is enormous:
Even though initially the underlying assets were either bank loans to small/medium-
cap corporations or non-rated corporate bonds (so-called junk-bonds), an increasing
number of CDOs are backed by other ABS, which sometimes are even backed by other
ABS in turn. Moreover, while initially many transactions were fully funded in the
sense that they consisted of a true sale transaction with securities issued and bought
by external investors, more and more of the younger CDOs are synthetic. "Synthetic"
refers to the fact that instead of truly selling securities, the originator transfers only
the credit risk. By doing so, the originator can still realize a regulatory capital relief.16
1.3.2 The Institutional and Regulatory Environment
Starting with the First Basel Accord (Basel I) from 1988, banks were required to hold
equity capital equal to 8% of their risk weighted assets. Basel I has been implemented
by about 100 countries worldwide. However, the rise in nancial innovation and the
resulting complex interdependences in nancial markets led to a perceived inadequacy
of a standardized equity requirement approach. In particular, banks could obtain
an inadequate capital relief by issuing ABS under Basel I. This is due to the fact
that the maximum risk weighting was limited to 100%, which initially applied also
for the highly risky equity tranche. An originator keeping the equity tranche had
to hold regulatory equity amounting to only 8% of this fraction, even though the
equity tranche gathered all the expected losses of the underlying pool ( e.g. Deutsche
Bundesbank (2001)). Hence, banks had a strong incentive to issue ABS in order to
realize a so-called "regulatory capital arbitrage" (Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi (2007)).
This inadequacy led to an amendment of the First Basel Accord in 2001 and then to
the publication of the New Basel Accords (Basel II) in 2004, which were nalized in
very heterogeneous pools. However, we do not observe heterogeneous pools in practice.
15A more comprehensive classication of ABS is given by Rudolph and Scholz (2007).
16As a detailed description of the design of CDOs is beyond the scope of this paper, I relegate
the interested reader to more comprehensive studies like for example Jobst (2002). How the cur-
rent subprime crisis will a¤ect the variety of ABS instruments remains an interesting question to be
explored.
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2006. The goal of Basel II is to better account for the real economic risks (including
operational risks) in the banking sector. With respect to securitization this means that
the "securitization exposure must be determined on its economic substance rather than
its legal form" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 120). It implies
that the originator should only be allowed to obtain a regulatory capital relief on the
real economic extent of risks transferred. In the standardized ratings-based approach
the originator has to apply the following risk weightings (according to S&Ps rating
categories):17
100%28%8%4%1,6%Result. Equity
Requirement
Deduction
(1250%)
350%100%50%20%Risk
Weighting
B+ to
unrated
BB+ to BB-*BBB+ to
BBB-
A+ to A-AAA to
AA-
External
Rating
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p.127
* Only applies to external investors. Originator has to fully deduct all retained exposure below BBB-.
Figure 1.3: Risk Weighting Categories
For example, if a bank keeps a BBB rated ABS, 100% risk weighting applies and it
has to hold equity amounting to 8% of the securitys value. If the bank keeps a AAA
rated ABS, it has to hold only 20% of the 8% regulatory capital requirement, i.e. 1.6%
of the securitys value in equity.
Note that also under Basel II securitization is still attractive for obtaining a reg-
ulatory capital relief even though regulatory capital arbitrage is not possible (Jobst
(2005)). The capital relief obtained under Basel II reects a real transfer in credit
risks. Consider the typical example of an ABS introduced above. In this example the
originator retains the equity tranche and can reduce the regulatory capital require-
ment: If we assume that the underlying pool has a risk weight of 100%, the required
regulatory capital is 40 Mio. EUR (=8% of 500 Mio. EUR). If, however, he decides to
securitize, sell all senior tranches and keep the equity tranche, the regulatory capital
requirement is reduced to 20 Mio. EUR (=100% of 20 Mio. EUR). This allows the
originator to realize a capital relief of 20 Mio. EUR. While full compliance with Basel
II is compulsory for European banks since 2007, the USA only approved the imple-
17Under Basel II banks are also allowed to apply internal ratings if they have the approved sys-
tems in place. For details on the internal ratings based approach see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2006), p 133 ¤.
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mentation of Basel II at the end of 2007. Compliance with the regulatory framework
(with a few amendments) is expected to be achieved by the end of 2009. The e¤ects
of a change in the capital requirements under Basel II are investigated in section 1.7.
1.4 The Model
Model Set-up
Consider a risk-neutral bank with an existing debt portfolio.18 The debt consists
of a single loan and promises an interim interest payment of R1 and an additional
end-of-game debt repayment of R2:19 There is no discounting between the periods and
the bank can reinvest the interim payment of R1 at a short-term market interest rate
of zero. The total outstanding debt repayment is therefore D = R1 +R2:
The interest payment of R1 is only realized with a success probability of q 2 [0; 1] :20
The bank has the possibility to monitor the borrower. Monitoring improves the success
probability q of the outstanding loan but is costly for the bank. Without loss of
generality, it can be assumed that the bank directly chooses the probability of success
q at a monitoring cost of C(q). The monitoring cost C(q) increases in q, i.e. C
0
(q) > 0,
at an increasing rate, i.e. C 00(q) > 0: Together with the following properties of the cost
function, this ensures the existence of an internal solution for the optimal monitoring
e¤ort: C(0) = C 0(0) = 0 and limq !1C(q) =1.
If the borrower meets the interest payment R1 (with the probability of q), the bank
also receives R2 at the end of the game with certainty. This results in the total debt
repayment of D: If the borrower cannot realize the interest payment R1 (with the
probability of (1  q)), the bank decides either to liquidate or to continue the loan. In
case of liquidation the bank receives the enforceable liquidation value of D; with  2
[0; 1) being the recovery rate for early liquidation. In case of continuation the interest
18As in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Riddiough (1997) and also Osano (2007) the lending decision
is not included in the model. A simple reason therefore could be that at the lending stage banks do
not actually know whether they will need a capital relief in the future. Another possible reason for
this separation is that di¤erent divisions decide on the origination and the resale of the loan.
19Considering a single loan allows to focus on incentive e¤ects associated with the choice of the
resale structure beyond risk diversication e¤ects. This assumption also reects the homogeneity of
the underlying pools in ABS transactions: The part of the borrowers risk expected to be independent
of the lenders monitoring e¤ort should be highly correlated between the di¤erent borrowers in a
pool. For the monitoring-dependent individual part of the risk, the originator should have identical
monitoring incentives and hence inuence the risk in the same way.
20It is assumed that the borrower never has an incentive to strategically default due to prohibitively
high costs of default. Therefore, the borrower always pays back the loan whenever possible.
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payment of R1 is postponed and the bank receives full repayment of R2+R1 = D with
an exogenous probability of p at the end of the game. With the probability of (1  p),
the bank only obtains a total repayment of D; with 0   < . The assumption
 <  ensures that the liquidation value decreases over time.21 It follows for  that
 2 ( ; 1): All exogenous parameters of the model are common knowledge.
In order to realize a certain regulatory capital relief, the bank wants to sell o¤ part
of its existing debt to a risk-neutral external investor.22 The bank chooses between
syndication and securitization. The pay-o¤s associated with these two resale structures
are discussed next.
Credit Risk Transfer Instruments and Payoff Structures
Syndication. In case of syndication the originating bank sells a proportionate frac-
tion  of the loan. All payments by the borrower are shared proportionately between
the originator and the external investor, according to their fractions.
The general return characteristics for this debt resale structure are illustrated by
the following simple example: Consider an enforceable standard debt contract between
a bank and an entrepreneur without own funds, specifying the repayment of D. As
long as the entrepreneurs business generates su¢ cient prots, i.e. prots above the
promised debt repayment D, he will repay the amount of D. Whenever his returns
fall short of D, the creditor obtains all the prots generated by the entrepreneur. This
return structure is illustrated by the solid line in gure 1.4.
If the bank decides to sell a fraction  to an external investor and keep the fraction
(1   ), the return structure for the bank is given by the dashed line and for the
external investor by the dotted line in gure 1.4 (ignoring any payments between bank
and external investor). Thus, any debt repayment is proportionately shared between
the originating bank and the external investor. I dene this resale structure, typical
for syndication, as a Proportionate Sale (PS).
Securitization. If the originator chooses a senior/subordinate resale structure, he
21If   ; continuing the loan would always be the dominant strategy.
22For focusing on the choice of the resale structure, I do not explicitly model the reason why the
bank seeks a capital relief. However, one could think of a simple extension of the model in which the
bank has an alternative outside investment opportunity. For realizing this investment opportunity, it
needs to free up some regulatory equity. However, as the focus of my paper is on the choice of the
resale structure and not on the optimal extent of capital relief the bank seeks, this extension is left
out. I implicitly assume that the alternative investment opportunity is so protable that a loan resale
is always valuable.
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Figure 1.4: Repayments Proportionate Sale
sells o¤ a fraction  of the loan to the external investor and keeps (1   ) to himself.
However, debt repayments are not shared proportionately but it is agreed that the
external investor has a priority claim. Figure 1.5 illustrates the payo¤-structures for
the simple example introduced above.
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Figure 1.5: Repayments First Loss Provision
Again, the total debt repayment is given by the solid line. And again, both parties
 the external investor and the originator  receive proportionate debt repayments
according to their shares  and (1  ) as long as the entrepreneurs prots are above
D. However, the situation is di¤erent if project returns fall short ofD: If prots are very
low, the external investor as the senior claimant receives all repayments. Only if the
senior claimant is fully paid o¤, i.e. prots are above D; does the originator participate
in the repayments. The repayment structures for the senior external investor and the
junior originator are given by the dotted and dashed lines in gure 1.5, respectively.
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As the graph illustrates, this resale structure introduces an area (for prots below
D) for which the originating bank exhibits a risk-loving behavior. I dene this resale
structure, typical for securitization, as a First Loss Provision (FLP).
Assumptions and Timing
The fractions  and ; which the originator has to sell under the two structures in
order to realize his targeted regulatory capital relief, are context-specic and depend
on the regulatory environment of the originator. The derivation of the exact fractions
is beyond the scope of my analysis.
However, I do consider the following relationship between the fraction  under
syndication (PS) and the fraction  under securitization (FLP): Basel II prescribes
risk-weighted regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, the equity tranche of an ABS
issue has to be fully deducted from the equity base. Hence, for obtaining the same
capital relief under securitization and syndication, the fraction sold under securitization
has to be signicantly larger than the fraction sold under syndication. This relationship
is conrmed by empirical evidence and is captured by the following assumption:23
Assumption 1.1 The fraction which the originator sells under a First Loss Provision
is larger than the fraction he sells under a Proportionate Sale for obtaining the same
regulatory capital relief, i.e.  > :
Additionally, I make the following assumption with respect to the recovery rate in
case of an unsuccessful continuation of the loan:
Assumption 1.2 The recovery rate in case of unsuccessful continuation  is very low.
In particular,  < min

;  
1  ; 2   1
	
:
Assumption 1.2 is needed to capture the idea that if the continuation of a non-
performing loan is not successful, most of the repayment value is lost.
The timing of the model is as follows:
At date 0, the originator decides about the resale structure either securitization or
syndication and accordingly makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er to an external investor.
The "take it or leave it" o¤er species the price I for the share to be sold. At date 1,
23The originator typically keeps a fraction of approximately 30 percent of the underlying debt in
a loan syndicate (Su (2007)). The equity tranche typically amounts to 2-4 percent of the total loan
volume of a securitization pool (Murray (2002), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)).
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the originator decides about his monitoring e¤ort. The originators monitoring e¤ort is
not observable and hence non-contractible. This gives rise to a classical moral hazard
problem between external investors and the originator. At date 2, the scheduled interest
payment R1 is realized with the probability q. If at date 2 interest payments are not
realized, the originator decides whether to liquidate or continue the loan. At date 3,
nal repayments are realized. The timing of the model is summarized in gure 1.6.
The model is solved by backward induction.
t=0
•Bank chooses
resale structure
•Sells at price I
t=1
•Bank decides
on monitoring
intensity q
t=2
•R1 by borrower
•If not: Bank liqui-
dates/continues
t=3
•Final re-
payments
realized
Figure 1.6: Time Structure
1.5 Benchmark Case: No Debt Resale
In this section I derive the banks optimal monitoring and liquidation incentives in a
situation without a debt resale (No Sale). In this case the originator holds a standard
debt contract, which gives him a constant repayment without control rights in case
of the borrowers success and a variable repayment with control rights if the borrower
fails to meet scheduled payments.
In the literature on security design the standard debt contract we consider has
shown to be the optimal (second best) contract solving managerial moral hazard prob-
lems between the borrower and the lender in the presence of bank monitoring.24 Given
this optimality of the banks monitoring incentives vis-à-vis the borrower with a stan-
dard debt contract, we consider the situation without debt resale as the most e¢ cient
benchmark and focus on moral hazard problems associated with the resale. As can
be shown, the expected total value of the debt is highest at each point in time in this
benchmark case without a debt resale.
The timing in the benchmark case is as above, with date t=0 being omitted.
24See Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) for the solution of the "costly state verication"
problem with a standard debt contract and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for the role of debt in
disciplining the borrower.
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Consider the banks liquidation strategy in t=2, given that the borrower failed
to pay R1: The banks incentives to liquidate the loan depend on the banks date 2
expected prots, which are given by
Et=2NS;L = D; (1.1)
Et=2NS;C = [p+ (1  p) ]D (1.2)
for liquidation and continuation, respectively. If the bank liquidates the loan, it obtains
the liquidation value for sure. If, however, the bank decides to reschedule interest
payments and continue the loan, it will be able to receive full repayment of D in t=3
with a probability of p. Otherwise, the bank will only obtain D < D. The bank
liquidates the loan whenever Et=2NS;L  Et=2NS;C .
At date 1, the bank chooses the monitoring e¤ort q to maximize date 1 expected
prots, which are given by
Et=1NS = qD + (1  q)max f; p+ (1  p)gD   C(q): (1.3)
If the borrower successfully repays R1 in t=2 (with probability q), the bank receives
the total scheduled amount of D. The rst term in equation 1.3 reects this part of the
banks expected prots. If the borrower cannot meet the scheduled interest payment
in t=2 (with probability (1 q)), the banks expected prots depend on the liquidation
strategy as introduced above. This is represented by the second term in the expected
prot function. The last term in the expected prot function captures the monitoring
costs.
The results for the benchmark case are summarized in Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1 Without a debt resale,
1) The banks optimal monitoring level qNS in t=1 is uniquely characterized by
[1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]D = C 0(qNS):
2) The bank liquidates a non-performing loan in t=2 whenever   eNS = p+(1 p) :
Proof: Straightforward by 1) solving the date 1 optimization problem and 2) compar-
ing date 2 expected prots and solving for .25
25With C 00 > 0; the Second Order Condition for the optimization problem is always fullled.
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Part 2) of the proposition is evident. The intuition of part 1) is as follows: The
bank employs a constant monitoring e¤ort independent of  as long as the liquidation
value is below eNS. This is due to the fact that the bank always continues the debt
for these low values of  and hence expected date 2 prots are independent of . If
the liquidation value  is above the threshold eNS, the monitoring e¤ort decreases in
: The higher , the smaller is the di¤erence in repayments between the situation with
full repayment and liquidation. Hence, the smaller is the benet of monitoring in terms
of expected returns. As, however, monitoring costs are independent of the liquidation
value, monitoring becomes less attractive for higher values of .
1.6 Equilibrium Outcome of the Model
1.6.1 The Liquidation Decision
In this section I analyze the originators liquidation strategy at date 2 for both resale
structures. Like in the benchmark case, the originator obtains control and has to
decide whether to liquidate the loan whenever the borrower fails to meet its interest
payments at date 2. I want to answer the following questions in this section: Are
there any di¤erences in the liquidation decision between the two structures? And, will
there be any ine¢ cient behavior as compared to the benchmark case? To answer these
questions I rst derive the originators date 2 expected prots and then compare the
liquidation decisions under syndication (Proportionate Sale) and securitization (First
Loss Provision).
With a Proportionate Sale (PS), date 2 expected prots are given by
Et=2PS;L = (1  )D; (1.4)
Et=2PS;C = (1  ) [p+ (1  p) ]D: (1.5)
Note that the originators date 2 expected prots with PS are proportionate to the
expected prots in the benchmark case. This is due to the fact that the originator
holds a proportionate fraction (1  ) of the total loan.
With a First Loss Provision (FLP), date 2 expected prots are given by
Et=2FLP;L = max f0; (   )Dg ; (1.6)
Et=2FLP;C = p(1  )D: (1.7)
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As the originators share (1   ) in the loan is subordinate to the external investors
share , liquidation only entitles him to the surplus of the liquidation value after the
external investor has been paid o¤. If the liquidation value is too low, the originator
receives nothing. Continuing the loan, on the other hand, gives the originator the
chance (with probability p) of a full repayment; with the probability of (1   p) he
obtains nothing, since  < .
In this section I introduce a further hypothetical resale structure, which I call a Last
Loss Provision (LLP). The LLP structure di¤ers from the FLP structure only in that
the originator keeps the senior part of the debt and sells the junior equity tranche.26
As will become clear further down, considering LLP leads to a better understanding of
the incentive e¤ects associated with a senior/subordinate structure.27
With a Last Loss Provision, the originators prots would be given by
Et=2LLP;L = min f; gD; (1.8)
Et=2LLP;C = [p + (1  p) ]D: (1.9)
Liquidating the debt yields the originator a safe payment of at least min f; gD: If
the liquidation value is relatively high, his fraction  in the debt is completely safe. On
the other hand, if the originator decides to continue the loan, he runs the risk (with
probability of (1  p)) of obtaining the lower payment of D < D.
Under all resale structures the originator chooses the action (to liquidate or to
continue) that maximizes his date 2 expected prots. Hence, he liquidates a non-
performing loan at date 2 whenever   ei; with i = PS; FLP; LLP (derivation see
Appendix). ei is given by
ePS = eNS = p+ (1  p) ; (1.10)eFLP = p+ (1  p); (1.11)eLLP = p+ (1  p) : (1.12)
By comparing these threshold levels I derive the following Proposition (for a graphical
26In order to keep the modeling as simple as possible, I assume that the sizes of the tranches are the
same under LLP and FLP. Of course, in this case, the regulatory capital relief under LLP would not
be the same as under FLP. However, as the main insights derived here carry forward to a modeling
with more accurate fractions, it su¢ ces to consider identical fractions.
27Interestingly, there is no real world instrument of credit risk transfer which resembles this LLP
structure in its pure form. However, in the context of synthetic CDOs there are arrangements which
incorporate elements of this structure. These are discussed in more detail at the end of chapter 1.6.2.
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illustration see Appendix):
Proposition 1.2 The originating banks liquidation strategy is always e¢ cient under
a Proportionate Sale (PS). Under a First Loss Provision (FLP) the originator ine¢ -
ciently continues the loan for eNS   < eFLP . Under a Last Loss Provision (LLP)
he ine¢ ciently liquidates the loan for eLLP   < eNS.
Proof: See Appendix.
For very low and very high liquidation values all resale structures lead to e¢ cient
continuation (for  < eLLP ) or liquidation (for   eFLP ) as in the benchmark case.
In these cases the liquidation prots are so low (high) that it is optimal to continue
(liquidate) the loan irrespectively of the resale structure employed.
However, Proposition 1.2 shows that for intermediate levels of  the originators
liquidation incentives are distorted for senior/subordinate resale structures. Consider
FLP rst: The originator ine¢ ciently continues the loan under FLP whenever eNS 
 < eFLP . For this intermediate level of the liquidation value he has an incentive
to "gamble for resurrection". What is the underlying reason? Consider for example
the originators liquidation decision at eNS = p + (1   p) . At eNS expected total
repayments are equal under liquidation and continuation and hence both strategies are
equally e¢ cient. Under FLP, the originator holds the junior tranche and only receives
the surplus max f0; [p+ (1  p)   ]Dg in case of liquidation. With  <  and hence
p+(1 p) < p+(1 p); this is unambiguously lower than his expected prots under
continuation of p(1   )D. Thus, if the liquidation value is not too large, liquidating
the debt would give the originator only negligible prots (if any at all). For these
liquidation values he prefers to play for the (small) chance of a full repayment under
continuation instead of settling for the negligible certain liquidation prot.
Under LLP, the originator ine¢ ciently liquidates the loan for eLLP   < eNS.
In this case he is the rst to be repaid and prefers to enjoy his certain intermediate
repayment rather than running the risk of the very low repayment of D. Thus, as
opposed to FLP, the originator would intervene and liquidate the debt too often.
Both for FLP and LLP the distortions in the liquidation decision arise due to the
senior/subordinate structure of the debt. As the senior debtholder is paid o¤ rst,
holding a subordinate fraction in the loan renders the bank too soft on the borrower,
whereas holding a senior fraction makes him too tough.
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Interestingly, under PS, the e¢ cient liquidation strategy is attained irrespective
of the liquidation value. This is due to the fact that under PS the originator has a
proportionate share in the underlying debt and hence prefers the structure generating
higher overall returns.
1.6.2 The Monitoring E¤ort
Let us consider the banks optimal monitoring e¤ort at t=1 next. The originator
chooses his monitoring e¤ort to maximize date 1 expected prots. Date 1 expected
prots under the di¤erent resale structures are as follows:
Et=1PS = [q + (1  q)max f; p+ (1  p)g] (1  )D   C(q); (1.13)
Et=1FLP = q(1  )D +
(1  q)max f(   ); p(1  )gD   C(q); (1.14)
Et=1LLP = qD +
(1  q)Dmax fmin f; g ; p + (1  p)g   C(q): (1.15)
The rst part of the expected prot functions gives the originators prot share when-
ever he does not encounter any debt repayment problems in t=2 (with probability q).
If the borrower cannot repay R1 (with probability (1  q)), the originators prots de-
pend on his liquidation strategy and he receives the expected payments exposed in the
second part of the above functions. The last term in the above functions reects the
originators monitoring costs under the di¤erent resale structures. With identical cost
functions the only cost di¤erence between the structures will be caused by di¤erent
choices of q.
The originators date 1 optimization problem is given by
max
q
Et=1i ; (1.16)
with i = PS; FLP; LLP:
First, consider the originators optimization problem under a Proportionate Sale.
Proposition 1.3 Under a Proportionate Sale (PS), the unique optimal monitoring
e¤ort qPS is characterized by
[1 max f; p+ (1  p)g] (1  )D = C 0(qPS):
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The originator chooses an ine¢ ciently low monitoring e¤ort as compared to the bench-
mark case, i.e. qPS < qNS, 8 2 ( ; 1).
Proof: See Appendix.
The originator employs a constant monitoring level independent of , as long as
 < eNS: For   eNS monitoring decreases in : As the originator only holds a
fraction (1   ) of the outstanding debt but bears the total monitoring costs, his
monitoring incentives fall short of the e¢ cient level. This is a classical free-riding in
monitoring problem.
With respect to the originators monitoring incentives under a FLP, I derive the
following Proposition:
Proposition 1.4 Under a First Loss Provision (FLP), the unique optimal monitoring
e¤ort qFLP is characterized by
[1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]D = C 0(qFLP ):
1) While the originator chooses an ine¢ ciently low monitoring level qFLP < qNS for
 < eFLP , monitoring is e¢ cient, i.e. qFLP = qNS for   eFLP .
2) Compared to a Proportionate Sale, monitoring is higher under FLP, i.e. qFLP  qPS
whenever   FLP=PS. For  < FLP=PS it follows that qFLP < qPS:
With FLP=PS = 1  (1 p)(1 )(1 ) ; and eFLP = p+ (1  p):
Proof: See Appendix.
The results for a First Loss Provision are surprising: For values of  below eFLP
(for which the originator chooses to liquidate the loan in case of failure) there is a free-
riding in monitoring problem. However, this free-riding problem completely disappears
for   eFLP and the monitoring e¤ort under FLP is e¢ cient. The intuition for this
result lies in the subordination of the originators share: If the liquidation value is
relatively high (  eFLP ), the external investors fraction in the debt is completely
safe (as in this case it holds that  < ). Therefore, an increase in the monitoring level
directly increases the originators own expected returns and provides him with strong
monitoring incentives.
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Note that for low liquidation values, i.e.  < eFLP , the originators monitoring
incentives are even lower than under PS. This is due to the fact that his fraction under
FLP is smaller than under PS and the return in case of unsuccessful continuation, i.e.
D; is not too high (both ensured by the assumption  <  
1  ).
28 Thus, the free-riding
problem under FLP is more severe than under PS.
For a better understanding of the incentive e¤ects under a senior/subordinate struc-
ture, I consider the (theoretical) LLP structure as well.
Proposition 1.5 Under a Last Loss Provision (LLP), the unique optimal monitoring
e¤ort qLLP is characterized by
[  max fmin f; g ; p + (1  p)g]D = C 0(qLLP ):
1) The originator always chooses an ine¢ ciently low monitoring level as compared to
the benchmark case, i.e. qLLP < qNS 8 2 ( ; 1).
2) Compared to a First Loss Provision, monitoring is higher under LLP, i.e. qLLP >
qFLP , for  < FLP=LLP : For   FLP=LLP it follows that qLLP  qFLP :
3) Compared to a Proportionate Sale (PS), monitoring is higher under LLP, i.e.
qLLP > qPS; for  < LLP=PS if either   0:5 or  < 0:5 ^  <  (1 ) : In all other
cases, LLP is dominated by PS.
With FLP=LLP =    (1  p)(1  ) and
LLP=PS = max
n
   (1  )(1  p)(1  );  (1 )

o
:
Proof: See Appendix.
There are three di¤erent ranges with respect to the monitoring e¤ort under LLP:
First, for liquidation values  > , the originators senior fraction of the debt is com-
pletely safe and he has no incentive to monitor the underlying loan. Second, for in-
termediate values of , i.e. eLLP = p + (1   p) <   ; potential losses a¤ect the
originators share in the debt and he can improve his expected repayments by moni-
toring more. Note that the smaller the liquidation value  is, the stronger this e¤ect
becomes. Therefore, the originator has stronger monitoring incentives for lower values
28A higher value of  reduces the originators monitoring incentives under PS as it implies higher
repayments for the originator even in the case of total failure.
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of . And nally, for   eLLP the originator decides to continue the loan and his
monitoring level is at its maximum; independent of the liquidation value . Note that
in this range the free-riding in monitoring problem is also present under LLP, but it is
less pronounced than under FLP as the monitor keeps a larger fraction of the loan.29
Amajor insight we obtain by comparing the senior/subordinate structures FLP and
LLP is that monitoring incentives are strong under FLP whenever they are weak under
LLP and vice versa: If the liquidation value is expected to be low (high), the senior
(junior) debtholder has better monitoring incentives. The stakeholder whose stakes
are at risk is always most active. The stakeholder whose stakes cannot be inuenced
either because they are perfectly safe or lost for sure has no incentive to intervene.
If the liquidation value is expected to be very high, the junior debtholder has better
monitoring incentives as potential losses are expected to be low and hence a¤ect only
his fraction of the loan. In this case the senior debtholder has no (negligible) incentives
for monitoring as his share is not (barely) at stake. If, on the other hand, the liquidation
value is expected to be low, the senior debtholder has a strong interest in monitoring
as potential losses directly a¤ect his share.30 This result of my model contributes to
the literature on the seniority of debt as it reconciles both views on the allocation of
control rights between junior and senior debtholders and explains the optimality of
both under di¤erent circumstances.
For high liquidation values LLP is also dominated by PS. This is due to the fact that
an increase in  triggers a stronger decrease in incentives under LLP than under PS.
Note that if the required capital relief is not too large ( < 0:5) and the recovery rate
in case of total failure is relatively high (   (1 )

), LLP is completely dominated by
PS. This is due to the following two e¤ects: First, with  < 0:5, monitoring incentives
are relatively strong under PS. Secondly, the relatively high value of  ; which the
originator as the senior shareholder completely receives for sure under LLP, adversely
a¤ects his monitoring incentives in this case. Overall, for  < 0:5 ^    (1 )

, the
originators incentives are always lower as compared to PS despite the larger share
of the debt he keeps in this case.
The above analysis highlights two possible reasons for not observing the LLP struc-
ture in its pure form in practice.31 First, if the required capital relief is not too large
29This stems from the assumption  < 2   1; which implies that  > 0:5.
30Note that with the option to continue the debt and "gamble for resurrection" also the junior
debtholder has some (weaker) incentives to monitor. However, these would completely disappear, if
there was no continuation option and the loan was liquidated for sure.
31One exception to this can be seen in the case of single-tranched synthetic CDOs. In a single-
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( < 0:5), it might be the case that the certain recovery rate  is typically too high
to make LLP attractive. Secondly, even if  is not prohibitively high and the required
capital relief is large, it is possible that the expected liquidation value  is never as low
as to render the LLP structure an attractive alternative.
As LLP is not observed (in its pure) form in practice, I again exclusively focus on
the two real world resale structures, securitization and syndication, in the subsequent
analysis of the resale decision in t=0. The relevant threshold values for  under NS,
PS and FLP are summarized in the following gure.
Figure 1.7: Overview Thresholds for 
1.6.3 The Debt Resale Structure and Ex-Ante E¢ ciency
In this section I consider the resale decision of the originator at date 0. I want to
answer the following questions: When does the originator choose syndication (PS)
over securitization (FLP) and when vice versa? And, is the originators choice e¢ cient
from an ex-ante perspective?
To answer these questions we have to consider the external investor rst. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the external investor with syndication is typically another
bank, whereas investors who buy the senior tranche of an ABS issue are often institu-
tional investors like pension funds and insurance companies. Generally, institutional
investors are de facto limited in their investment possibilities. They have to stick to rel-
tranched synthetic CDO issue, the originator only transfers the risk of the mezzanine tranche of the
pool. The originator keeps the equity tranche and the most senior part of the debt pool. The pool
can be highly customized and consists of a relatively small number of (often unrated) corporate bonds
or loans, and more and more often of other ABS. In terms of my model, this structure resembles a
combination of FLP and LLP. A possible reason for the employment of this combination could be that
ex-ante expectations about the liquidation value are bi-polar, i.e. the liquidation value is expected to
be either very high or very low, but not in an intermediate range. Even though this interpretation is
speculative, it does not seem implausible, given the very volatile and highly correlated nature of the
underlying assets of these CDOs.
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atively secure, liquid and highly rated investment opportunities like the senior tranche
of an ABS issue (was perceived to be).32 This limitation has two major implications:
First of all, these institutional investors do not participate in a Proportionate Sale.
Secondly, they are expected to accept lower returns due to their limited investment
prole.33 In my model these limitations translate into the following: If the originator
chooses a Proportionate Sale, the external investor is another bank and, given its in-
vestment alternatives, requires an expected rate of return of at least rH > 0. If the
originator chooses a First Loss Provision and sells the senior tranche, the external in-
vestor can either be a bank or a pension fund. The pension fund requires an expected
rate of return rL; with 0  rL < rH . The originator makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er,
asking for a price IFLP which leaves the external investor with an expected return of
rLIFLP . As this corresponds to the outside-option of the pension fund, it accepts the
o¤er. As a (risk-neutral) external bank can also invest into riskier investment oppor-
tunities yielding a higher expected return of rHIFLP > rLIFLP , the bank will prefer to
do so and not accept the originators o¤er.
Having introduced the external investors, I investigate the originators resale deci-
sion. Consider a Proportionate Sale rst. Under PS, the originators date 0 expected
prots are given by
Et=0PS =

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)g (1  )D   C(qPS) + IPS: (1.17)
IPS is the payment for the fraction  sold to the external investor. As stated above the
external investor in case of a Proportionate Sale is a bank and requires an expected
rate of return of rH . The external investors ex-ante expected prot is given by
EIPS =

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD   IPS; (1.18)
which is his proportionate fraction  in expected debt repayments minus the price
32Fiduciary requirements, as for example set by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) for US pension funds, prevent pension funds from investing in non-investment grade funds
and holding low-rated or very junior ABS (Elul (2005), Kregel (2008)). Similar investment restrictions
apply also for German institutional investors (Maurer (2004)). These restrictions, in turn, boost the
demand for very highly rated investment opportunities (Du¢ e (2007)) and make institutional investors
more conservative (Blome et al. (2007)).
33This could be interpreted also as an e¤ect of higher total demand for secure investments in a
more complex setting with bargaining: The higher the total demand, the better is the bargaining
position of the originator and hence the larger is the share the originator can extract of the total
surplus. In fact, due to the high demand for secure and liquid investments, highly rated corporate
debt instruments often commanded a price premium associated with liquidity (Du¢ e (2007), p. 10).
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paid to the originator. As the investor has the outside option of rH and the originator
makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er, the following has to hold: EIPS
!
= (1+rH)IPS IPS:
Solving for IPS yields
IPS =

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD
(1 + rH)
: (1.19)
Plugging equation 1.19 into equation 1.17 yields, after some algebraic simplication,
the following ex-ante expected prots for the originator under PS (see Appendix):
Et=0PS =
eDPS   C(qPS)  "rH eDPS
1 + rH
#
; (1.20)
with eDPS = qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD:
Note that a higher outside-option rate of return rH results in a larger fraction of
total prots that goes to the external investor. Hence, the originators expected prots
decrease in rH ; i.e.
@Et=0PS
@rH
< 0.
Consider a First Loss Provision next. For FLP the external investor is a pension
fund requiring a rate of return of rL: The originators ex-ante prots are given by
Et=0FLP = q
FLP (1  )D + (1  qFLP )max f(   ); p(1  )gD   C(qFLP ) + IFLP :
(1.21)
Again, the originators date zero expected prots consist of the sum of his date 1
expected prots and the external investorss payment IFLP . In case of a FLP, IFLP is
given by
IFLP =
8<:
D
(1+rL)
if   eFLP ;
f[qFLP+(1 qFLP )p]+(1 qFLP )(1 p)gD
(1+rL)
if  < eFLP ; (1.22)
with eFLP = p+ (1  p):
If   eFLP , the external investors fraction is completely safe.34 If  < eFLP ;
the external investor is only completely paid o¤ if interest payments can be met in
t=1 (with probability qPS) or if the full amount is repaid at the end of t=2 (with
probability (1  qPS)p). If, however, the loan cannot be repaid at all (with probability
34This stems from the liquidation condition   p+ (1  p) =  + (1  )p| {z }
>0
> :
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(1  qPS)(1  p)), he receives the total remaining value of D:
The originators expected ex-ante prots under FLP are given by (see Appendix)
Et=0FLP =
8>><>>:

qFLP + (1  qFLP )D   C(qFLP )  rLD
(1+rL)
if   eFLP ;
qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D   C(qFLP )
  rLf[q
FLP+(1 qFLP )p]+(1 qFLP )(1 p)gD
(1+rL)
if  < eFLP :
(1.23)
Again, the originators ex-ante expected prots correspond to the total ex-ante value
of expected debt repayments minus the fraction in the expected prots he has to cede
to the external investor, amounting to rLIFLP .
Consider the originators choice of the resale structure at date 0. For the sake of
simplicity, I normalize the outside option of the pension fund to zero, i.e. rL = 0: The
originators ex-ante choice of the resale structure is given by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1.6 Suppose that C
00
(qPS)
C0 (qPS) >

(1 qPS) for   p+ (1  p) :35
1) If rH < r; the originator chooses a First Loss Provision (FLP) for   eFLP and a
Proportionate Sale (PS) for  < eFLP :
2) If r  rH < r; he only chooses PS for    < eFLP and FLP otherwise.
3) If rH  r; he always chooses FLP.
 is characterized by eDFLPC   C(qFLP )  (1+(1 )rH1+rH ) eDPSL + C(qPS) = 0;
with eDPSC = qPS + (1  qPS)(p+ (1  p))D, eDPSL = qPS + (1  qPS)D;eDFLPC = qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D; eFLP = p+ (1  p);
rH =
eDPSC  C(qPS)  eDFLPC +C(qFLP )eDFLPC  C(qFLP ) (1 ) eDPSC +C(qPS)
and rH =
[qPS+(1 qPS)eFLP ]D C(qPS)  eDFLPC +C(qFLP )eDFLPC  C(qFLP ) [qPS+(1 qPS)eFLP ](1 )D+C(qPS) :
Proof: See Appendix.
35This assumption is only needed in order to keep the implicit form of the prot functions. It
ensures that under PS expected prots are increasing in ; :i.e. @E
t=0
PS
@  0:
An increase in  has two e¤ects on expected prots of liquidation under PS: First of all, it has an
direct e¤ect by enhancing the liquidation repayments. This in turn reduces the originators monitoring
incentives. If the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect, an increase in  has a positive total impact
on expected prots. In the appendix I show for several explicit cost functions that the direct e¤ect
unambiguously dominates the indirect e¤ect and @E
t=0
PS
@  0: This suggests that the above assumption
is not binding.
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Note that external investors anticipate the monitoring and liquidation decision of
the originator and adjust their willingness to pay accordingly. Therefore, it is even-
tually the originator who bears the agency costs induced by ine¢ cient monitoring or
liquidation choices.
First, consider the originators resale decision in the absence of an outside option
for both external investors, i.e. for rH = rL = 0. Investigating this case facilitates
the understanding of the above Proposition. With rH = rL = 0; both types of ex-
ternal investors realize expected prots of zero. Therefore, the originators ex-ante
prots correspond to the total ex-ante value of the debt, given by eDPSC  C(qPS) for a
Proportionate Sale and eDFLPC   C(qFLP ) for a First Loss Provision.
If rH = rL = 0; the originator prefers FLP over PS for very high values of ;
i.e.   eFLP : For this range the originator chooses e¢ cient liquidation under both
structures but has a higher monitoring e¤ort under FLP. Even though choosing FLP
causes higher monitoring costs, it allows him to realize higher ex-ante expected prots.
Interestingly, with rH = rL = 0; the originator prefers PS over FLP for all values
of  < eFLP : As for  < FLP=PS monitoring incentives are higher and the liquidation
decision always e¢ cient under PS, it is straightforward that the originator prefers PS
for this range. Surprisingly, he prefers PS also for the range FLP=PS   < eFLP ,
for which monitoring incentives are higher under FLP. In this range the originator
liquidates a non-performing loan under PS but ine¢ ciently continues it under FLP.
Therefore, one would expect the threshold to be determined by the trade-o¤ between
these two e¤ects. However, the loss in expected prots due to the ine¢ cient continu-
ation under FLP outweighs the positive monitoring incentives. The intuition for this
result lies in the following: For this parameter range monitoring and expected prots
under FLP are independent of  because the originator does not liquidate a non-
performing loan. As he liquidates a non-performing loan under PS, an increase in 
a¤ects expected prots under PS in this range: It has a direct e¤ect due to an increase
in the liquidation value and an indirect e¤ect since this increase in the liquidation value
reduces the originators monitoring incentives. Overall, the direct e¤ect dominates the
indirect e¤ect and expected prots under PS increase in : With increasing expected
prots under PS and constant expected prots under FLP, PS dominates FLP for the
whole range  < eFLP :
Now consider the existence of an outside option for the external bank, i.e. rH >
rL = 0: With rL = 0; the pension fund still realizes expected prots of zero and the
originators expected prots correspond to the total ex-ante value of the debt under
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FLP. Under PS, the originator has to share expected prots with the external bank.
The better the banks outside option as compared to the pension funds, i.e. the higher
rH , the larger is the fraction of expected prots that the external investor receives.
This prot-sharing e¤ect reduces the attractiveness of PS compared to FLP.
For   eFLP the originator prefers FLP over PS even in the absence of an outside
option for the external bank. Thus, the optimality of FLP for this range is reinforced
for rH > rL = 0. Consider the parameter range  < eFLP : As long as the outside
option of the external investor is not too good, i.e. rH < r, PS remains the optimal
choice. But as soon as rH  r; the prot share of the external investor under PS is
very large and the originator prefers FLP for at least very low values of  < : As
expected prots under PS increase in  but expected prots under FLP do not, PS is
still attractive for    < eFLP . However, for very high values of rH , i.e. rH  r, the
originator always prefers FLP irrespective of the liquidation value : In this case, the
costs of prot-sharing are prohibitively high:
Let us consider the e¢ ciency of the two resale structures next: The more e¢ cient
resale structure is determined by comparing the ex-ante total expected value of the
debt, i.e. the total expected debt repayments minus the monitoring costs. The resale
structure that generates a higher ex-ante value of the total debt is the more e¢ cient
one.36 Ex-ante expected values of the debt are given by
EV t=0PS =

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD   C(qPS) (1.24)
for the PS structure and by
EV t=0FLP =
( 
qFLP + (1  qFLP )D   C(qFLP ) if   p+ (1  p);
qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D   C(qFLP ) if  < p+ (1  p)
(1.25)
for the FLP structure. Note that these values correspond to the sum of the originators
and the external investors prots.
The e¢ ciency results are summarized in the following Proposition:
36It can be shown that the benchmark case exhibits higher ex-ante values of the debt as compared
to both resale structures (or equal to FLP for   eFLP ) . However, I do not stress this result as
it is implicitly assumed that the investor prefers the resale as it for example allows him to invest
in alternative projects which yield very high expected prots. Hence, expected prots from the
alternative investment opportunity are high enough to cover the ine¢ ciencies resulting from a resale.
This basically implies that overall a resale is e¢ cient and the question is rather which structure to
employ.
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Proposition 1.7 Suppose that C
00
(qPS)
C0 (qPS) >

(1 qPS) for   p+ (1  p) :37
Then, a First Loss Provision (FLP) is more e¢ cient than a Proportionate Sale (PS)
for all   eFLP = p+ (1  p) and less e¢ cient than PS for all  < eFLP :
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 1.7 is identical to the intuition of the above discussed
case with rH = rL = 0. This is due to the fact that with rH = rL = 0; both external in-
vestors realize expected prots of zero and the originators expected prots correspond
to the total expected values of the debt.
Comparing the originators choice with the e¢ cient resale structure reveals a po-
tential ex-ante ine¢ ciency: The originators choice of FLP for high values of , i.e.
  eFLP ; is always e¢ cient. However, the originator has an incentive to ine¢ ciently
choose FLP for lower values of  whenever rH  r: Intuitively, one would expect that
this preference is a marginal e¤ect and hence the incentive to ine¢ ciently choose FLP
is stronger for parameter ranges close to the e¢ cient choice of FLP; thus, for interme-
diate values of : Yet surprisingly, these incentives are strongest for low values of :
The intuition for this lies in the liquidation strategy of the originator for intermediate
ranges of : As for intermediate values of  the originators expected prots under PS
increase in , but under FLP they do not, it becomes less attractive to renounce to
the large total value under PS.
This result has an interesting implication for the nancial sector: Regulatory invest-
ment restrictions for institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies
are meant to protect individuals and enhance social e¢ ciency. However, if these (uni-
lateral) restrictions are too strong (i.e. rH  r), they introduce ine¢ ciencies in another
part of nancial markets, i.e. the market for credit risk transfer. The reason therefore
is that they distort the investment decisions of only some market participants (e.g.
pension funds and insurance companies) but not of others (e.g. banks or hedge funds).
This in turn inuences the prots which the originator can extract from di¤erent in-
vestor groups distorting his resale decision.
37This assumption is the same as in proposition 1.6 and is only needed in order to keep the implicit
form of the prot functions. It ensures that under PS the expected total value of the debt is increasing
in ; i.e. @EV
t=0
PS
@  0: Again, it can be shown that for explicit cost functions this assumption is not
needed (see Appendix).
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1.7 Increased Regulatory Capital Requirements for
Asset-Backed Securities under Basel II
A major change introduced by Basel II is the adjustment of the regulatory capital
requirements for ABS.38 As compared to the capital requirements under Basel I, the
risk-adjusted capital rules under Basel II attach a higher risk weight to the equity
tranche. Therefore, under FLP, the originator has to sell a larger (senior) fraction to
external investors in order to realize the same capital relief as under Basel I. In terms of
my model, the shift from Basel I to Basel II translates into an increase in the fraction
 sold under FLP for a given fraction  sold under PS.
In the following I analyze the equilibrium e¤ects of tightening the regulatory capital
requirements under Basel II, i.e. an increase in .
Proposition 1.8 The originators monitoring and liquidation incentives under a First
Loss Provision are adversely a¤ected by an increase in the fraction  sold to external
investors. The originators incentives under a Proportionate Sale are not a¤ected.
Proof: See Appendix.
Clearly, the originators incentives under PS are not a¤ected as the amendments
do not regard a Proportionate Sale, leaving  unchanged. The adverse e¤ects on the
originators incentives under FLP are due to the following: After the shift to Basel
II, the originator holds a smaller share (1   0) of the debt and only participates in
the liquidation repayments if they are very high.39 Therefore, the threshold valueeFLP increases and, with eNS not being a¤ected, it enlarges the range for which the
originator ine¢ ciently continues the loan under FLP. Thus, an increase in  enlarges
the range for which the originator "gambles for resurrection" under FLP.
The originators monitoring incentives for very high values of ; i.e.   e 0FLP ;
are not altered by a change in the regulatory capital requirements. But, for lower
values of , i.e.  < e 0FLP ; the originators monitoring incentives are adversely a¤ected:
As the originator holds a smaller fraction in the debt now, his monitoring incentives
are weakened; the free-riding in monitoring problem is exacerbated. Furthermore, the
38In this section, Basel II is meant comprehensively, including all amendments of the initial regu-
latory capital requirements under Basel I.
39All parameters with an index
0
indicate the parameter values after the change to Basel II.
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range for which the originator chooses an ine¢ ciently low monitoring level is larger aseFLP increases to e 0FLP .
The following Proposition summarizes the e¤ects of an increase in  to 
0
on the
e¢ ciency of the originators choice of the resale structure:
Proposition 1.9 An increase in  increases the scope for an ex-ante ine¢ cient choice
of a First Loss Provision (FLP) only if rH  r and the resulting fraction 0 is not very
large. Otherwise the scope for an ine¢ cient choice of FLP is reduced.
Proof: See Appendix.
An increase in  has two e¤ects: First, it shifts the threshold value for liquidation
under FLP, eFLP ; to a higher value e 0FLP > eFLP : Second, it reduces the attractiveness
of choosing FLP for  < e 0FLP as his monitoring incentives deteriorate. Generally, this
leads to a more e¢ cient ex-ante choice of the resale structure: For  > e 0FLP ; the
originator (still) chooses e¢ ciently FLP. Furthermore, as the attractiveness of FLP vs.
PS is reduced for lower values of ; the scope for an ine¢ cient choice of FLP is reduced.
However, there is one exception, which arises if prior to the regulatory change FLP
completely dominated PS, i.e. rH  r; and the increase in  is not too large, thus FLP
still dominates PS for  > eFLP : In this case, the only e¤ect of the increase in  to 0
is to shift out the upper limit of the range for which FLP is ine¢ ciently chosen.
This result has an interesting implication for the debate on the relationship between
the subprime crisis and Basel II: Basel II curbs the originators monitoring incentives
and increases its incentives to "gamble for resurrection" with non-performing loans.
However, as the change in regulatory capital requirements under Basel II is relatively
drastic, it is plausible to assume that from an ex-ante perspective it increases e¢ ciency
because it reduces the originators interest in ine¢ ciently choosing FLP over PS. But
if the ine¢ cient choice of FLP is not completely eliminated, it becomes clear why the
originators incentives might deteriorate for these deals.
1.8 Conclusion
As shown by the analysis above, the two di¤erent forms of a debt resale securitiza-
tion and syndication lead to quite di¤erent ex-post ine¢ ciencies. While syndication
always implies an e¢ cient liquidation strategy, it is associated with adverse monitoring
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incentives due to free-riding in monitoring. Under securitization ex-post ine¢ ciencies
can be completely avoided if the liquidation value of the underlying debt is very high.
However, with intermediate or lower liquidation values, securitization exhibits stronger
monitoring ine¢ ciencies as compared to syndication. Additionally, for intermediate
liquidation values, the originator has an incentive to "gamble for resurrection", i.e.
ine¢ ciently continue a non-performing loan. Note that in practice this problem is
exacerbated by the servicing fee the originator receives for his servicing and handling
function.
The comparison with a hypothetic situation in which the senior tranche holder is
given control rights allows reconciling the two di¤ering views on the seniority of the
debtholder: Whenever the liquidation value is expected to be relatively high (low),
monitoring should be undertaken by the junior (senior) debtholder.
From an ex-ante perspective, the only possible ine¢ ciency exists for low to in-
termediate liquidation values. In this case, the originator might have an interest in
ine¢ ciently preferring securitization over syndication since this allows him to appro-
priate a large share of the expected total value of the debt. This is due to the fact that
with securitization he is able to sell the senior tranche to institutional investors like pen-
sion funds and insurance companies who are limited in their investments by regulatory
provisions and are willing to pay a higher price for safer investment opportunities.
The liquidation value of the debt can be a¤ected by di¤erent factors. First, it de-
pends on inherent characteristics of the underlying debt. Secondly, the extent to which
a borrower will be able to reap the liquidation value depends on the prevailing creditor
rights and their enforcement. And nally, as we have seen for the case of the U.S.
housing market, general macroeconomic conditions can inuence the liquidation value
of a loan. In the remainder of this conclusion, I briey discuss empirical implications
of my model with respect to these determinants.
Syndicates are typically formed for the nancing of large stand-alone entities. Of-
ten, these loans are given to project nance vehicles or used to nance takeovers. Given
the characteristics of these loans highly specic assets in the case of project nance
and a high risk of unsuccessful takeover it seems plausible to assume that the asso-
ciated liquidation values are expected to be intermediate or low. The most notorious
securitization market is the subprime mortgage market. In these transactions, mort-
gages made to borrowers with questionable creditworthiness were bundled and resold.
As over the last decades housing prices kept rising, the liquidation value of these loans
was very high irrespective of the borrowerscreditworthiness. Thus, the securitization
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of these loans was e¢ cient. However, with the stagnation and following fall of housing
prices on the U.S. markets, the liquidation value deteriorated. It is plausible to assume
that for a while, originators continued to securitize subprime mortgages even though
it was not e¢ cient to do so any more.
With respect to creditor rights we would expect securitization to prevail in countries
with strong creditor rights and syndication in countries with weak creditor rights.
This seems close to what can be observed in practice: Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)
nd that the extent to which a loan can be syndicated increases as the loan lacks
collateral. According to Lee and Mullineaux (2004), syndicates are smaller when the
loan is secured. In a similar vein, Esty and Megginson (2003) nd that syndicates
in countries with weak creditor rights and poor legal enforcement are larger. Even
though these papers focus on the size and structure of syndicates and do not consider
the market for securitization, they indicate that syndication seems to be associated
with low collateral value and weak creditor rights.
With respect to general macroeconomic or sector specic conditions, Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) show how in economic downturns the liquidation value for a rm is
expected to be adversely a¤ected. This is due to the fact that also the rms peers
might not have su¢ cient funds for buying the assets.
However, more work needs to be done in this area. For example, an interesting
extension of the above analysis might be to introduce a base-line success probability
for the borrower which is independent of monitoring. Depending on whether monitoring
has a substitutive or a complementary relationship with this monitoring-independent
probability of success, we should expect opposite e¤ects on the originators monitoring
incentives.
Chapter 2
Creditor Rights and Debt
Allocation within Multinationals
2.1 Introduction
Multinational companies (MNCs) have a wide range of nancing options when they
set up a foreign subsidiary. They can rely on capital transferred from the parent
company, but they can also raise local credits. How do multinational rms nance
their foreign subsidiaries? To what extent do they rely on local nancing and why?
Empirical evidence suggests that only part of the subsidiaries is nanced internally,
with capital from the parent company. Furthermore, multinationals seem to choose
a di¤erent nancing strategy depending on where their foreign subsidiary is located.
Kang et al. (2004) report that in industrial countries 29 percent of the nancing of
subsidiaries come from parents and 42 come from host residents, while in developing
countries 45 percent of the nancing come from U.S. parents and 34 percent come from
host country residents.
In this paper we focus on one particular aspect of a multinationals nancing de-
cision: the credit nancing. If (at least) part of the nancing has to be done through
credits, the question arises whether these should be raised locally in the foreign sub-
sidiarys host country or via the parent company. The aim of our paper is to determine
the optimal debt allocation within a multinational corporation. For this purpose we
develop a model of multinational borrowing that explicitly considers agency problems
in internal capital markets, the existence of bankruptcy costs and the role of creditor
This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer from the University of Munich.
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rights.
In our model the trade-o¤ between decentralized (local) and centralized (parent)
debt nancing is driven by two main e¤ects, the incentive and the coinsurance e¤ect.
Centralizing the borrowing structure allows the multinational corporation to realize a
so-called coinsurance e¤ect.40 In this case the CEO of a MNC can use the net prots
of all its subsidiaries to repay debt and avoid costly bankruptcy. Only if the sum of
net prots is not su¢ cient to cover all debt repayments, bankruptcy occurs. Thus, one
subsidiary "coinsures" another subsidiary and bankruptcy becomes less likely. This is
the positive e¤ect associated with debt centralization.
However, debt centralization also entails negative incentive e¤ects. These arise
because the coinsurance of the subsidiaries attenuates the disciplining e¤ect of debt.
Consider a multinational with two subsidiaries A and B. If, say, the manager of
subsidiary A borrows locally, he is directly liable to his debtors. This gives him strong
immediate incentives to work hard and avoid the bankruptcy of his subsidiary at
least if he enjoys private benets of control and does not want to lose his job (Aghion
and Bolton (1992)).41
Centralizing the borrowing for subsidiaryA weakens managerAs incentives because
it reduces the direct link between his success and the liquidation of his subsidiary: Even
if he fails, subsidiary A will not be liquidated as long as subsidiary B is successful
because he "is coinsured" by subsidiary B.
Similarly, centralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B, thus "coinsuring" subsidiary
B entails negative incentive e¤ects for the subsidiary manager A as well. Now, internal
capital market considerations come into play: If subsidiary B is coinsured and fails
but manager A is successful, the prots generated by manager A are used to meet
the debt repayments of subsidiary B. As managers are typically interested in having
40This coinsurance capacity has also been recognized by a di¤erent strand of the literature dealing
with the boundary of the rm and the optimality of conglomeration. Lewellen (1971) was among the
rst to focus on this coinsurance aspect in view of the large mergers wave in the US of the 1960s. Even
though this strand of the literature has thoroughly investigated the di¤erences between stand-alone
rms and conglomerates (e.g. Inderst and Müller (2003), Berkovitch et al. (2006), Li and Li (1996)
and Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005)), the authors mainly focus on the e¤ects on investments in
internal capital markets and the valuation of conglomerates. These articles neither consider the debt
allocation within the multi-entity rm nor the possibility of employing mixed borrowing structures
nor the relevance of creditor rights explicitly.
41The disciplining e¤ect of bankruptcy is especially important in countries in which it is di¢ cult
or very costly to write contracts with subsidiary managers about a performance-based dismissal. For
example, this might be the case in countries with very strong employer rights, like Germany and other
Western European countries. Furthermore, managerial entrenchment might reduce the credibility of
contract enforcement.
Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals 44
large empires, taking away these funds reduces a managers benets and hence his
incentives. This is the downside of reallocating funds within internal capital markets
(see for example Brusco and Panunzi (2005)). To summarize, both "being coinsured"
by and "coinsuring" the other subsidiary entail adverse incentive e¤ects. These negative
incentive e¤ects countervail the positive risk-reducing e¤ect of coinsurance.
The trade-o¤between coinsurance and incentive e¤ects di¤ers for various host coun-
tries depending on the strength of creditor rights.42 Stronger creditor rights imply more
control rights for the creditor in case of insolvency. As creditors are interested in liqui-
dating insolvent rms, the liquidation of unsuccessful rms becomes more likely when
creditor rights are stronger.43 When creditor rights are weak, the threat of liquidation
in case of insolvency and hence the disciplining e¤ect of debt is less present than with
strong creditor rights. This a¤ects the overall trade-o¤.
We determine the optimal debt structure depending on rm characteristics and the
specic legal and institutional settings. In the rst part of our analysis we disregard
di¤erences in the legal environment of host and home countries. In the second part
of the paper we introduce these di¤erences and derive how they a¤ect the optimal
borrowing structure.
Our main ndings are as follows: For MNCs operating in countries with very weak
or very strong creditor rights, mixed borrowing structures are optimal. A "mixed bor-
rowing structure" indicates a borrowing structure with centralized borrowing for one
subsidiary and decentralized borrowing for the other subsidiary. The optimality of the
borrowing structure for intermediate ranges of creditor rights depends on manager-
ial incentives: If managerial empire-building tendencies are weak, a fully centralized
borrowing structure is optimal. If empire-building tendencies are strong, a fully decen-
tralized borrowing structure is optimal because it becomes more attractive to provide
42In practice insolvency regimes and bankruptcy procedures are very complex. For example, often,
an insolvent rm does not have to le for bankruptcy but can reach an out-of-court settlement with
its creditors. Even if an insolvent rm is declared bankrupt, it can still be either liquidated or
reorganized. Overall, there are a multitude of possible outcomes for an insolvent rm depending on
the specic institutional environment and bankruptcy legislation. It is beyond the scope of our paper
to include the multitude of insolvency regimes. We only focus on the link between creditor rights and
the probability of liquidation in case of insolvency.
43See also Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). We do not know of any empirical paper directly in-
vestigating the relationship between creditor rights and rm liquidation. However, a recent paper
by Claessens and Klapper (2005) nds a positive relationship between the strength of creditor rights
and bankruptcy. Based on the plausible assumption that more bankruptcy lings are associated with
more liquidation, this paper provides support for our modeling. See also Acharya et al. (2005) for
the positive relationship between creditor orientation and liquidation. This aspect requires further
investigation.
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incentives.
Stronger creditor rights increase the attractiveness of substituting parental borrow-
ing with local debt in the foreign a¢ liates country. Furthermore, we nd that, due to
agency problems, weak creditor rights are associated with higher risk levels and higher
interest rates for foreign a¢ liateslocal borrowing. Higher bankruptcy costs increase
the attractiveness of centralized borrowing.
If the two countries in which the multinational operates di¤er with respect to bank-
ruptcy costs, the CEO prefers to borrow in the country with a more e¢ cient bankruptcy
system. Di¤erences in creditor rights do not have any direct e¤ect on expected prots
under any of the borrowing structures. However, as they a¤ect the disciplining e¤ect
of debt, they inuence managerial incentives and indirectly expected prots. More
specically, weaker creditor rights in the foreign country decrease the attractiveness of
a (partially) decentralized borrowing structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview
of the related literature. Section 2.3 lays out the set-up and basic mechanisms of our
model. In section 2.4 we derive the equilibrium outcome and optimality conditions in a
national setting. Section 2.5 analyzes the comparative statics and introduces di¤erences
in the legal environment between the a¢ liates and the parental country. Section 2.6
highlights the empirical ndings of our model. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The borrowing decision of multinational corporations (MNCs) has attracted increasing
attention over the last years. A major focus is on the comparison between multina-
tional corporations and national rms on an aggregated level. Several authors investi-
gate whether the overall leverage of MNCs is higher or lower as compared to national
corporations (see for example Doukas and Pantzalis (2003), Fatemi (1988), Lee and
Kwok (1988), Mittoo and Zhang (2005) and Burgman (1996)). Another strand of the
multinational nance literature explicitly considers the determinants of foreign a¢ l-
iatesborrowing structures. Even though these papers account for the possibility of
prot shifting within multinationals and the opportunity to substitute external with in-
ternal funds, the primary focus is on tax issues (Hodder and Senbet (1990), Chowdhry
and Nanda (1994), Chowdhry and Coval (1998) and Huizinga et al. (2008)). Empirical
evidence suggests that a major determinant of the multinationals and its subsidiaries
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borrowing structure is the institutional and legal environment of the host country (Er-
runza (1979)). The relevance of political risk as a determinant has been investigated
extensively over the last years.44
The only paper explicitly considering the e¤ect of host country creditor rights on
the leverage of multinational a¢ liates is Desai et al. (2004). The authors nd a
positive relationship between creditor rights and local borrowing of the a¢ liate. Their
second nding of a negative relationship between creditor rights and interest rates is
conrmed by Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004), who also investigate the e¤ects of the host
country environment on the capital structure of MNC a¢ liates. Similarly, Laeven and
Majnoni (2005) nd that judicial e¢ ciency is negatively correlated with interest rate
spreads across countries. Finally, Kang et al. (2004) identify a positive relationship
between the degree of nancial market development which, as other authors show,
is closely related to creditor rights and their enforcement and the extend of local
borrowing for multinational a¢ liates. The ndings of our model are conrmed by
these empirical studies. However, overall there is still very little work done on the
e¤ect of creditor rights on multinational capital structure.
In contrast, there is a large and growing body of mainly empirical literature on law
and nance. Starting with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) this strand of the literature
provides ample evidence of the central role legal institutions and creditor rights play
for capital markets. Both laws and their enforcement matter in credit markets (Safa-
vian and Sharma (2007)). Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) show that in
countries with more e¢ cient legal systems, more rms use long-term external nance
(1998) and rms do use more long-term external debt relative to assets (1999). Simi-
larly, also Giannetti (2003) nds that rms in countries with better creditor protection
have higher leverage. Safavian and Sharma (2007) provide evidence on how (enforced)
creditor rights allow for a better access to bank credit.
The only other theoretical paper which incorporates creditor rights in a multina-
tional nance model is Noe (2000). The author shows how, in a setting with di¤erences
in the creditor rights between the parental country and the host country of the sub-
sidiary, bargaining over the debt in case of bankruptcy determines the optimal debt
allocation within a multinational. Similar to our work, the author recognizes the
44Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004) identify that for US multinational a¢ liates among others low political
risks were associated with high external debt ratios. Hooper (2002) and Desai et al. (2008), on the
other hand, nd signicantly higher (local) debt ratios for a¢ liates in politically riskier countries.
Kesternich and Schnitzer (2007) show, theoretically and empirically, how di¤erent forms of political
risks a¤ect the multinational capital structure.
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trade-o¤ the CEO of a multinational faces between reducing the occurrence of costly
bankruptcy and agency costs associated with weak creditor rights and nds a positive
relationship between local borrowing and the strength of creditor rights in the host
country. However, we can show how creditor rights inuence the optimal borrowing
decision even in the absence of di¤erences between the legal setting of both countries 
as it is the case for nationally operating business groups as well as multinationals oper-
ating in countries with similar legal environments. Furthermore, we take our analysis
one step further, as we do not only focus on the borrowing decision of a single sub-
sidiary but take into account the existence of internal capital markets. As we show
in our analysis, a comprehensive view of the multinational with all its subsidiaries is
essential to understanding the borrowing decision of and debt allocation within a multi-
national corporation. The reason lies in the feedback e¤ects on managerial incentives,
which were identied by the literature on internal capital markets.45
Starting with Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) the literature on internal capi-
tal markets did pioneering work in corporate nance by identifying incentive problems
within large corporations. Rajan et al. (2000) nd evidence for ine¢ cient internal
cross-subsidization between divisions. Brusco and Panunzi (2005), Gautier and Heider
(2002), Inderst and Laux (2005) and Inderst and Müller (2003) all develop models with
managerial incentives of empire-building, in which they highlight adverse incentive ef-
fects associated with the reallocation of internally generated funds. Even though their
focus is typically on the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and incentive aspects of "winner-
picking", the underlying incentive mechanisms are the same as for our modeling of the
incentive e¤ects associated with coinsuring the other subsidiary. Inderst and Müller
(2003) are the only ones who do not only focus on the reallocation of existing internal
funds but include the e¤ects on external funding and account for the coinsurance e¤ect
of conglomeration.
And nally, a separate but related strand of the corporate nance literature consid-
ers the nancing of nationally operating business groups. The focus of this literature
is mainly on corporate governance issues and the explanation of concentrated, often
pyramidal and family controlled ownership structures, while taking into account dif-
ferent legal environments. However, there are a few papers explicitly investigating
the debt structure within business groups. Bianco and Nicodano (2006) acknowledge
the richer debt structure choice of business groups as compared to stand-alone rms
and the relevance of limited liability in determining the optimal debt allocation within
45A good survey of the internal capital markets literature is given by Stein (2003).
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business groups. Finally, Gopalan et al. (2007) nd evidence for cross-subsidization
after weak performance and lower bankruptcy rates for group a¢ liates as compared to
stand-alone rms.
2.3 The Model
Consider a multinational corporation (MNC) that consists of a non-operating parent
company and two legally independent subsidiaries. All units are run by risk-neutral
managers. While one of the subsidiaries (B) is located in the same country as the pa-
rent company, the other subsidiary (A) operates in a foreign country. Each subsidiary
manager has the opportunity to invest into a project.46
Each investment project yields a return of X in case of success and zero otherwise.
Project returns are uncorrelated. The probability of success for the investment project
in the foreign subsidiary A is directly determined by the e¤ort level of the subsidiary
manager. In particular, if the manager chooses the e¤ort level qA, the corresponding
probability of success is qA: As e¤ort is costly, the manager chooses the probability
of success qA 2 [0; 1] that maximizes his utility, given the borrowing structure of the
multinational corporation. We will discuss the underlying managerial incentives in
more detail below. To keep the analysis concise, we focus on the incentives of manager
A in the foreign country and therefore x the probability of success for the investment
project in subsidiary B at an exogenously given level of qB with qB 2 [0; 1].47 By
introducing this asymmetry between the two subsidiaries, we also take into account
in a stylized way the empirical nding that monitoring becomes more di¢ cult with
distance.48
Both projects generate further prots beyond the rst period. These additional
prots are identical for both subsidiaries and denoted by F . F can be interpreted as
the sum of discounted future prots of a subsidiary and it is independent of managerial
e¤ort and the rst period outcome.
46In the following analysis, we only consider investment projects with a positive net present value.
47In doing so we follow Boot and Schmeits (2000) in their main analysis, who in a similar set-up
investigate the e¤ects of coinsurance and incentives on the optimality of conglomeration.
48See Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) and Wright et al. (2002). In a similar vein, Burgman (1996)
nds that MNCs have higher agency costs as compared to national corporations.
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Borrowing Structures and Bankruptcy
Financing an investment project requires a certain amount of external debt D.
Outside investors provide the necessary funds. The market interest rate is normalized
to zero, so the investorsopportunity cost is zero. Investors are risk-neutral and fully
competitive. They will therefore realize expected prots of zero. Interest rates for
the investment projects are determined endogenously. The manager of the parent
company, i.e. the CEO of the multinational rm, decides on the debt allocation within
the MNC. The CEO maximizes total expected prots for the multinational rm. For
each subsidiary he decides whether the borrowing is undertaken centrally by the parent
company or decentrally by the subsidiary. Thus, he can choose among the following
four borrowing structures:
1. A fully decentralized debt structure, with decentralized borrowing in both sub-
sidiaries, denoted by dd.
2. A mixed debt structure, with decentralized borrowing in subsidiary A and cen-
tralized borrowing for subsidiary B, denoted by dc.
3. A mixed debt structure with centralized borrowing for subsidiary A and decen-
tralized borrowing in subsidiary B, denoted by cd.
4. A fully centralized debt structure, with centralized borrowing for both sub-
sidiaries, denoted by cc. In this case, the CEO borrows the total amount of
2D from a single creditor.49
Figure 2.1 gives an overview of these debt structures.50 The rst letter always
indicates the borrowing in the foreign subsidiary A, whereas the second letter refers
to the borrowing for subsidiary B, c stands for centralized borrowing by the parent
company and d for decentralized borrowing by the subsidiary itself.
49Borrowing from a single investor is in the interest of the CEO because it allows him to credibly
convey the information to the creditor that the debt structure is completely centralized. It furthermore
is a reasonable presumption if we consider transaction cost motives.
50The question might arise, why the CEO could not decide to mix centralized and decentralized
borrowing for each subsidiary. In fact, the model does not preclude these kind debt structures but
rather focuses in a stylized way on the e¤ects of a su¢ ciently high level of local borrowing. Thus,
one can think about the necessary amount of external debt, D, as the crucial amount of (additional)
borrowing, which would induce di¢ culties in payment in case of failure.
Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals 50
dddcDecentral.
cdccCentral.
A
Decentral.Central.
B
Figure 2.1: Overview Borrowing Structures
If debt repayments cannot be met, the borrowing unit is insolvent and a bankruptcy
process is initiated.51 Initiating a bankruptcy process entails costs that reduce the fu-
ture value of the corresponding subsidiary to F ,  2 [0; 1]. These bankruptcy costs
are independent of whether the insolvent borrowing unit is continued or liquidated.52
Thus, we refrain from considering further value-destroying ine¢ ciencies in case of liqui-
dation of the rm. These further costs would complicate the analysis without changing
the qualitative results of our model.
In order to capture the e¤ect of creditor rights on the bankruptcy process, we
introduce a parameter p 2 [0; 1]. The parameter p reects the probability of liquidation
for the borrowing unit in case of insolvency. If liquidated, the assets of the subsidiary,
i.e. the future value F , are transferred to the debtor. With the probability of (1  p),
liquidation does not take place. In this case debtors obtain nothing and F remains
within the corresponding subsidiary. Creditor rights a¤ect the probability of liquidation
p insofar as a stronger creditor-orientation typically leads to a relatively high probability
of liquidation p. Conversely, in countries with weak creditor rights and/or a more
debtor-oriented legal environment the liquidation of an insolvent rm is less probable,
resulting in a lower value for p.53
51In the following we use the expressions insolvency and bankruptcy synonymously in referring to
the situation that a debtor is not able to meet its debt repayments. Hence, bankruptcy processis
meant in a comprehensive way including also possible out of court settlements.
52These might include direct bankruptcy costs, like ling and administrative costs but especially
consist of indirect bankruptcy costs like the loss of future business and prots due to high insecurity
and bad reputation associated with the rumors about the corporations insolvency independent of
whether it is actually declared bankrupt. Due to the relevance of missed prots, we prefer to consider
proportional bankruptcy costs (1 )F in our model. However, our results also hold in a setting with
additive bankruptcy costs in the form of  C. For empirical research on the costs of bankruptcy see
also Altman (1984). As also Djankov et al. (2006) nd in a case study, bankruptcy costs are c.p.
higher, thus  lower, the less developed the country is.
53In a simplied way we could think about the di¤erence between a creditor-oriented legal envi-
ronment like in Germany and a typically more debtor-oriented legal system like the US system. For
empirical evidence on this relationship see for example Claessens and Klapper (2005). Even though
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We start by analyzing a set-up that does not allow for di¤erences in the legal set-
ting, in particular for the parameters  and p, between the two countries. This setting
applies to purely nationally operating business groups as well as multinationals oper-
ating in countries with similar legal environments like Germany and Italy. However,
di¤erences in the legal environment introduce further e¤ects on the optimality of the
debt structure. These e¤ects, which are especially present in multinational corpora-
tions operating in very di¤erent countries like Germany and India, will be investigated
in section 2.5.
The Coinsurance Effect
To capture the e¤ect of coinsurance in our model, we make the following assump-
tion:54
Assumption 2.1 The return X, which a single investment project generates if success-
ful, is high enough to cover the debt repayments of both investment projects whenever
needed.
Assumption 2.1 ensures that debt repayments are feasible. Furthermore, it ensures
that in case of (partially) centralized borrowing the parent company is able to meet
both debt repayments and thus avoid a costly bankruptcy process as long as at least
one of the subsidiaries is successful.55 This introduces the possibility of coinsurance:
Centralizing the borrowing structure c.p. reduces the occurrence of costly bankruptcy.
To see this we consider the di¤erent borrowing structures in more detail.
1. Fully decentralized debt structure (dd)
In this case, each subsidiary manager borrows on his own. For each subsidiary the
project can either be successful and debt can be repaid, or it can be unsuccessful
and the insolvency of the subsidiary has to be declared.56 In case of insolvency,
they only investigate the relationship between ling for bankruptcy and creditor rights, their nding
of a positive relationship gives suggestive support for our modeling. See also Acharya et al. (2005) for
the positive relationship between creditor orientation and liquidation.
54For keeping the exposition of our model as simple as possible, the formal delineation of this
assumption is only introduced when needed in the further analysis.
55This is in line with empirical evidence on ine¢ cient cross-subsidization in business groups
(Gopalan et al. (2007)).
56This can only be an equilibrium outcome if the parent company does not have any incentives
to bailout the subsidiary concerned. This is the case if the following condition holds: F   DRijk 
(1   p)F , with i; j 2 fc; dg ; k 2 fA;Bg ; and Rijk as the equilibirum interest rate. This can be
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liquidation occurs with probability p.57
2./3. Mixed debt structures (dc, cd)
Consider dc rst. Under dc subsidiary A (in the foreign country) borrows locally
whereas the parent company borrows on behalf of subsidiary B (in the parental
country). A bankruptcy process will be initiated for subsidiary A if A0s project
fails. However, subsidiary B benets from the coinsurance by subsidiary A:
Even if B0s project fails, the parent company is able to repay the debt, as long as
subsidiary A is successful.58 Only if A0s project fails as well, the parent company
has to declare bankruptcy. The reasoning for cd follows the same lines.
4. Fully centralized debt structure (cc)
If the borrowing is completely centralized, both subsidiaries coinsure each other
and the parent company has to declare bankruptcy only if both fail simultane-
ously. In this case, the whole MNC is liquidated with the probability p.
Thus, for given e¤ort levels, centralizing the borrowing structure reduces the occurence
of bankruptcy.
Managerial Incentives
We now turn to managerial incentives. The manager of subsidiary A derives private
benets of control. These "classical" managerial benets of control are denoted by
M  0 and reect the psychic benets of running the subsidiary, having a prestigious
job, etc. (Aghion and Bolton (1992)). The manager can enjoy M as long as he is
the manager of the subsidiary. This is denitely the case if his investment project is
successful. However, even if his project fails, he may be able to enjoy these benets:
Either because he is helped-out by subsidiary B or because weak creditor rights prevent
the liquidation of subsidiary A.
rearranged to DRijk  F [1  (1  p)] . The condition states that the necessary debt repayments
have to be larger than the increase in the expected future value for the MNC if the local debt is
repayed. In case of debt repayment, the future value within the MNC would be F with certainty. In
case of insolvency, there is a chance that the subsidiary will not be liquidated resulting in the expected
future value of (1  p)F at the end of t = 1. The cost of debt repayment is DRijk .
57If for example both subsidiaries fail, the multinational will either continue with both subsidiaries,
or with only one subsidiary, or in the worst case scenario both subsidiaries are liquidated, which
corresponds to the liquidation of the whole MNC as the parent company is non-operative.
58We implicitly assume that the funds can be frictionless passed on to the parent company if needed.
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Furthermore, the managers private benets increase with the resources under his
control, i.e. the manager enjoys empire-building.59 To capture this e¤ect, we introduce
the benet variable, E  0. The manager enjoys E, whenever he is successful and does
not have to bailout subsidiary B.60
Finally, we assume that e¤ort is costly for the manager. E¤ort costs are captured
by the following quadratic cost function 1
2
q2A.
61
The managers expected utility for the di¤erent borrowing structures are given by
the following functions:
EU(dd) = qA(M + E) + (1  qA)(1  p)M   1
2
(qA)
2; (2.1)
EU(dc) = qAqB(M + E) + [qA(1  qB) + (1  qA)(1  p)]M   1
2
(qA)
2; (2.2)
EU(cd) = qA(M + E) + f(1  qA) [qB + (1  qB)(1  p)]gM   1
2
(qA)
2; (2.3)
EU(cc) = qAqB(M + E) +
fqA(1  qB) + (1  qA) [qB + (1  qB)(1  p)]gM   1
2
(qA)
2: (2.4)
The rst two terms capture the expected managerial benets and the last term the
monitoring costs. Note that the wage of the manager is normalized to his outside
option of zero. This reects the problem that the manager does not react to nancial
incentives due to problems of incomplete contracts.62 We expect cultural and geograph-
ical distance between the parent company and a foreign subsidiary to aggravate the
problem of contractual incompleteness, making it particularly relevant in the present
context of a multinational corporation. Furthermore, we implicitly assume a fully en-
trenched subsidiary manager. This implies that the investment project and thus rst
and second period prots can only be realized by the specic subsidiary manager in
59Note that in the following we use the term "empire-building" slightly di¤erent from other authors.
While with "empire-building" some previous papers referred to the resulting problem of ine¢ cient
overinvestment, we focus on the underlying managerial incentives. Throughout our paper "empire-
building" refers to the interest of the manager in having more assets under management. Even though
we exclude overinvestment in our model, we show that these managerial preferences induce additional
ine¢ ciencies in a conglomerate setting.
60If the borrowing for subsidiary B is undertaken centrally and subsidiary B fails, the prots
generated by the investment project in subsidiary A (in case of success) are used by the parent
company to meet the debt repayments of subsidiary B. In this case, the manager of subsidiary A is
not able to enjoy E, even though he is successful.
61This simple functional form for the e¤ort costs allow us to keep the analysis explicit. However,
we could generalize the cost function without loss of generality as long as it is increasing and convex
in qA:
62See for example Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
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charge at the beginning of period t = 1. Overall, this implies that the CEO has to
use the debt structure in order to provide the manager with incentives. Given that
external contracts are enforceable, decentralized debt and bankruptcy are a credible
commitment device as the CEO is not able to inuence the continuation decision for
an insolvent subsidiary with decentralized borrowing.63
Expected Profits
We now derive expected prots for the MNC under the di¤erent borrowing struc-
tures. As shown in the Appendix, these are given by
E(dd) = (qddA + qB)X   2D +

2  (2  qddA   qB)(1  )

F; (2.5)
E(dc) = (qdcA + qB)X   2D +

2  (2  qB)(1  qdcA )(1  )

F; (2.6)
E(cd) = (qcdA + qB)X   2D +

2  (1  qB)(2  qcdA )(1  )

F; (2.7)
E(cc) = (qccA + qB)X   2D + [2  2(1  qccA )(1  qB)(1  )]F: (2.8)
All four expected prot functions have the same structure:
The rst term reects rst period expected returns from the investment. They
depend on the probabilities of success, and are higher with higher managerial e¤ort
levels and thus probabilities of success for subsidiary A. qddA ; q
dc
A ; q
cd
A and q
cc
A denote the
optimal e¤ort levels under the di¤erent borrowing structures and will be derived in
section 2.4.1.
The second term is the total amount of investment needed, reecting the real eco-
nomic costs of the investment projects, which is D for each subsidiary and independent
of managerial e¤ort.
The last term reects the expected second period prots of the investment projects.
Recall that 2F is the value of second period prots in the absence of bankruptcy
costs. As bankruptcy reduces the second period prots of a subsidiary to F , the
resulting economic loss in case of bankruptcy is (1   )F per subsidiary. For each
borrowing structure this economic loss is multiplied with the corresponding probability
of bankruptcy. For example, under a fully decentralized borrowing structure each
subsidiary will declare bankruptcy with the probability (1 qi) with i = A;B, resulting
63Even if the CEO could avoid insolvency for a decentrally borrowing subsidiary as long as the
other subsidiary is successful, this is now costly. As discussed above, we only consider cases in which
these costs are prohibitively high and the CEO has no incentive to bailout the subsidiary. Note further
that our results are not a¤ected by the possibility of monitoring. With a fully entrenched manager,
introducing monitoring in our model does not change any of the results.
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in the overall expected bankruptcy loss of (2  qddA   qB)(1  )F . Similarly expected
bankruptcy costs can be derived for all four settings.
The di¤erences between the four borrowing structures are driven by the coinsurance
e¤ect and managerial incentives. Apart from these two e¤ects the choice of the bor-
rowing structure does not inuence expected prots. In particular, as investors make
zero expected prots, interest rates are irrelevant for ex-ante expected prots.
The Time Structure
In period t = 0, the CEO of the multinational corporation decides on the debt
structure of the MNC and borrowing is undertaken. In the beginning of period t = 1;
the manager of subsidiaryA in the foreign country decides on his e¤ort level. At the end
of this period, project returns are realized and debt is repaid if possible. If a borrowing
unit is insolvent at this stage, the corresponding subsidiary will be liquidated at the
beginning of t = 2 with the probability of p. At the end of period t = 2, future rm
values are realized and the game ends. The time structure of the model is summarized
in gure 2.2.
CEO
chooses
cc, dc,
cd, or dd
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
D is
raised
Manager A
chooses qA
Profits
realized
Debt
repayment
Insolvency
Liquidation
Contiuation
Realization
of F or aF
Figure 2.2: Time Structure
2.4 Equilibrium Outcome of the Model
2.4.1 Optimal Managerial E¤ort Level
To solve the model, we rst derive the optimal managerial e¤ort level under the dif-
ferent borrowing structures. The optimization problem of the manager of the foreign
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subsidiary A is:
Max
qA
EU ij(qA) (2.9)
s:t: 0  qA  1;
with i; j 2 fc; dg. Again, i refers to subsidiaryA while j relates to subsidiaryB. Solving
this optimization problem for all four debt structures yields the optimal managerial
e¤ort levels and hence probabilities of success for subsidiary A.64 The internal solutions
for the di¤erent borrowing structures are given by
qddA = pM + E; (2.10)
qdcA = pM + qBE; (2.11)
qcdA = (1  qB)pM + E; (2.12)
qccA = (1  qB)pM + qBE: (2.13)
By comparing these probabilities of success, we derive Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 The more centralized the debt structure, the lower is c.p. the proba-
bility of success for subsidiary A. In particular:
1) qddA  qdcA  qcdA  qccA if pME  (1 qB)qB ;
2) qddA  qcdA  qdcA  qccA if pME < (1 qB)qB :
Proof: Straightforward by comparing the optimal e¤ort levels qijA with i; j 2 fc; dg :
The underlying intuition is the following: Managerial incentives and thus e¤ort lev-
els are driven by benets of control (given by the rst term of the optimal e¤ort levels)
and benets of empire-building (given by the second term of the optimal e¤ort levels).
Being coinsured by subsidiary B reduces manager A0s optimal e¤ort level, as manager
A anticipates a potential bailout by B. This e¤ect relates to the disciplining e¤ect
of debt (Grossman and Hart (1982), Hart and Moore (1995)), which is stronger with
local borrowing. Similarly, coinsuring subsidiary B reduces A0s e¤ort: A anticipates
that even if he is successful, he may not be able to keep the additionally generated
funds in his subsidiary but have to bailout subsidiary B. This e¤ect is in the vein
64Di¤erentiating with respect to qA and with @
2EUij
@q2A
< 0 8i; j = c; d yields these internal solutions
for the optimal e¤ort level. Potential corner solutions are analyzed further down in Corollary 2.1.
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of the negative incentive e¤ects associated with the reallocation of funds in internal
capital markets. If we now compare the di¤erent borrowing structures, the results of
Proposition 2.1 become clear:
Under a fully decentralized structure dd neither subsidiary A nor subsidiary B are
coinsured, so none of the adverse incentive e¤ects is present. The manager chooses the
highest e¤ort level qddA . Under a fully centralized structure cc both of the subsidiaries
are coinsured and both adverse incentive e¤ects are present. Thus, the manager chooses
the lowest e¤ort level qccA . Under the mixed borrowing structures dc and cd only one
of the two adverse incentive e¤ects of coinsuring or of being coinsured is present. The
ordering between the two mixed structures is not conclusive. Whether the borrowing
structure dc or cd is associated with a higher e¤ort level depends on the relative strength
of the two incentive e¤ects. The stronger the e¤ective disciplining e¤ect of bankruptcy
pM as compared to the managerial empire-building tendencies E; and the lower the
probability of success for subsidiary B, i.e. qB, the stronger are the incentives under dc
as compared to cd: With higher values for pM; the incentives from decentralizing the
borrowing for subsidiary A are very valuable, while with lower values for E, the loss
in incentives by decentralizing B are less severe. Similarly, a high value of qB reduces
the disadvantage of centralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B while it reinforces the
disadvantage of centralizing the debt for subsidiary A.65
Finally, note that the optimal e¤ort levels depend on the prevailing creditor rights p.
As p reects the threat of liquidation in case of bankruptcy, stronger creditor rights, i.e.
higher values of p, induce higher e¤ort levels. With strong creditor rights, the manager
of subsidiary A knows that whenever a bankruptcy process is initiated the probability
of remaining the manager of subsidiary A is small. This gives him a strong incentive to
exert high e¤ort and avoid bankruptcy. This e¤ect is strongest for borrowing structures
with decentralized debt in subsidiary A.
2.4.2 Optimal Borrowing Structure and Creditor Rights
As we have seen in section 2.3, centralizing the borrowing structure allows the CEO
of the multinational corporation to reallocate internal funds in order to c.p. reduce
the occurrence of bankruptcy and hence expected bankruptcy costs. However, coin-
suring the subsidiaries entails adverse incentive e¤ects. These incentive e¤ects reduce
65The low probability of failure for subsidiary B (1  qB) makes it less probable that subsidiary A
will have to bailout subsidiary B in case of coinsurance of B: However, the manager of subsidiary A
can comfortably rely on being bailed out by subsidiary B, in case of coinsurance of subsidiary A.
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the probability of success in case of debt centralization and thus c.p. lower expected
returns and increase expected bankruptcy costs. Based on this trade-o¤, we now de-
rive the optimal borrowing structure for the multinational corporation. The focus of
our analysis is on creditor rights. For the following analysis, we only allow for para-
meter ranges resulting in positive net interest rates, thus RijA  1 and RijB  1 with
i; j = c; d.66
Case 1: Equilibrium Without Empire-Building Tendencies
First, we consider the situation without empire-building tendencies, i.e. E = 0. In
this case the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 2.2 Without empire-building tendencies, i.e. E = 0, the borrowing
structures dd and cd are never optimal. The CEO of the multinational prefers a fully
centralized borrowing structure when creditor rights are weak and the mixed borrowing
structure dc when creditor rights are strong. The optimal borrowing structure is
1) cc for p < p1;
2) dc for p  p1;
with p1 =
(1 )F
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]M :
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition of the result is as follows: First of all, note that without empire-
building tendencies, i.e. E = 0, coinsuring subsidiary B entails no adverse incentive
e¤ects on the foreign subsidiary manager A. Thus, centralizing the borrowing for sub-
sidiary B reduces expected bankruptcy costs and is the dominant borrowing strategy
for subsidiary B. The fully decentralized borrowing structure dd is always dominated by
the mixed borrowing structure dc with local borrowing in the foreign subsidiary A and
centralized borrowing in the subsidiary B: Similarly, the mixed borrowing structure cd
is always dominated by the fully centralized borrowing structure cc.
Consider the extreme case in which creditor rights are practically inexistent, i.e.
p = 0. In this situation, local borrowing entails no disciplining e¤ect as even in case
of insolvency the subsidiary will not be liquidated. Thus, decentralizing the borrowing
66This assumption excludes implausible situations in which investors are willing to pay the MNC
for lending money. Investors would only want to pay for lending in the unrealistic situation that their
expected pay-o¤s in case of bankruptcy were higher than debt repayments.
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of subsidiary A would not enhance managerial e¤ort but induce additional expected
bankruptcy costs. So for p = 0; decentralizing the debt of subsidiary A cannot be
optimal. Similarly, for very low levels of creditor rights, the increase in managerial
incentives by decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary A is negligible as opposed to
the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs which, due to the coinsurance e¤ect, can
be achieved by centralizing the borrowing for subsidiary A. Increasing creditor rights
enhance the disciplining e¤ect of local borrowing and thus the incentives of subsidiary
A manager. Thus, the opportunity cost of centralizing the borrowing for subsidiary
A increases with creditor rights and at p1 dominates the coinsurance advantage of
centralizing the borrowing for subsidiary A.
Case 2: Equilibrium with Weak Empire-Building Tendencies
For small tendencies of empire-building the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 2.3 When empire-building tendencies are weak, i.e. 0 < E < E, the
optimal borrowing structure is
1) cd for p < p2;
2) cc for p2  p  p3;
3) dc for p > p3;
with E = (1 qB)(1 )
2F 2
X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F 2
; p2 =
[X+(1 2qB)(1 )F ]E
(1 qB)(1 )FM and
p3 =
(1 )F (1 EqB)
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]M :
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for the result is as follows: Again, when creditor rights are very
weak, decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary A entails negligible incentive e¤ects.
Therefore, the borrowing for subsidiary A should be undertaken centrally in order
to exploit the coinsurance e¤ect without any signicant loss in incentives. However,
decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B entails some incentive e¤ects for the
manager of subsidiary A. Furthermore, with weak empire-building tendencies and
weak creditor rights, the coinsurance of subsidiary B by subsidiary A is not very
valuable. Hence, it is optimal to decentralize the borrowing for subsidiary B in order
to at least exploit the associated incentive e¤ects, as these are relatively valuable with
a low overall incentive level. With intermediate levels of creditor rights, however, the
disciplining e¤ect of bankruptcy is stronger; enhancing the incentives and probabilities
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of success associated both with local and centralized borrowing for subsidiary A. As
now the part of incentives associated with empire-building becomes negligible but the
coinsurance of subsidiary B becomes more attractive, it is optimal to centralize B
as well and fully exploit the coinsurance e¤ect. With very strong creditor rights,
incentives due to the discipling e¤ect of debt are very strong, and hence the probability
of success for subsidiary A is relatively large. This renders the coinsurance of subsidiary
A unnecessary but the coinsurance of subsidiary B even more valuable, resulting in
the optimal borrowing structure dc.
Case 3: Equilibrium with Strong Empire-Building Tendencies
If empire-building tendencies are very strong, the following Proposition holds:67
Proposition 2.4 Consider the case when empire-building tendencies are strong, i.e.
E > E. Then the optimal borrowing structures with very low and very strong creditor
rights are mixed structures, cd and dc respectively. For intermediate levels of creditor
rights a fully decentralized borrowing structure is optimal. Thus,
1) cd for p < p4;
2) dd for p4  p  p5;
3) dc for p > p5;
with E = (1 )
2F 2
X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F 2
; p4 =
(1 )F (1 E)
[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]M and
p5 =
[X+(1 qB)(1 )F ]E
(1 )FM :
Proof: See Appendix.
For weak creditor rights the intuition is similar to the case with small empire-
building tendencies: The CEO wants to exploit the incentive e¤ects associated with
decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B. These are now even more valuable, as
empire-building tendencies are strong. As for weak creditor rights (decentralized) debt
entails no major direct incentive e¤ects, it is again optimal to exploit the coinsurance
e¤ect for subsidiary A and hence choose the borrowing structure cd. For very strong
67With intermediate levels of empire-building tendencies E  E  E, the optimal borrowing
structure will always be a mixed structure. For very low creditor rights the optimal structure is cd,
with very high creditor rights, the optimal structure is dc. Note further that the comprehensive set
of optimal borrowing structures cd ! dd ! dc only exists if the benets of empire building are not
indenitely high. In particular, for having a full set, the benets of empire-building are limited above
by E  E = (1 )FMX+(1 qB)(1 )F in order to ensure p5  1.
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creditor rights the intuition is also identical to the case with weak empire-building
tendencies: As the incentives associated with the disciplining e¤ect of debt are very
high, exploiting this incentive e¤ect by decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary A is
optimal. As with the decentralization of the borrowing for subsidiary A, the probability
of success for subsidiary A increases, the coinsurance of subsidiary B becomes very
valuable as well and is exploited by decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B.
But what changes for the intermediate level of creditor rights now? Again, stronger
creditor rights increase the attractiveness of the coinsurance e¤ect for subsidiary B as
well as the incentive e¤ect of local borrowing for subsidiary A. With strong empire-
building tendencies, however, local borrowing for subsidiary B is very valuable as it
allows fully exploiting the corresponding incentive e¤ects for subsidiary A. This e¤ect
dominates the attractiveness of coinsuring subsidiary B for a larger range of creditor
rights. Thus, with strong empire-building tendencies, it is optimal to decentralize the
borrowing for subsidiary A for lower values of creditor rights before decentralizing the
borrowing for subsidiary B becomes attractive. Overall, a fully decentralized borrowing
structure is optimal for intermediate levels of creditor rights.
Finally, an interesting implication for the optimal borrowing structure results from
a closer look at the corner solutions of the managerial optimization problem (see Ap-
pendix). We summarize the ndings in the following Corollary:
Corollary 2.1 Irrespective of creditor rights, a fully centralized borrowing structure is
optimal both in the absence of and with very strong private benets for the manager of
subsidiary A.
The complete absence of private benets, i.e. M = E = 0, means that the manager
does not derive any private benets - neither from being the manager of the subsidiary
nor from having additional funds under control. Thus, neither decentralizing the bor-
rowing for subsidiary A nor decentralizing the borrowing for subsidiary B entails any
incentive e¤ects. The project in subsidiary A fails for sure in t = 1.68 Hence, the CEO
of the multinational corporation centralizes the borrowing structure in order to opti-
mally exploit the coinsurance e¤ect.69 Similarly, in case of very strong private benets
68Remember that the future prot F is generated irrespectively of the probability of success in
t=1. Therefore, the NPV of the investment project can still be positive.
69Note that more precisely the CEO of the multinational corporation is indi¤erent between the
borrowing structures cc and cd. This is due to the fact that in our basic model set-up the probability
of success for subsidiary A is equal to zero if the manager exerts no e¤ort. In a richer model set-up
allowing for a base-line probability of success, which can be realized independent of managerial e¤ort,
choosing the borrowing structure cc would be unambiguously optimal.
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of control, the manager of subsidiary A always exerts maximum e¤orts resulting in a
probability of success of one under all borrowing structures. In this case, the managers
incentives are already strong enough with a fully centralized borrowing structure. Thus
the CEO can perfectly well centralize the borrowing structure in order to optimally ex-
ploit the coinsurance e¤ect without renouncing to managerial incentives. Surprisingly,
even though we consider two completely di¤erent incentive situations, the optimal bor-
rowing structure is the same and in both cases independent of the prevailing creditor
rights.
Creditor Rights and Interest Rates
One interesting aspect we have not explicitly considered yet is the e¤ect of creditor
rights on equilibrium interest rates. Doing so allows us to derive empirically testable
predictions, which can be used to verify the compliance of our model with real world
data.
Proposition 2.5 Foreign a¢ liates face lower interest rates for local borrowing if cred-
itor rights are strong. That is @R
dc
A
@p
 0 and @RddA
@p
 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this Proposition is as follows: Stronger creditor rights reduce the
agency problem between the CEO and the manager of subsidiary A. This implies a
higher e¤ort level for the manager of subsidiary A and hence higher probabilities of
success for the investment project, which are reected in the reduced interest rates.
Desai et al. (2004) and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004) nd empirical evidence conrming
this relationship.
2.5 Comparative Statics
In this section we investigate how rm and country characteristics inuence the optimal
borrowing structure. We consider the impact of protability, of private benets and of
di¤erences in the legal environment between the two countries in turn.
Short-term vs. Long-term Profitability
How does the pay-o¤ structure of the investment projects a¤ect the degree of cen-
tralization of the borrowing structure? Do multinational corporations in industries
Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals 63
with relatively high immediate pay-o¤s to investment, i.e. high values of X, e.g. in the
music industry, prefer a more decentralized borrowing structure? Or should we rather
expect multinationals with investment opportunities exhibiting very long pay-o¤ pe-
riods, like infrastructure projects, which have a high continuation value F , to prefer
a more centralized borrowing structure? We provide the answer in the following two
Propositions:
Proposition 2.6 A higher rst period prot in case of success X increases the parame-
ter range for which a more decentralized borrowing structure is preferred. In particular,
@p1
@X
 0, @
@X
(p3   p2)  0 ^ @@X (p5   p4)  0 and @E@X  0, @E@X  0:
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2.7 A higher future value of the rm F increases the parameter range
for which a more centralized borrowing structure is preferred. In particular, @p1
@F
 0,
@
@F
(p3   p2)  0 ^ @@F (p5   p4)  0 and @E@F  0, @E@F  0:
Proof: See Appendix.
Consider Proposition 2.6 rst: A higher rst period prot X makes the success
of a subsidiary more valuable. Thus, it is more attractive to provide the manager of
subsidiary A with stronger incentives by decentralizing the borrowing structure. This
is reected both in the reduced optimality range for cc in the cases 1 and 2 (without
and with weak empire-building tendencies), and in the increased optimality range for
dd in case 3 (with strong empire-building tendencies). Additionally, as compared to
case 2, case 3 becomes relatively more likely.
In contrast, consider Proposition 2.7: An increase in the future value of the invest-
ment project F increases the attractiveness of realizing the coinsurance e¤ect as there
is more at stake if a borrowing unit goes bankrupt. Centralizing the borrowing struc-
ture has a negative impact on the probability of success for subsidiary A: However, we
can show that this adverse e¤ect is outweighed by the positive e¤ect of coinsurance by
centralizing the borrowing structure. Hence, in cases 1 and 2 the optimality range for
cc increases, in case 3 the optimality range for dd decreases. Furthermore, as compared
to case 3, case 2 becomes relatively more likely.
To summarize, we can say that while rst period prots increase the relevance of
the incentive e¤ect, future prots or rather the threat of losing them increase the
relevance of the coinsurance e¤ect.
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The Private Benefits of Control
Intuitively we would expect that the private benets of control E and M have
very clear cut and similar e¤ects on the borrowing structure. Both types of private
benets should increase the attractiveness of a decentralized borrowing structure as
incentives become more important: An increase in M implies stronger direct private
benets of being the manager. Therefore, we would expect an increase in the attrac-
tiveness of decentralized borrowing for subsidiary A in order to exploit these incentives.
An increase in E implies stronger indirect benets of empire-building. Thus, we would
expect an increase in the attractiveness of decentralized borrowing for subsidiary B in
order to exploit these incentives. Furthermore, we would not expect that an increase in
M inuences the borrowing structure for subsidiary B. Similarly, we would not expect
that an increase in E inuences the borrowing structure for subsidiary A. But this is
not what we nd.
Proposition 2.8 Stronger empire-building tendencies E increase (decrease) the pa-
rameter range for which a decentralized (centralized) borrowing structure is optimal.
However, higher benets of controlM increase the parameter range for which the mixed
debt structure dc is preferred as compared to all other borrowing structures. That is for
E: @p2
@E
 0; @p3
@E
 0 and @p4
@E
 0 @p5
@E
 0 and for M: @p3
@M
< @p2
@M
 0 and @p5
@M
< @p4
@M
 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
The direct incentive e¤ects are as expected. If the benets of being a manager
M increase, decentralizing subsidiary A becomes more attractive as an increase in M
implies a higher incentive e¤ect associated with the decentralization of the foreign man-
agers own subsidiary A: A similar rationale holds with respect to the private benets
associated with empire-building E. In this case, decentralizing subsidiary B becomes
more attractive when the associated benets E are high. Coinsuring subsidiary B
would weaken the incentives of the subsidiary manager A too much. However, there
is a further indirect e¤ect associated with an increase in the private benets: Higher
private benets, i.e. higher values of E and M , both c.p. increase the probability of
success qA for subsidiary A. This in turn inuences the attractiveness of the coinsur-
ance e¤ect. As qA increases, coinsuring subsidiary B in the parental country becomes
more attractive whereas the coinsurance of subsidiary A becomes less attractive. This
indirect e¤ect leads to the asymmetric results laid down in Proposition 2.8.
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National Differences in the Legal Environment
So far, we focused on multinational corporations and/or business groups operating
in countries with similar legal environments. Naturally, many multinationals have
subsidiaries in countries with very di¤erent legal environments. In this nal part of
the section, we therefore introduce di¤erences in the legal environment and investigate
how these a¤ect the optimal borrowing structure of multinational corporations. In
our model, the legal environment is reected by two parameters: First of all, creditor
rights, captured by the parameter p, are core to the legal environment of a country (see
introduction). Secondly, the legal environment comprehends also the design and the
e¢ ciency of the bankruptcy process. Thus, the associated dissipative costs (1 ) will
be shaped by the prevailing legal environment.
In the following, we discuss the impact of both aspects on the optimal borrowing
structure of a multinational corporation.
Consider the bankruptcy process rst. Without di¤erences in the bankruptcy
process, i.e. identical values of  for the two countries, bankruptcy costs reected
by (1 ), inuence the optimal borrowing structure in exactly the same way as future
prots F . Both higher values for F or lower values of  increase expected losses from
bankruptcy and therefore increase the attractiveness of avoiding bankruptcy and hence
of a more centralized borrowing structure. The more interesting question however is,
how di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of the bankruptcy process between the parental and
the foreign country a¤ect the optimal borrowing structure. To answer this question
we introduce country specic parameters P and A for the (in-)e¢ ciencies of the
bankruptcy process in the parental and foreign country and investigate the e¤ects on
expected prots. Our results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2.9 If multinationals operate in countries with di¤erent bankruptcy sys-
tems, the CEO prefers to borrow in the country with a more e¢ cient bankruptcy system.
With @E(cc)
@A
jA=P== @E(cd)@A jA=P== 0 
@E(dd)
@A
jA=P= @E(dc)@A jA=P=,
a decrease in the bankruptcy costs (1  A) increases the attractiveness of decentraliz-
ing the borrowing for subsidiary A in the foreign country. This increase is especially
pronounced for the mixed borrowing structure dc.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward: A lower bankruptcy ine¢ ciency in the foreign
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country A, i.e. a higher value for A, is associated with a lower downside risk of de-
centralized borrowing in A. The loss in the future rm value in case of bankruptcy is
lower, and so the CEO prefers to decentralize the borrowing for subsidiary A in order
to better exploit the incentive e¤ect. Since under dc subsidiary B is coinsured by sub-
sidiary A, there are positive spillover e¤ects of the better legal environment in country
A. The intuition therefore is as follows: As coinsuring subsidiary B entails adverse
incentive e¤ects for the subsidiary A manager and hence lower probability of success
for subsidiary A, the gains of a reduced cost of bankruptcy are larger. Note however,
that the results are only driven by the reduced attractiveness of the coinsurance e¤ect
of centralized borrowing for subsidiary A. The (in-)e¢ ciency of the bankruptcy sys-
tem does not a¤ect managerial incentives but only the loss in future value in case of
bankruptcy.
Let us now turn to creditor rights. A priori, we would expect creditor rights to have
a strong direct e¤ect on expected prots. Surprisingly, though, this is not the case.
Proposition 2.10 Di¤erences in the creditor rights do not directly a¤ect expected
prots under any borrowing structure. However, due to the incentive e¤ect, the at-
tractiveness of borrowing structures with decentralized borrowing for subsidiary A in-
creases with higher creditor rights in country A as compared to the parental country,
i.e. @E(cd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= @E(cc)@pA jpA=pP=p= 0 
@E(dd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p @E(dc)@pA jpA=pP=p :
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition is as follows: Di¤erences in the borrowing structure directly inuence
expected bankruptcy costs of the multinational corporation. However, they also a¤ect
the interest rates external investors require. From an ex-ante perspective, as investors
are fully competitive, these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other out. The only remain-
ing impact of creditor rights is on the incentives of the subsidiary manager A. These
of course only depend on the creditor rights prevailing in the country of origin of the
debt. The overall e¤ect under dc is stronger than under dd. This is due to the fact
that the same increase in incentives has a stronger e¤ect on expected bankruptcy costs
if subsidiary B is coinsured.
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2.6 Empirical Hypothesis
In this nal section, we highlight the empirical implications of our model. We rst
set forth two general empirical hypotheses and then further hypotheses relating to the
di¤erent aspects of the legal environment.
General Implications
Hypothesis 2.1 The more decentralized the MNCs borrowing structure, the higher is
a subsidiarys success rate.
This hypothesis is based upon Proposition 2.1: Recall that both centralizing the
debt for the subsidiary concerned as well as the other subsidiary entail adverse incentive
e¤ects. Hence, we expect lower probabilities of success for subsidiaries of multinationals
with a higher degree of debt centralization.
From Propositions 2.6 and 2.7 we know that immediate prots and future prots
have completely opposing e¤ects. Therefore, we derive the following hypothesis with
respect to the timing of investment pay-o¤s:
Hypothesis 2.2 MNCs operating in industries with long life cycles (e.g. infrastruc-
ture and energy) prefer a centralized borrowing structure, whereas MNCs in industries
with short life cycles (e.g. music industry and IT) prefer a decentralized borrowing
structure.
Creditor Rights
As we have shown in our analysis, creditor rights are key in determining the optimal
borrowing structure of a MNC.70
The rst hypothesis we derive relates the strength of creditor rights to the per-
formance of the MNCs foreign a¢ liates. As stronger creditor rights in the a¢ liates
country lead to stronger managerial incentives, the following hypothesis can be estab-
lished:
70Note, however, that with creditor rights we refer to e¤ective creditor rights. As also Safavian and
Sharma (2007) verify empirically, it is not only the creditor-friendliness of the laws that determines
the e¤ective strength of creditor rights in a country but also the enforcement of the laws. This is part
of our model, as only an e¤ective creditor-orientation constitutes a credible threat of liquidation.
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Hypothesis 2.3 MNC a¢ liates in countries with weaker creditor rights are riskier
and less successful.
The existing empirical literature provides indirect evidence for this hypothesis:
Claessens et al. (2000) nd that rms operating in common law countries which
are typically associated with more e¢ cient legal enforcement and stronger investor
protection appear less risky. Levine (1999) nds that nancial institutions are better
developed with better legal protection and that the portion of the development of -
nancial institutions related to better legal protection is associated with more economic
growth. Our hypothesis also supports a positive relationship between the legal protec-
tion of creditors and growth as with weak creditor rights rms will be less successful.
We can derive a closely related second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.4 Weaker creditor rights lead to less investment by MNCsforeign af-
liates and more bad loans.
This hypothesis reects that with a lower probability of success the investment
project is more likely to fail and hence debt repayments cannot be met. In the extreme
case an investment project might not even be NPV-positive and hence the investment
project will not be undertaken.
Finally, when considering the overall borrowing structure of the MNC, we derive
the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.5 Subsidiaries of MNCs in countries with weaker creditor rights will
face higher interest rates and substitute costly external borrowing with internal funds.
Hypothesis 2.6 MNCs adjust their debt allocation in order to optimally exploit dif-
ferences in creditor rights. In particular, MNCs shift their borrowing to the country
with better creditor protection.
These hypotheses reect the ndings of Desai et al. (2004). The authors nd evi-
dence that foreign a¢ liatesborrowing costs for external nance are higher in countries
with weak creditor rights. They furthermore show that foreign a¢ liates in countries
with weak creditor rights use internal capital markets in order to substitute for external
debt. As the authors reckon, weak creditor rights might give rise to an agency problem
as they reduce the creditors incentive to avoid bankruptcy. Internal capital markets
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can thus be used "to fund subsidiaries in jurisdictions providing weak creditor rights,
drawing on capital from operations located in countries o¤ering strong creditor rights"
(Desai et al. (2004), p. 2456). These are exactly the forces at work in our model. Also
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004) empirically conrm our ndings with respect to interest
rates. Furthermore, taking into account that nancial institutions are better developed
with better legal protection (Levine (1999)), it is also in line with the ndings of Kang
et al. (2004) of a positive relationship between the extent of foreign a¢ liates local
borrowing and nancial market development.
Dissipative Bankruptcy Costs
Consider the dissipative costs associated with the bankruptcy system next. In our
model, bankruptcy costs are captured by the parameter (1 ). As higher bankruptcy
costs increase expected losses from bankruptcy, we derive the following empirical hy-
pothesis:
Hypothesis 2.7 High bankruptcy costs lead to a more centralized borrowing structure.
Even though in our analysis bankruptcy costs are modeled in a rather stylized way 
as they simply consist of the costs associated with nancial distress, and not of actual
liquidation  the above relationship should even be reinforced if we included actual
costs of liquidation.
Taking into account di¤erences in the legal environment between the parent com-
pany and its foreign a¢ liates allows us to derive the second empirical hypothesis with
respect to bankruptcy costs.
Hypothesis 2.8 MNCs adjust their debt allocation in order to optimally exploit dif-
ferences in bankruptcy systems. In particular, they borrow more in countries with more
e¢ cient bankruptcy procedures.
Private Benefits and the Legal Environment
Finally, a more indirect relationship that can be established between the legal en-
vironment and the borrowing structure is related to the private benets of control. As
for example Dyck and Zingales (2004) empirically verify: strong "legal institutions are
strongly associated with lower levels of private benets" (Dyck and Zingales (2004),
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p. 582).71 This holds in particular for regulations regarding the transparency of rms.
Thus, we expect the general level of private benets of control to be relatively lower
in countries with a more e¤ective and transparent legal environment. Combining this
relationship with our insights with respect to managerial private benets, M and E,
we can derive the following nal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.9 MNCs with foreign a¢ liates in countries with relatively low trans-
parency requirements decentralize their a¢ liatesborrowing.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a framework for understanding the debt allocation process
within multinational corporations. In our analysis we showed that the debt structure
within multinationals matters beyond tax issues a fact that had almost been com-
pletely neglected in the literature so far. In particular, we highlighted that the legal
environment is key in determining the degree of debt centralization within a MNC.
However, as our analysis suggests, di¤erent aspects of the legal environment have dif-
fering e¤ects on the borrowing structure.
Although very stylized, our model and results do reect the existing empirical nd-
ings related to multinational nance and creditor rights. While we provide a rationale
for mixed borrowing structures, we demonstrate how the trade-o¤ between incentive
problems in internal capital markets and coinsurance determines the optimal borrow-
ing structure. Our analysis highlights the relevance of creditor rights for a multi-entity
rms capital structure in general and for multinational corporations in particular.
Di¤erences in the legal environment induce a bias of the debt allocation towards the
country with a better legal environment, i.e. stronger creditor rights and lower bank-
ruptcy costs. A major contribution of our paper is to highlight the importance of a
comprehensive view on multinationalsborrowing decision due to feedback e¤ects on
internal capital markets  an aspect that current research on MNC nance did not
focus on yet.
A more comprehensive model would endogenize the incentive problems of the home
subsidiary as well. The basic trade-o¤ of our model would not be a¤ected but there
71Even though the focus of their analysis is on private benets controlling shareholders enjoy, the
general ndings should at least be partially applicable to the private benets a non-owner subsidiary
manager enjoys.
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may be room for reinforcing incentive e¤ects between the subsidiaries. This must be
left to future research. Further questions to be addressed in future research relate to
the e¤ect of creditor rights on several aspects of multinational nance. An extension
of our work could incorporate the choice between equity and debt into a model of
multinational nance. A particularly interesting question is how the legal environment
a¤ects the multinationals choice between internal debt, i.e. parental borrowing for
the subsidiaries, and internal equity. Another interesting aspect which needs further
empirical investigation is a di¤erentiated analysis of the e¤ect of creditor rights on the
di¤erent aspects of the insolvency regime, for example also the actual liquidation of
insolvent rms.
Chapter 3
Home Market E¤ects of
Cross-Listing
3.1 Introduction
Several emerging economies have dismantled capital controls and liberalized their -
nancial markets over the last decades. This nancial market liberalization was followed
by a strong increase in the number of cross-listings on international stock exchanges,
especially in the United States. While in 1988 only one single company from an emerg-
ing market issued American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on an U.S. stock exchange,
this number increased to 106 by 1995 and again doubled, reaching 214 cross-listed
companies, by the beginning of 2008.72 Interestingly, only about 60 percent of these
companies used this issue to raise new capital, whereas the other 40 percent of the rms
decided to cross-list but did not raise additional funds on the U.S. stock exchanges.
This observation seems surprising if rms are expected to cross-list in order to
broaden their investor basis and generate new capital inows. However, the observation
supports the claim that rms use cross-listing as an informational device. Firms from
72Source: Moel (1999) and Bank of New York Depository Receipts, http://www.adrbny.com/, data
downloaded on August 7, 2008. Besides obtaining a direct listing on an US stock exchange, foreign
rms can and typically prefer to participate in a so called American Depository Receipt (ADR)
Program. Depository Receipts are certicates issued by a US Depository Bank and represent a non-
US companys traded equity or debt. The companys original shares are held in custody by the issuing
bank in the companys home country. There are four types of ADR issues. Thereof, only Level II and
III ADRs allow rms to be listed on an US stock exchange, and only a Level III issue allows rms to
raise new capital. Accordingly, level II and level III issues have very high informational requirements,
with rms having to register with the US Securities and Exchange Commission and comply with US
GAAP disclosure requirements. For a detailed overview see Moel (1999).
Home Market Effects of Cross-Listing 73
informationally opaque countries with relatively weak corporate governance standards
can borrow on the strict regulatory disclosure requirements of countries with better
informational standards.
It is expected and empirically veried that cross-listing rms benet from using this
informational device. However, it is not clear up-front how this will a¤ect the cross-
listing rms home market competitors and local welfare in the emerging country. The
analysis of these home-market e¤ects and in particular of the resulting welfare e¤ects
is the goal of my paper. In a model of adverse selection  taking into account the
informational value of cross-listing as a signaling device  I rst derive equilibria in
closed and open economies and then investigate welfare e¤ects of nancial market
liberalization. The model is designed in a way that excludes any e¤ects of capital
inows and the changes of availability of funds. This allows me to focus on equilibrium
and welfare e¤ects which arise due to informational issues.
There are two major ine¢ ciencies identied by the existing literature which might
arise in emerging market nance due to problems of adverse selection. On the one hand,
a problem of underinvestment can arise. Good rms might be credit-rationed, despite
the existence of su¢ cient funds, simply because banks cannot distinguish between good
and bad rms and want to avoid adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). On the
other hand, the adverse selection problem can lead to a problem of overinvestment,
such that socially undesirable projects are nanced (de Meza and Webb (1987)). The
model I develop captures both of these ine¢ ciencies in a stylized way and allows me
to analyze welfare e¤ects of nancial market liberalization in a unied framework.
As derived in my analysis, the equilibrium in a closed economy exhibits either
an overinvestment problem (de Meza and Webb-type economy), in which bad rms
with NPV-negative investment projects are cross-subsidized by good rms with NPV-
positive projects, or it exhibits an underinvestment problem, with bad rms driving
good rms out of the market as well (Stiglitz and Weiss-type economy). The situation
with underinvestment arises whenever the average project protability on the local
pool is very low. This can either be due to the fact that the market share of good
rms is relatively small or due to the fact that the protability of good investment
projects is relatively low. The situation with overinvestment arises if the average project
protability on the home market pool is su¢ ciently high.
Liberalizing nancial markets allows rms to cross-list. The decision of a rm to
cross-list on an international stock exchange with very strong disclosure requirements
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conveys information about the investment opportunities of the rm.73 Only good rms
have an interest in using this signaling device because being identied as a good rm
allows them to obtain nancing at a much lower interest rate than the prevailing average
market interest rate.
However, cross-listing is costly. Apart from the direct costs of an issue, the costs
of cross-listing also consist in the costs of complying with new accounting standards
and typically providing more detailed and accurate nancial information than required
under local legislation. These costs depend on the legal environment of the home
country as well as rm-specic characteristics, like its corporate governance practice
and size. Doidge et al. (2008a) show how the incentives to cross-list are determined
by the possibility of consuming private benets and thus the corporate governance
level of a particular company. They nd that rms with bad corporate governance,
which implies high benets of control, are less likely to cross-list. This suggests that
the (opportunity) cost of cross-listing is too high for these rms. Typically, protable
rms di¤er with respect to their corporate governance level and their size and as a
consequence their costs of cross-listing. Therefore, only good rms with relatively low
costs of cross-listing consider using this signaling device.
For both types of economies economies characterized by an underinvestment or
by an overinvestment problem liberalizing nancial markets entails negative cost of
capital spillovers in form of higher interest rates on the local market and valuation
spillovers for non-cross-listing rms. Despite these negative spillovers, welfare e¤ects
are not clear up-front. This is primarily due to the fact that negative spillovers on
protable domestic rms are indeed welfare reducing, whereas negative spillovers on
unprotable rms can be welfare increasing.
If the closed economy is characterized by an underinvestment problem (de Meza
and Webb-type economy), nancial market liberalization unambiguously enhances lo-
cal welfare. In this case, nancial market liberalization allows some of the good rms
to cross-list and therefore obtain nancing and invest. Therefore, the underinvestment
problem is mitigated. If the closed economy is characterized by an overinvestment prob-
lem (Stiglitz and Weiss-type economy), welfare e¤ects of nancial market liberalization
73One could also think about other signaling devices like engaging an auditor or certied accountant.
The problem with employing these devices is, however, that they are subject to the same weak legal
environment like the company. Thus, if the informational problem arises especially because of the
weaknesses of this system, most probably similar issues will arise as to the reliability of the certicate
provided by an auditor. In fact, for example, Rahman (1998) shows how auditors failed to act as
e¤ective external monitors in the East Asian crisis.
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are ambiguous. In this case, it depends on whether the average project protability
in the home market pool is of intermediate level or high. If the average protability
is high, nancial market liberalization reduces local welfare. However, if the average
protability is intermediate, nancial market liberalization increases the local welfare.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that for high project protability liberalizing -
nancial markets primarily causes cross-listing costs, whereas for intermediate values it
mitigates the overinvestment problem.
Overall, my analysis reveals that, despite negative cost-of-capital spillovers, nan-
cial market liberalization can only entail negative welfare e¤ects for the emerging econ-
omy if it is characterized by overinvestment ine¢ ciencies prior to liberalization.
The related literature on cross-listing is mainly empirical. Yet, there are a few
theoretical models explaining how cross-listing allows managers to signal their com-
mitment to comply with high disclosure and corporate governance standards (e.g.,
Fuerst (1998), Moel (1999) and Cantale (1996)). Co¤ee (1999, 2002) was among the
rst to rationalize the so-called bonding hypothesis, according to which cross-listing
might be attractive due to informational issues since it gives rms the possibility to
credibly bond themselves to stricter regulatory and disclosure practices. Based on
this bonding hypothesis, several empirical studies investigate cost-of-capital and valu-
ation e¤ects of cross-listing. Stulz (1999) provides evidence on the positive impact of
increased globalization on the costs of capital due to the improvement of agency prob-
lems. Also a study by Miller (1999) conrms the hypothesis on the informational value
of cross-listing. He nds positive share price reactions for the announcement dates of
the initiation of ADR-programs. Interestingly, these reactions are signicantly higher
for rms from emerging countries with typically more severe informational problems
than developed countries, and for exchange-listings, which typically have much higher
disclosure requirements, and thus entail higher informational value. Also, more recent
studies a¢ rm the informational hypothesis. Hail and Leuz (2008) nd positive cost-
of-capital e¤ects for cross-listing rms, which are also present after the passage of the
Sarbanes and Oxley Act in 2002.74 Consistent with the informational view, they nd
weaker cost-of-capital e¤ects for rms that cross-list in the over-the-counter market
and for exchange-listed rms from countries with stronger home-country institutions.
Similarly, Claessens and Schmuckler (2007) nd evidence that rms are more likely to
74The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed after the accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom in
order to further strengthen the regulatory and disclosure requirements for US stock exchanges. There
is a relatively large literature investigating the e¤ects of this law, in particular as it increased the
compliance costs for cross-listing rms. For a survey see for example Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008).
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cross-list with worse institutional environments in their home country. And Doidge et
al. (2004, 2008b) nd a signicant positive e¤ect of cross-listing on the valuation of
cross-listing companies if these rms cross-list in the U.S.. The higher valuation is in-
deed more pronounced for exchange-listed rms, and rms from countries with weaker
investor protection, which conrms the informational hypothesis.
These empirical ndings support the results of my model: As cross-listing rms
are identied as good rms, they obtain nancing at a lower interest rate and hence
have lower costs of capital and a higher valuation. Furthermore, if the closed economy
was characterized by an underinvestment problem, these rms can realize positive
investment projects which they were not able to nance before. This enhances their
rm value.
While the reasons for cross-listing and the resulting e¤ects on the cross-listing rm
in particular on its valuation and cost-of-capital have been widely investigated, only
a few papers consider spillover e¤ects on domestic rms. Melvin and Valero-Tonone
(2008) nd empirical evidence for a negative stock price impact of a rms cross-listing
decision on its home market rivals. They interpret their result as evidence for in-
vestorsvaluation of the rmsfuture protability. If investors observe cross-listing,
they perceive it as a positive signal about the rmsgrowth prospects. Not listing on
another stock exchange is therefore associated with relatively poor growth prospects.
Lee (2003) shows as well that the announcement of cross-listing in the U.S. is associ-
ated with negative abnormal returns for the local competitors and that these e¤ects are
higher for rms with higher agency costs. Karolyi (2004) also nds evidence for neg-
ative spillover e¤ects on the home market rivals of a cross-listing rm. He shows that
contrary to the evidence for the cross-listing rms themselves, the capitalization and
turnover ratios of local non-cross-listing rms decline with the increase in cross-listings
in twelve emerging markets. Levine and Schmuckler (2006) nd negative spillovers on
domestic rmsliquidity through the internationalization of other rms. Overall, there
is signicant evidence that cross-listing has adverse spillover e¤ects for domestic rms
on the local market. These empirical ndings are consistent with the predictions of
my model. However, as I show in my analysis, negative spillovers do not have to be
detrimental for local welfare but can even be benecial if they imply a better allocation
of capital to protable rms. Welfare e¤ects have not been analyzed in the existing
literature yet.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 equilibria are analyzed for the closed and open economy, re-
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spectively. The welfare analysis is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of risk-neutral rms, whereof a fraction  are
good rms and a fraction (1   ) are bad rms, with 0 <  < 1. Good rms have
an investment opportunity which requires an initial investment normalized to one and
yields a certain return of X. The investment opportunity of bad rms generates zero
prots.
Firms have no funds of their own, so they have to borrow the required investment
amount at a gross interest rate R from risk-neutral external investors.75 In case of
borrowing, investments are enforced and returns are veriable. External investors are
assumed to be risk-neutral and fully competitive. They have renancing costs of R0,
which is the world risk-free gross interest rate. Given this interest rate R0; it is assumed
that X   R0 > 0; i.e. the investment project of good rms exhibits a positive net
present value (NPV). The bad rms investment opportunity is NPV-negative, i.e.
 R0 < 0. The availability of funds is not limited. These assumptions hold for the
closed as well as the open economy.76
The market is characterized by asymmetric information. While rms know their
types, external investors only know the ex-ante distribution of good and bad rms. In
a closed economy, investors have no means to distinguish whether a potential borrower
is of a good or a bad type.
Opening up the economy gives rms the possibility to cross-list. As the availability
of funds at R0 is limited neither in the open nor in the closed economy, the decision to
cross-list has only an informational value. I assume that cross-listing implies perfect
disclosure of relevant project information and allows (local) investors to identify the
type of a cross-listing rm. For the rms cross-listing is costly. The costs of cross-
listing depend on di¤erent factors like the legal environment of the home-country and
75Of course, rms also have the opportunity to raise external equity, especially if they are already
listed on a stock-exchange. However they might prefer to avoid the issuance of new shares: Besides
diluting the value of existing shares, issuing new shares involves cumbersome and time-consuming
transactions.
76As stated in the introduction, these simplifying assumptions are made on purpose in order to
focus on informational e¤ects of nancial market liberalization that go beyond international capital
ows and the availability of additional funds. In fact, in an empirical study, King and Segal (2008)
nd that rms benet from cross-listing even if they fail to broaden their investor base.
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individual rm characteristics, such as the rms size and the accounting standards
already adopted. Firms are expected to di¤er with respect to their costs of cross-
listing.77 For simplication reasons I assume that the individual xed costs of cross-
listing for good rms Fi are uniformly distributed on the interval

0;F

.78 The same
distribution function of cross-listing costs is assumed for bad rms as well. Besides the
borrowerstypes, all other information is common knowledge.
The timing of the model is as follows: At date 0, if the economy is open, rms decide
whether to cross-list or not. The decision is observable to all market participants. If
the economy is closed, this step is omitted. At date 1, investors decide whether and
at which interest rate R to o¤er credit contracts to potential borrowers. At date 2, if
o¤ered a contract, rms decide if they want to borrow at the required interest rate,
upon which investors provide the necessary funds. Finally, at date 3, investments are
realized, and debt is repaid (if possible). The model is solved by backward induction.
3.3 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Consider the situation in a closed economy rst. In a closed economy, rms cannot
cross-list and convey information about their project quality.
At t=2, if o¤ered a credit contract, a rm decides whether to borrow at the specied
interest rate RC . As bad rms never repay the debt, they always want to borrow
regardless of the interest rate required. Hence, they accept any credit contract o¤ered
to them.79 Good rms base their investment decision on the prots they can realize,
which are given by
G = X  RC : (3.1)
Good rms only borrow and invest if doing so gives them positive prots, i.e. G  0:
If prots would be negative at a given interest rate RC , i.e. G < 0, good rms do not
have any incentive to borrow and invest.80
77For example, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) identify size as a determinant of a rms cross-listing
decision due to cost e¤ects. Doidge et al (2008a) show that rms with bad corporate governance, thus
high compliance costs, are less likely to cross-list.
78The main e¤ects identied by this analysis do not depend on the specic distribution function.
The aspect that drives the results is that good rms di¤er with respect to their costs of cross-listing.
79I implicitly assume that bad rms do borrow and invest if they are indi¤erent to do so.
80I assume that good rms have no incentive to invest if RC > X. To be more precise, good rms
would not be able to repay the debt in this case as they have no funds of their own. Hence, they
would realize expected prots of zero and be indi¤erent whether to borrow or not. However, even if
they wanted to borrow in this case, investors would anticipate that they will not be able to repay the
Home Market Effects of Cross-Listing 79
At t=1, risk-neutral investors decide on their credit o¤er. As investors have no
means to distinguish between good and bad rms, they can only o¤er a single credit
contract to all potential borrowers. If they expect good rms to be on the market, they
o¤er a pooling credit contract to all potential borrowers at the pooling interest rate
RC . As investors are fully competitive, the equilibrium interest rate RC leaves them
with expected prots of zero. If they do not expect good rms to be on the market,
they do not o¤er any credit contract at all.
The equilibrium in the closed economy is summarized by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.1 In the closed economy, if the average protability on the local market
is high enough, i.e. X  R0, there exists a unique pooling equilibrium with all rms
investing at the pooling interest rate
RC =
R0

> R0:
If X < R0; there exists a unique pooling equilibrium without borrowing and investment.
Proof: Straightforward by backward induction.
As a benchmark, consider the full information case: If investors had full information,
they would o¤er a credit contract to good rms at R0: Bad rms would not obtain any
nancing because their investment projects exhibit a negative NPV.
However, under asymmetric information, investors have no means to di¤erentiate
between good and bad rms. The best they can do is to o¤er a pooling contract based
on the ex-ante market shares of good and bad rms. Good rms only borrow and
invest whenever X  RC : Potential investors anticipate the good rmsbehavior and
know that for interest rates RC > X only bad rms are willing to borrow. As bad rms
never repay the debt, nancing solely bad rms implies losses for potential investors.
Hence, they are not willing to o¤er bad rms any credit contract in this case.
Which of the two possible situations arises depends on the market characteristics:
The higher the market share of good rms ; the closer is the pooling interest rate RC
to the risk-free interest rate R0: Therefore, the higher  and/or project returns X; the
easier it becomes to sustain a pooling equilibrium with investment.
full amount and thus would not o¤er any credit contract for RC > X. This leads to the results of our
modeling. Therefore we prefer the more intuitive formulation of our model.
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This basic set-up allows me to capture both potential cases of ine¢ cient investment
levels stressed in the existing literature in a unied framework: The underinvestment
problem focused on by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in their analysis of credit rationing as
well as the overinvestment problem addressed by de Meza and Webb (1987).
In my model, the pooling equilibrium without borrowing, hence with market break-
down, which occurs if X < R0; captures the underinvestment problem. In this case,
the required pooling interest rate is too high for good rms to invest into their NPV-
positive projects. Due to the adverse selection problem, the market breaks down and
protable investments are not realized. The overinvestment problem emerges in the
pooling equilibrium with all rms investing at the pooling interest rate for X  R0.
In this case, bad rms are cross-subsidized by good rms via the relatively low pool-
ing interest rate. Due to their limited liability they nd it attractive to invest into
their NPV-negative projects, and additional to the NPV-positive projects also these
NPV-negative investments are realized.
3.4 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
Consider the situation in an open economy. Now, each good rm has the possibility
to cross-list and convey full information about its type at an individual cost of cross-
listing Fi, with Fi s U(0; F ): Being identied as a good rm allows borrowers to obtain
nancing at the risk-free interest rate R0. In principle, bad rms could cross-list as
well. However, they will never choose to cross-list even if cross-listing is costless as
this would reveal their true type to investors and preclude them from borrowing.
Firms that do not cross-list are either o¤ered a credit contract at an adjusted
pooling interest rate of eR; or they are not o¤ered any credit contract.
Good rms cross-list and invest at the risk-free interest rate if they can realize
higher expected prots by doing so. As the costs of cross-listing are assumed to be
uniformly distributed on the interval

0;F

, each rm has to incur a di¤erent cost
level. As a consequence, only some good rms namely, the one with relatively low
cross-listing costs decide to cross-list.
The equilibrium in the open economy is summarized by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that F > max
n
4R0(1 )

;X  R0
o
:81 Then, the equilibrium
81This assumption ensures that the range for the xed costs is su¢ ciently large, hence F su¢ ciently
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in the open economy is characterized as follows:
1) For very high project returns, i.e. X  X2, there exist two possible subgame perfect
equilibria in pure strategies in which good rms with cross-listing costs Fi  F 1 or
Fi  F 2 , respectively, cross-list and invest at the risk-free interest rate R0. All other
rms invest at the pooling interest rate of eR(F 1 ) or eR(F 2 ); respectively.
2) For intermediate project returns, i.e. X1  X < X2; there exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which good rms with Fi  F 1 cross-list and
invest at the risk-free interest rate R0. All other rms invest at the pooling interest
rate of eR(F 1 ).
3) For relatively low project returns, i.e. X < X1; there exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which good rms with Fi  F 0 cross-list and
invest at the risk-free interest rate R0: All other rms do not borrow and invest at all.
With F 1 =
F
2

 p ; F 2 = F2 +p ; F 0 = X  R0; eR(F 1;2) = R0(1 F1;2F )
 F

1;2
F
;
and X1 =
R0(2 +
p)
+
p ; X2 =
R0(2  
p)
 p ;
p =
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ):
Proof: See Appendix.
The cross-listing decision of good rms is determined by the comparison between
the expected prots they can realize by cross-listing and the expected prots they can
realize in the local nancing pool. The trade-o¤ a good rm faces lies in the nancing
cost advantage of cross-listing (as it would have to pay R0 instead of eR) as compared
to its individual costs of cross-listing. Good rms with negligible costs of cross-listing
denitely prefer to cross-list and leave the local pool. However, it is not clear up-front
which total fraction F

i
F
of good rms cross-lists and leaves the local pool in equilibrium.
The cross-listing decision of a single good rm depends on the decision of the other
good rms as well. The more good rms cross-list, the higher is the pooling interest
rate eR investors require as the remaining fraction of good rms in the pool decreases
and the average pool quality deteriorates. As a consequence, expected prots on the
local market are lowered and it becomes less attractive for good rms to stay in this
market.
high and is needed to generate an inner solution. Note that I focus on pure strategies only.
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Due to this negative feedback e¤ect of cross-listing there are two possible equilibria
for X  X2. One possible outcome is that a relatively small fraction of good rms F

1
F
decides to leave the local nancing pool. In this case, the average pool quality is quite
high, the pooling interest rate eR(F 1 ) is rather low and hence prots are relatively high
on the local market. Thus, it is more attractive for a good rm with intermediate levels
of cross-listing costs Fi, i.e. with Fi 2 (F 1 ;F 2 ]; to stay in the local pool since many
other good rms do so as well.
There also exists an equilibrium for X > X2 in which a larger fraction
F 2
F
>
F 1
F
of good rms leaves the local pool. In this case expected prots in the local pool are
relatively low. Hence, it also pays for a good rm with Fi 2 (F 1 ;F 2 ] to incur the
cross-listing costs. Given that also the other rms in this range cross-list, staying in
the local pool is not an attractive option. Overall, the prots of good rms are higher
in the rst of the two equilibria. Intuitively, this is the case because rms can avoid
the costs of cross-listing and anyhow obtain funding at a relatively low interest rate.
If project returns X are not too high, i.e. X1  X < X2, the second equilibrium
disappears. The intuition for this is as follows: If at intermediate values of X all rms
with Fi  F 2 left the local pool, the pooling interest rate eR(F 2 ) would be too high to
sustain an equilibrium with positive expected prots and the local pool would break
down. However, if only rms with Fi  F 1 leave the local pool, eR(F 1 ) is su¢ ciently
low to sustain positive expected prots. Enough good rms remain in the local pool to
avoid market breakdown, and all rms invest. As shown in the Appendix, the pooling
equilibrium with market breakdown cannot exist in this case: All rms with Fi > F 1
can attain higher prots by staying in the home market pool instead of cross-listing
and prefer to do so. Hence, the local pool does not break down.
Finally, if project returns are low, i.e. X < X1, both cross-listing and borrowing
in the local pool becomes relatively unattractive. In equilibrium, good rms with
relatively low costs of cross-listing, i.e. Fi  F 0 , prefer to leave the local pool. The
marginal rm to leave the local pool, with F 0 = X   R0, makes zero prots by cross-
listing. All good rms with Fi < F 0 realize positive prots by cross-listing. All other
good rms with Fi > F 0 would realize expected losses by cross-listing. They also
prefer not to borrow at eR(F 0 ) in the local pool. X is too low as compared to eR(F 0 ) for
realizing positive expected prots in the local pool. Hence, the home market collapses.
As discussed in the Appendix, the second equilibrium forX  X2 with F 2 is Pareto-
dominated by the rst and furthermore is not stable. I therefore exclude this second
equilibrium from the rest of the analysis in this paper.
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Note that the pooling interest rate eR in the open economy is always higher than
the pooling interest rate RC in the closed economy. This is due to the smaller share of
good rms in the local pool in an open economy and reects the negative cost-of-capital
e¤ect on locally nanced rms.
With respect to the problem of over- and underinvestment, the following can be
said: ForX  X1 the situation in the open economy is characterized by overinvestment.
All rms obtain nancing and invest and all NPV-negative investment projects are
also realized. For X < X1 the situation in the open economy is characterized by an
underinvestment problem; not all good rms with NPV-positive investment projects
are able to realize their investment. However, as compared to the closed economy, the
underinvestment problem is mitigated as at least some of the NPV-positive investment
projects can be realized. In the following, I call the equilibrium outcome for X  X1
the equilibrium without market breakdown and the equilibrium outcome for X < X1
the equilibrium with market breakdown.
The next questions to be answered is which outcome is more likely to arise in what
kind of an emerging country. In particular, how does the equilibrium outcome depend
on the average project protability, i.e. X; of the market? And, how will the xed
costs of cross-listing a¤ect the equilibrium outcome?
First note that a change in the average project protability, determined by the
project returns X and the market share  of good rms, inuences the fraction of good
rms that decides to cross-list in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 The higher the market share of good rms , the lower is the fraction
F 1
F
of these good rms cross-listing in an equilibrium without market breakdown. The
higher the project returns X, the larger is the fraction of good rms F

0
F
cross-listing
in an equilibrium with market breakdown. An increase in  (in X) does not a¤ect the
fraction of good rms cross-listing in an equilibrium with (without) market breakdown.
That is
@(
F 1
F
)
@
< 0 ^ @(
F 0
F
)
@
= 0;
@(
F 1
F
)
@X
= 0 ^ @(
F 0
F
)
@X
> 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
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Consider the results with respect to . First, assume that X is high enough to
sustain an equilibrium without market breakdown. In this situation an increase in the
market share of good rms  implies that a larger number of good rms is active in
the local pool for a given marginal rm F 1 to cross-list.
82 Ceteris paribus, this lowers
the pooling interest rate eR(F 1 ) and increases expected prots on the local market.
Therefore, good rms with relatively high costs of cross-listing now prefer not to cross-
list and the fraction of cross-listing good rms F

1
F
, decreases. In a situation with market
breakdown the marginal rm is determined by its individual zero-prot condition for
cross-listing, i.e. X   R0   F 0 = 0. Therefore, the market share of good rms  does
not a¤ect F

0
F
.
Interestingly, an increase in X does not a¤ect the fraction of good rms cross-listing
in an equilibrium without market breakdown. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
the relative attractiveness of cross-listing as compared to the home market pool is not
a¤ected because neither eR(F 1 ) nor the xed costs of cross-listing change. However, X
a¤ects the zero prot-condition for cross-listing in case of market breakdown. In this
case, more good rms decide to cross-list as their prots increase in X.
Based on these insights I derive the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.3 The higher the average project protability, i.e. X, the easier is an
equilibrium without market breakdown sustained. This is either driven by high project
returns for good rms X, given that @X1
@X
= 0; or it is driven by a higher market share
of good rms , with @X1
@
< 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
The result with respect to the project returns X is straightforward: The higher the
value of X, the easier it becomes to sustain an equilibrium with positive prots in the
home market pool and the easier X > X1 is fullled.
The market share of good rms  increases the parameter range for which an
equilibrium without market breakdown exists. This is due to two e¤ects. First of
all, there is a direct e¤ect resulting from an increase in : For a given marginal rm
F 1 there are ceteribus paribus more good rms on the home market. This increases
the attractiveness of borrowing in the local pool. Secondly, as shown in Lemma 3.1,
82This is due to the fact, that an increase in  does not change F . Thus, the additional good rms
have also xed costs which are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; F

:
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an increase in  reduces the fraction F

1
F
of cross-listing good rms. This reinforces
the positive e¤ect of  on the attractiveness of the home market pool. Overall, the
threshold level for market breakdown X1 decreases in : Good rms prefer to stay in
the local nancing pool for lower project returns X, as eR is relatively close to R0:
To summarize, as in the case of a closed economy, I expect that strong open
economies, i.e. economies with a relatively high average project protability X, are
characterized by an overinvestment problem. Weak open economies, i.e. economies
with a relatively low average protability X; are expected to exhibit an underinvest-
ment problem. However, for weak economies the underinvestment problem is mitigated
as some good rms do cross-list. Furthermore, I expect a larger fraction of good rms
to cross-list if the home market economy is relatively weak.
Let us nally consider the e¤ect of the overall level of cross-listing costs, i.e. of F ,
on the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3.4 With a larger range for cross-listing costs, i.e. higher values of F ,
a smaller fraction of good rms cross-lists. In turn, the prot range for which an
equilibrium without market breakdown is sustained, increases. That is
@(
F 1
F
)
@F
< 0 ^ @X1
@F
< 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
An increase in F implies a dilation of the distribution of cross-listing costs, shifting
the average costs of cross-listing towards higher levels. On average, it becomes more
expensive for good rms to obtain a cross-listing. With higher costs of cross-listing,
only a smaller number of good rms nd it attractive to cross-list. Thus, the fraction
F 1
F
decreases. As a larger fraction of good rms stays on the home market pool, the
average pool quality increases, the pooling interest rate eR decreases and hence the
range for which an equilibrium without market breakdown can be sustained increases.
One driver of the cross-listing costs is the necessary adjustment to the cross-listing
rms accounting practices. These, in turn, are inuenced by the existing disclosure
requirements in the home country of the cross-listing rm. In particular, the adjustment
costs should be lower for all good rms if the local accounting standards are close to
the standards of the target country for cross-listing and well enforced. In terms of the
model, we expect countries with internationally more harmonized accounting standards
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to exhibit a lower upper limit of the cross-listing costs F . This allows me to derive a
surprising result: Local governments of emerging countries can prevent good rms from
leaving the local market and avoid market breakdown by opposing the harmonization
of their accounting rules with international standards, i.e. by keeping a high value for
F .
3.5 Welfare E¤ects of Cross-Listing
In this section I investigate welfare e¤ects. In particular, I determine under which
circumstances nancial market liberalization can be benecial for an emerging market
economy.
Welfare comprises expected prots of local investors and rms.83 As a benchmark
case, I derive welfare for the rst best full information case. In a situation with full
information, investors know the type of potential borrowers and o¤er all good rms a
credit contract at the risk-free interest rate of R0: Bad rms are not o¤ered any credit
contract. In this case welfare is given by
WF FB = (X  R0) > 0: (3.2)
Welfare represents the total economic surplus generated by the good rms. Bad
rms do not realize any prots, and investors realize expected prots of zero.
Now, turn to the situation in the closed economy with asymmetric information.
First, consider the situation with underinvestment, i.e. market breakdown. In this
case, welfare is given by
WFMBDC = 0: (3.3)
In the closed economy, underinvestment implies that none of the rms neither
good nor bad is able to invest. Underinvestment induces an ine¢ ciency as the good
rmsNPV-positive projects are not realized. Welfare is reduced as compared to the
rst best case by exactly (X  R0); which reects the total surplus generated by the
fraction  of all good rms.
Second, in the situation without market breakdown welfare is given by
83It is assumed that cross-listing good rms obtain nancing from local investors. This assumption
is not crucial for the results, as availability of funds is not limited in the closed economy and investors
realize expected prots of zero. For a detailed derivation of the welfare functions see Appendix.
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WFNMBDC = X  R0 > 0: (3.4)
Without market breakdown, all rms obtain funding and invest into their projects at
the pooling interest rate RC . As compared to the rst best case, welfare is lowered by
the economic loss induced by the bad rms: A bad rms investment requires an expense
of R0 but does not generate any prots. Welfare is reduced by exactly the resulting
total loss of (1  )R0: However, as the average project protability is relatively high,
total welfare is positive and higher as compared to the underinvestment case.
Note that a higher average project protability X unambiguously increases welfare
in the closed economy. First, it becomes easier to sustain an equilibrium without market
breakdown. Secondly, welfare in the situation with market breakdown is unchanged
whereas it is higher in the situation without market breakdown.
Next, consider the open economy. Welfare for the equilibrium with market break-
down is given by
WFMBDO =

2F
(X  R0)2 > 0: (3.5)
In an equilibrium with market breakdown, a fraction F

0
F
of the good rms  with
relatively low costs of cross-listing can realize their NPV-positive investment projects.
This has the positive welfare e¤ect of F

0
F
(X   R0). However, each of these rms has
to incur its individual cost of cross-listing. The total cross-listing costs are F

0
2
2F
. With
the marginal rm determined by F 0 = X   R0 and no other rm investing, I obtain
the above welfare function. The welfare reducing e¤ects as compared to the rst best
are twofold: First, the ine¢ ciencies lie in the costs of cross-listing, which constitute
pure waste for welfare. Secondly, only a fraction F

i
F
of the  good investment projects
are realized. However, total welfare is positive. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that
all cross-listing rms voluntarily do so since they realize positive expected prots.
If there is no market breakdown in the open economy, welfare is given by
WFNMBDO = (X  R0)  (1  )R0  
F 21
2F
> 0: (3.6)
In this case, good rms with relatively low cross-listing costs do cross-list and obtain
nancing at the risk-free interest rate R0. The remaining good and bad rms all obtain
nancing at the pooling interest rate eR(F 1 ) in the home market pool. As compared
to the rst best benchmark case, there are again two welfare reducing e¤ects: First,
welfare is reduced due to overinvestment, i.e. the nancing of NPV-negative projects.
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This e¤ect is identical to the one in the closed economy and is given by  (1   )R0.
Secondly, welfare is reduced by the cross-listing costs F
2
1
2F
, which the fraction F

1
F
of
good rms incur in order to be separated from bad rms. Note that there are two
further e¤ects of cross-listing: An interest rate advantage for cross-listing rms (R0
vs. eR(F 1 )) and an interest rate disadvantage for non-cross-listing good rms (higher
interest rate eR(F 1 ) as compared to RC). However, these countervailing e¤ects perfectly
set each other o¤ and have no net e¤ect on total welfare. Again, it can be shown that
total welfare is positive: The expected prots of good rms are so high that they
compensate for the losses caused by the nancing of bad rms and the xed costs of
cross-listing.
A better average project protability, i.e. higher values for  and/or X, unambigu-
ously increase welfare in the open economy, both with and without market breakdown.
However, welfare e¤ects of the overall cross-listing costs, more precisely of F ; depend
on the market situation.
Proposition 3.5 An increase in the range of cross-listing costs, i.e. an increase in
F ; decreases welfare in an open economy with market breakdown. In an open economy
without market breakdown it has the opposite e¤ect. That is
@WFMBDO
@F
< 0 ^ @WF
NMBD
O
@F
> 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
An increase in F reduces the fraction of good rms that cross-list if there is market
breakdown in the open economy. With market breakdown, cross-listing is the only
possibility to obtain funds and invest into NPV-positive projects. As in this case less
good rms can do so, this has an adverse e¤ect on welfare. If there is no market
breakdown in the economy, the decreased attractiveness of cross-listing has a welfare
enhancing e¤ect since it lowers the total (waste) costs of cross-listing.
Together with the result that an equilibrium without market breakdown becomes
easier to sustain, i.e. @X1
@F
< 0; this has an interesting implication: Governments of
very weak economies, i.e. economies with a very low average pool quality, are expected
to have an incentive to harmonize their legal accounting system with international
standards, i.e. try to reduce F : However, if the economy is relatively strong, i.e. it
has a relatively high average pool quality, the government might have an interest in
opposing the harmonization of their accounting rules with international standards.
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The nal question I address in this paper is how nancial market liberalization
a¤ects local welfare. The results are given in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.6 If the closed economy is characterized by
1) Underinvestment, i.e. X < R0

, nancial market liberalization increases local wel-
fare.
2) Overinvestment, i.e. X  R0

; nancial market liberalization increases local welfare
for R0

 X < XWF and decreases local welfare for X  XWF .
The threshold value XWF lies in the range R0  XWF < X1 and is given by XWF =
F +R0  
q
F
2   2FR0(1 )

:
Proof: See Appendix.
Consider the situation for X < R0

rst.
In this case, there is market breakdown in the closed as well as the open economy.
Hence, the only e¤ect nancial market liberalization entails is that good rms with
relatively low cross-listing costs are able to cross-list and invest. As these rms volun-
tarily decide to do so, they make positive prots. Therefore, liberalizing the nancial
market mitigates the underinvestment problem and welfare increases.
Consider the situation for X  R0

next.
In this case, nancial market liberalization might lead to market breakdown. This is
due to the fact that the threshold for market breakdown in the closed economy (given
by R0

) is lower than the threshold in the open economy (given byX1). If project returns
are of an intermediate level, i.e. R0

 X < X1; the average project protability of the
remaining rms in the home market is not su¢ cient to sustain an equilibrium without
market breakdown. However, if project returns are very high, i.e. X  X1, nancial
market liberalization does not lead to market breakdown.
The welfare reducing e¤ect of nancial market liberalization for X  X1 is clear:
With X  X1; there is no market breakdown neither in the closed nor in the open
economy and all NPV-positive and NPV-negative investment projects are being real-
ized. Therefore, the net e¤ect of nancial market liberalization is that cross-listing
good rms incur costs in order to be identied as good rms. All other e¤ects are
purely redistributional: The prot increase due to the lower risk-free interest rate for
cross-listing good rms is perfectly o¤set by the reduction in prots of the good rms
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in the local pool due to the increase in the pooling interest rate from RC to eR(F 1 ).
As a consequence, the welfare loss corresponds to the total costs of cross-listing good
rms.
The welfare implications of nancial market liberalization are not straightforward if
it induces market breakdown, i.e. for R0

 X < X1: In this case, there are two negative
e¤ects of nancial market liberalization: First, as in the cases before, there are the costs
of cross-listing, amounting to  F 20
2F
. Secondly, as nancial market liberalization leads
to market breakdown, good rms with relatively high cross-listing costs are not able
to obtain nancing and invest into their NPV-positive projects anymore. This intro-
duces a (partial) underinvestment problem and reduces welfare by (1  F 0
F
)(X  R0).
However, nancial market liberalization entails also a positive e¤ect now: Bad rms
are also not able to obtain nancing and invest into their NPV-negative investment
projects anymore. Thus, the overinvestment problem is mitigated. This increases local
welfare by (1  )R0.
The negative e¤ects dominate the positive e¤ect of nancial market liberalization
only for higher values of X, i.e. X  XWF . This is due to the following: The posi-
tive e¤ect of mitigating the overinvestment problem is independent of X in this range.
However, the negative e¤ects increase in X. With higher values of X, more good rms
decide to cross-list (remember that F 0 = X   R0). This increases the overall cross-
listing costs. Interestingly, despite the increased number of cross-listing good rms,
also the welfare loss associated with the underinvestment problem increases in X. The
intuition therefore is that the loss for the omitted NPV-positive investment opportu-
nities also increases in X. For higher values of X, this dominates the positive e¤ect
of less omitted NPV-positive projects, i.e. more cross-listing good rms. As a conse-
quence, the negative e¤ects associated with the costs of cross-listing and the increased
underinvestment problem dominate the positive e¤ect related to the mitigation of the
overinvestment problem for X  XWF .
To summarize, for an economy characterized by an underinvestment problem
(Stiglitz and Weiss-type of economy) nancial market liberalization has a welfare en-
hancing e¤ect even though negative interest rate spillovers on domestic rms take place.
Even if the costs of cross-listing are welfare-reducing, these are more than o¤set by the
positive e¤ects of the mitigation of the underinvestment problem. Furthermore, for
an economy characterized by an overinvestment problem (de Meza and Webb-type of
economy) nancial market liberalization can have a positive e¤ect on national welfare
as it allows to mitigate the overinvestment problem. However, this positive e¤ect is
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dominated by the the cross-listing costs and the introduction of a (partial) underinvest-
ment problem whenever the NPV-positive investment projects that cannot be realized
are relatively protable. For a high project protability in the emerging economy nan-
cial market liberalization is unambiguously welfare reducing since the overinvestment
problem can not be mitigated but cross-listing costs are incurred.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed welfare e¤ects of nancial market liberalization within a model
of adverse selection. In particular, I have shown that welfare e¤ects can be positive
or negative, depending on the average protability of investment projects and the
level of cross-listing costs in the emerging economy. As shown in the above analysis,
and consistent with empirical evidence, nancial market liberalization has a negative
cost-of-capital spillover on the local nancial market as the interest rate in the local
pool increases. Nevertheless, allowing rms to cross-list does in many cases have a
welfare increasing e¤ect. This is due to the fact that it reduces the ine¢ ciency related
to an under- or overinvestment problem in the emerging economy. In a situation
characterized by underinvestment, liberalizing nancial markets gives at least some
good rms the opportunity to obtain nancing. In a situation with overinvestment,
the introduction of this signaling device can reduce the overinvestment problem and
enhance welfare. However, this positive welfare e¤ect can be overcompensated by the
introduction of an underinvestment problem and the cross-listing costs if the good
rmsinvestment projects are quite protable. If the good rmsprojects are highly
protable welfare is unambiguously reduced.
My analysis demonstrates that for assessing the e¤ects of cross-listing on the do-
mestic market it is not su¢ cient to consider the cost-of-capital or valuation spillover
e¤ects on local rms only. But in addition, the protability and growth opportunities
of these have to be taken into account.
Another contribution of the model is to derive under which circumstances emerging
countries might be reluctant to harmonize their accounting system with international
standards. As shown in the analysis, this is the case for strong emerging countries, i.e.
economies with a high average protability of local rms.
My ndings are also consistent with empirical evidence on a positive relationship
between nancial market liberalization and the cross-listing rms externally nanced
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growth (Khurana et al. (2008)) as well as local development on an aggregate level
(e.g. Bekaert et al. (2005)). Whenever in my model welfare is enhanced by nancial
market liberalization, the average protability of nanced projects increases, which in
turn leads to higher growth rates for the economy.
Thus, my model explains how cross-listing can have negative spillover e¤ects on
domestic rival rms, and at the same time can increase local welfare and contribute to
an accelerated growth of the emerging economy.
Appendix to Chapter 1
A1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2: Liquidation Strategies
Derivation of Threshold Values ei
Proportionate Sale (PS). By comparing Et=2PS;L and E
t=2
PS;C it follows that the
originator liquidates the loan whenever   ePS = eNS = p + (1   p) : For  < eNS
the loan is continued.
First Loss Provision (FLP). Et=2FLP;C = [p(1  ) + (1  p)0]D as  > : By com-
paring Et=2FLP;L and E
t=2
FLP;C it follows that the originator liquidates the loan whenever
max f(   )D; 0g  p(1 )D: If  < , this condition reduces to 0 > p(1  )D| {z }
>0
and
is never fullled. If   , the condition reduces to    p(1 ),   p+(1 p):
Overall, the originator liquidates the loan whenever   eFLP = p + (1   p)84. He
continuous the loan whenever  < eFLP .
Last Loss Provision (LLP). By comparing Et=2LLP;L and E
t=2
FLP;C it follows that
the originator liquidates the loan, whenever min f; g > p + (1   p) : If  < ;
this condition reduces to  > p + (1   p) : If   ; the condition reduces to
  p + (1  p) : As with the assumption  >  it holds that (1  p) > (1  p) ; it
follows that the condition is always fullled. Overall, the originator liquidates the loan
whenever   eLLP = p + (1  p) 85: He continues the loan whenever  < eLLP :
Comparison of Threshold Values ei
Proportionate Sale (PS) vs. No Sale (NS). With ePS = eNS; PS implies the
same liquidation strategy as NS.
First Loss Provision (FLP) vs. No Sale (NS). With  < ; there exists a range
84This condition implies that liquidation only occurs if  > ; as with p+ (1  p) =  + (1  )p
and (1  )p > 0; the condition  >  holds a fortiori.
85This condition implies also that continuation only occurs if  > ; as with  <  it follows that
p + (1  p) < .
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[eNS; eFLP ); for which the originator chooses continuation under FLP but liquidation
under NS. For   eFLP ( < eNS) the originator chooses liquidation (continuation)
under both structures.
Last Loss Provision (LLP) vs. No Sale (NS). With   1; there exists a range
[eLLP ; eNS); for which the originator chooses liquidation under LLP but continuation
under NS. For   eNS ( < eLLP ) the originator chooses liquidation (continuation)
under both structures.
The originators liquidation strategies are summarized in the following gure:
A1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3: Optimal Monitoring Proportionate Sale (PS)
The date 1 optimization problem of the originator is given by
maxEt=1PS =
q
(1  ) [qD + (1  q)Dmax f; p+ (1  p)g]  C(q);
yielding the following First Order Condition (FOC):86
@Et=1PS
@q
= [1 max f; p+ (1  p)g] (1  )D| {z }
MRPS
  C 0(qPS) = 0:
86With @
2Et=1PS
@q2 =  C
00
(q) < 0; the second order condition (SOC) for a maximum is fullled.
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Proportionate Sale (PS) vs. No Sale (NS). Comparing date 1 marginal revenues
MRPS with MRNS = [1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]D yields
MRNS  MRPS = [1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]| {z }D
>0
> 0:
As with C
0
(q) > 0 and C
00
(q) > 0; the cost function is monotonically increasing in q,
it follows immediately that qNS > qPS.
A1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4: Optimal Monitoring First Loss Provision
(FLP)
The date 1 optimization problem of the originator is given by
max
q
Et=1FLP = q(1  )D + (1  q)max
8<:(   ); p(1  ) + (1  p)0| {z }
as <
9=;D   C(q);
yielding the following FOC:87
@Et=1FLP
@q
= [(1  ) max f   ; p(1  )g]D| {z }
MRFLP
  C 0(qFLP ) = 0;
which can be rearranged to the condition in Proposition 1.4.
First Loss Provision (FLP) vs. No Sale (NS). Comparing date 1 marginal
revenues under NS and FLP yields
MRNS  MRFLP = [1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]D   [1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]D
= max f0;min f(1  p) + p  ; (   )(1  p)ggD;
which is equivalent to
MRNS  MRFLP =
8><>:
0 if   eFLP ;
[p+ (1  p)   ]D if eNS   < eFLP ;
(   )(1  p)D if  < eNS;
with eNS = p+ (1  p) and eFLP = p+ (1  p):
87Again, with @
2Et=1FLP
@q2 =  C
00
(q) < 0; the SOC for a maximum is fullled.
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For eNS   < eFLP it follows with  < p+ (1  p) that D [p+ (1  p)   ] > 0.
Similarly, for  < eNS; with  < ; it follows that (   )(1  p)D > 0:
Hence, overall it follows that MRNS  MRFLP  0 and, again, with C 0(q) > 0 and
C
00
(q) > 0; it follows that qNS  qFLP .
First Loss Provision (FLP) vs. Proportionate Sale (PS). Comparing date 1
marginal revenues under PS and FLP yields
MRPS  MRFLP =
8><>:
 (1  )D if   eFLP ;
[(1  )(1  )  (1  )(1  p)]D if eNS   < eFLP ;
(1  p) [(1  )(1  )  (1  )]D if  < eNS;
with eNS = ePS = p+ (1  p) and eFLP = p+ (1  p):
For   eFLP it is straightforward that MRPS  MRFLP < 0.
For eNS   < eFLP we have to consider two di¤erent ranges: At the upper bound-
ary, with  = eFLP ; the di¤erence in marginal revenues is given by (MRPS  
MRFLP ) j=eFLP= f(1  ) [1  p  (1  p)]  (1  )(1  p)gD =  (1   p)(1  
)D < 0:88 At the lower boundary, with  = eNS; the di¤erence in marginal revenues
is given by (MRPS MRFLP ) j=eNS= [(1  )(1  p)(1  )  (1  )(1  p)]D: The
assumption  < min

;  
1  ; 2   1
	
implies that  <  
1  . With this condition it fol-
lows that (1 )(1 p)(1 ) > (1 )(1 p) and hence (MRPS MRFLP ) j=eNS> 0:
With @(MRPS MRFLP )
@
=  (1   )D < 0 for eNS   < eFLP ; it follows that there is
a single interception point in this range, for which it holds that MRPS  MRFLP = 0:
Solving this term for  gives the threshold value FLP=PS in Proposition 1.4. It
follows that MRPS   MRFLP  0 for all  for which eNS <   FLP=PS; and
MRPS  MRFLP > 0 for all  2 (FLP=PS; eFLP ]:
For  < eNS with the assumption  < min;  1  ; 2   1	 ; it follows that (1 )(1 
)(1  p) > (1  )(1  p) and it unambiguously holds that MRPS  MRFLP > 0 for
 < eNS:
Overall, with C
0
(q) > 0 and C
00
(q) > 0; it follows that qPS > qFLP for  < FLP=PS;
qPS = qFLP for  = FLP=PS; and q
PS < qFLP for  > FLP=PS.
88As there is no jump discontinuity, it su¢ ces to consider the value at  = eFLP without forming
the limit.
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A1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.5: Optimal Monitoring Last Loss Provision
(LLP)
The date 1 optimization problem of the originator is given by
maxEt=1LLP = qD + (1  q)Dmax fmin f; g ; p + (1  p)g   C(q);
yielding the following FOC:89
@Et=1LLP
@q
= [  max fmin f; g ; p + (1  p)g]D| {z }
MRLLP
  C 0(qLLP ) = 0:
The FOC can be rearranged to
@Et=1LLP
@q
=
8><>:
0 if   ;
(   )D   C 0(mLLP ) if eLLP   < ;
(   )(1  p)D   C 0(mLLP ) if  < eLLP ;
with eLLP = p+ (1  p) :90
Last Loss Provision (LLP) vs. No Sale (NS). Comparing marginal revenues
under LLP with NS yields
MRNS  MRLLP =
= h[1 max f; p+ (1  p)g]  [  max fmin f; g ; p + (1  p)g]iD
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1  )D if    ^   eNS;
[1  p  (1  p) ]D if    ^  < eNS;
(1  )D if eLLP   <  ^   eNS;
[1   +    p  (1  p) ]D if eLLP   <  ^  < eNS;
(1  )(1  p)D if  < eLLP ;
with eNS = p+ (1  p) and eLLP = p+ (1  p) :91
For    ^   eNS; and eLLP   <  ^   eNS; and  < eLLP it is straightfor-
ward that MRNS  MRLLP > 0:
89Again, with @
2Et=1LLP
@q2 =  C
00
(q) < 0 the SOC for a maximum is fullled.
90Note that with  <  it follows that eLLP = p + (1  p) < :
91Note that we have to di¤erentiate ve cases because   p + (1   p) or  > p + (1   p) are
both possible.
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For  >  ^  < eNS it follows from the assumptions  < 1 and p < 1 that (p+ (1 
p)) < 1: Hence, it holds that MRNS  MRLLP > 0:
For eLLP   <  ^  < eNS it follows from   p + (1   p) that
[1   +    p  (1  p) ]  [1   + p+ (1  p)   p  (1  p) ] : The right-hand
side can be simplied to (1 )(1 p) > 0: Hence, we can derive thatMRNS MRLLP >
0 also for this case.
Overall, MRNS  MRLLP  0 holds 8 2 ( ; 1) and with C 0(q) > 0 and C 00(q) > 0; it
follows that qNS  qLLP 8 2 ( ; 1) :
Last Loss Provision (LLP) vs. Proportionate Sale (PS). Comparing marginal
revenues under PS and LLP yields
MRPS MRLLP =
8><>:
[(1  )(1  ) max f0;    g]D if   eNS;
[(1  )(1  p)(1  ) max f0;    g]D if eLLP   < eNS;
(1  p) [(1  )(1  )  (   )]D if  < eLLP ;
with eNS = p+ (1  p) and eLLP = p+ (1  p) :
For   eLLP it is straightforward that whenever   ; it holds that MRPS  
MRLLP > 0:
Consider  < 0:5 rst.
For  < 0:5 it holds that (1  )(2  1) < 0 and hence  (1 )

< 2   1 <  
1  :
92
In this case, there are two possible ranges for  . First,  (1 )

  < 2  1: Secondly,
 <  (1 )

:
For  (1 )

  < 2   1 the condition  (1 )

  implies that (1   )(1   )  
(   )  0 and therefore MRPS   MRLLP  0 for   eLLP :93 With @MRPS@ =
92Note that, if  <  (1 ) , marginal revenues are higher under LLP as compared to PS for
 < eLLP . Similarly, if  < 2   1; marginal revenues under LLP are higher than under FLP for
 < eLLP : Finally, if  <  1  ; marginal revenues under PS are higher than under FLP for  < ePS :
Comparing these thresholds yields the above described ordering whenever (1  )(2  1) < 0:
93Note that with  (1 )   this is the only case in which the constraints on the parameter
range for  and  could be binding. However, comparing all conditions on  shows that there exist
parameter ranges for which a solution exists.
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(
 (1  )D if   eNS
0 if  < eNS and @MRLLP@ =
8><>:
0 if   
 D if eLLP   < 
0 if  < eLLP ; it follows
that for eLLP <  <  marginal revenues decrease in  for both structures (or are
constant for PS if   eNS) and with @MRPS@ > @MRLLP@ the decrease is stronger for
LLP. Hence, it follows that MRPS  MRLLP > 0 also for eLLP <  < : And nally,
with MRPS   MRLLP > 0 for    it follows that LLP is dominated by PS, i.e.
MRPS  MRLLP  0; 8 2 ( ; 1):
For  <  (1 )

it follows that MRPS   MRLLP < 0 for   eLLP : As at
   it holds that MRPS   MRLLP  0 and at  = eLLP it holds that
MRPS   MRLLP j=eLLP< 0 it follows with @MRPS@ > @MRLLP@ for eLLP <  < 
that there is one interception point in the range (eLLP ; ): This threshold level is
characterized by the condition MRPS   MRLLP = 0; which solving for  yields
LLP=PS = max
n
 (1 )

;    (1  )(1  p)(1  )
o
: For  < LLP=PS it follows that
MRPS  MRLLP < 0 and for  > LLP=PS it follows that MRPS  MRLLP > 0: Note
that  (1 )

is the threshold value if the intercept lies in the range (eLLP ; eNS) and
  (1 )(1  p)(1  ) the threshold value if the intercept lies in the range  > eNS.
Consider   0:5 next.
For   0:5 it holds that (1   )(2   1)  0 and hence  
1   2   1   (1 ) : As
with  <  
1  it always holds that  <
 (1 )

; the same rationing as above applies
and it follows that MRPS  MRLLP < 0 for  < eLLP=PS and MRPS  MRLLP = 0
for  = eLLP=PS and MRPS  MRLLP > 0 for  > eLLP=PS:
Overall, with C
0
(q) > 0 and C
00
(q) > 0; it follows that if   0:5 or  < 0:5 ^
 <  (1 )

the monitoring e¤ort under LLP is higher (lower) than under PS, i.e.
qLLP > ()qPS; whenever  < ()eLLP=PS: If however  < 0:5 ^    (1 ) ; the
monitoring e¤ort under LLP is always lower than under PS, i.e. qLLP < qPS 8 2
( ; 1) :
Last Loss Provision (LLP) vs. First Loss Provision (FLP). Comparing mar-
ginal revenues under LLP with FLP yields
MRFLP  MRLLP =
8><>:
(1  )D if   eFLP ;
[(1  p)(1  ) max f0;    g]D if eLLP   < eFLP ;
(1  p) [(1  )  (   )]D if  < eLLP ;
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with eFLP = p+ (1  p) and eLLP = p+ (1  p) :
For   eFLP it is straightforward that MRFLP  MRLLP  0:
For eLLP   < eFLP we have to consider two possible ranges: At the upper boundary,
with  = eFLP ; it holds with p + (1   p) =  + (1   )p that  <  and hence
the di¤erence in marginal revenues is given by (MRFLP   MRLLP ) j=eFLP= (1  
p)(1   )D > 0:94 At the lower boundary, with  = eLLP ; the di¤erence in marginal
revenues is given by (MRFLP  MRLLP ) j=eLLP= [(1  p)(1  )  (1  p)(   )]D.
With the assumption  < min

;  
1  ; 2   1
	
; it holds that  < 2   1 and it
follows immediately that (MRFLP  MRLLP ) j=eLLP< 0: With @(MRFLP MRLLP )@  0;
it follows that there is a single interception point in this range for which it holds that
MRFLP   MRLLP = 0: Solving the equation (1   p)(1   )   max f0;    g = 0
yields the threshold level eFLP=LLP =    (1   p)(1   ) = 2   1 + p(1   ); at
which MRFLP  MRLLP = 0:95 With the monotonicity of the marginal revenues it
follows that MRFLP  MRLLP  0 for all ; for which eLLP <   FLP=LLP and
MRFLP  MRLLP > 0 for all ; for which FLP=LLP <   eFLP :
Also for  < eLLP ; with  < 2 1; it follows immediately thatMRFLP  MRLLP < 0:
Overall, with C
0
(q) > 0 and C
00
(q) > 0; it holds that qLLP > qFLP for  < FLP=LLP ;
qLLP = qFLP for  = FLP=LLP and q
LLP < qFLP for  > FLP=LLP .
A1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.6: The Originators Choice of the Resale Struc-
ture
Date Zero Expected Prots under PS
The originators ex-ante expected prots are given by
Et=0PS =

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)g (1  )D   C(qPS)+
+

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD
(1 + rH)| {z }
=IPS
:
94As there is no jump discontinuity for marginal revenues, it su¢ ces to consider the value at
 = eFLP = p+ (1  p) without forming the limit.
95Note that the intersection point between FLP and LLP will lie in a parameter range with  > ,
as the marginal revenue under LLP is equal to zero 8 with  >  but for FLP equals to zero only
for  = 1.
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This can be rearranged to
Et=0PS = (
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
)

qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD   C(qPS)
= eDPS   C(qPS)  rH
1+rH
eDPS;
with eDPS = qPS + (1  qPS)max f; p+ (1  p)gD.
Date Zero Expected Prots under FLP
In the following we consider the two parameter ranges   eFLP = (1   p) + p and
 < eFLP separately.
1)   eFLP
If   eFLP , the originator liquidates a non-performing loan in t=2. Expected prots
for the investor are given by
EIFLP = q
FLPD + (1  qFLP )D   IFLP
As the originator makes a take it or leave it o¤erit holds that D   IFLP != (1 +
rL)IFLP   IFLP : Solving for IFLP yields
IFLP =
D
(1+rL)
:
Therefore, ex-ante expected prots for the originator are given by
Et=0FLP = (1  )qFLPD + (1  qFLP )(   )D   C(qFLP ) + D(1+rL) =
=

qFLP + (1  qFLP )D   C(qFLP )  rLD
(1+rL)
:
2)  < eFLP
If  < eFLP , the originator continues a non-performing loan. Expected prots for the
investor are given by
EIFLP = q
FLPD + (1  qFLP ) [p + (1  p) ]D   IFLP :
Again, as the originator makes a "take it or leave it" o¤er, resulting in
IFLP =
f[qFLP+p(1 qFLP )]+(1 qFLP )(1 p)gD
(1+rL)
:
Therefore, ex-ante expected prots for the originator are given by
Et=0FLP = q
FLP (1 )D+(1 qFLP )p(1 )D C(qFLP )+D[q
FLP+p(1 qFLP )]+D(1 p)(1 qFLP )
(1+rL)
= (1+rL(1 )
(1+rL)
)

qFLP + p(1  qFLP )D + (1 qFLP )(1 p)D
(1+rL)
  C(qFLP ) =
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=

qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D C(qFLP )  rLf[qFLP+p(1 qFLP )]+(1 qFLP )(1 p)gD
(1+rL)
:
Comparison of Expected Prots
By setting rL = 0; I obtain the following term for the originators ex-ante prots under
FLP:
Et=0FLP =
( 
qFLP + (1  qFLP )D   C(qFLP ) if   eFLP ;
qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D   C(qFLP ) if  < eFLP ;
with eFLP = p+ (1  p):
The originator chooses the resale structure that gives him higher expected prots. The
di¤erence in expected prots under PS and FLP is given by
Et=0PS Et=0FLP =
8>>><>>>:
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPL + C(qFLP ) if   eFLP ;h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPC + C(qFLP ) if eNS   < eFLP ;h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSC   C(qPS)  eDFLPC + C(qFLP ) if  < eNS;
with eFLP = p+ (1  p) and eNS = p+ (1  p) ;eDPSL = qPS + (1  qPS)D and eDPSC = qPS + (1  qPS)(p+ (1  p))D,eDFLPL = qFLP + (1  qFLP )D, and eDFLPC = qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D:
First, consider   eFLP :
For this range I want to show that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0; irrespectively of rH .
Since with 1    < 1 it holds that 1+(1 )rH
1+rH
< 1, it follows that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0
whenever eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPL + C(qFLP ) < 0.96
From the analysis of the optimal monitoring level in t=1 we know that for this
range qFLP > qPS. Even though it is straightforward with qFLP > qPS thateDFLPL > eDPSL ; we still have to show that this e¤ect is not overcompensated by the
higher costs of monitoring under FLP: For a given ; we obtain the following deriva-
tives
@[ eDFLPC  C(qFLP )]
@q
= (1  )D C 0(qFLP ) and @[ eDPSC  C(qPS)]
@q
= (1  )D C 0(qPS):
As (1   )D   C 0(qFLP ) is exactly the originators FOC under FLP at date 1, it
follows that (1 )D C 0(qFLP ) = 0 and date zero expected prots cannot be further
increased at the monitoring level qFLP . With a convex cost function, i.e. C
00
(q) > 0;
96Note that eDFLPL   C(qFLP ) = Et=0FLP for rL = 0 and eDPSL   C(qPS) = Et=0PS for rH = 0:
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and qFLP > qPS it follows that C
0
(qFLP ) > C
0
(qPS) and therefore
@[ eDPSC  C(qPS)]
@q
> 0: AseDPSL   C(qPS) and eDFLPL   C(qFLP ) have the same cost function and are structurally
identical,
@[ eDPSC  C(qPS)]
@q
> 0 implies that eDPSL   C(qPS) < eDFLPL   C(qFLP ) and a
fortiori Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0 for   eFLP :
Next, consider the parameter range  < eNS:
For this range I want to show that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP > 0 whenever rH < r and Et=0PS  
Et=0FLP  0 whenever rH  r:
We know from the analysis of the optimal monitoring intensity that qNS > qPS >
qFLP : Given the derivatives
@[ eDFLPC  C(qFLP )]
@q
= f1  [p+ (1  p) ]gD   C 0(qFLP )
and
@[ eDPSC  C(qPS)]
@q
= f1  [p+ (1  p) ]gD   C 0(qPS) and a convex cost function
with C
00
(q) > 0; it follows with f1  [p+ (1  p) ]gD   C 0(q) = 0 at qNS that
@[ eDFLPC  C(qFLP )]
@q
>
@[ eDPSC  C(qPS)]
@q
> 0: As eDPSL   C(qPS) and eDFLPL   C(qFLP ) have
the same cost function and are structurally identical, this implies eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPL + C(qFLP ) > 0. Hence, if rH = 0; it would follow that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP > 0:
However, for rH > 0 as Et=0PS =
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSC   C(qPS) with h1+(1 )rH1+rH i < 1;
it can still be that Et=0PS < E
t=0
FLP : More specically, this is the case wheneverh
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSC  C(qPS)  eDFLPC +C(qFLP ) < 0: Solving for rH yields the threshold
value r:
Hence, with
@[ 1+(1 )r1+r ]
@r
=   
(1+r)2
< 0; it holds that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP  0 for rH  r and
for rH < r it holds that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP > 0 in the range  < eNS:
Finally, I consider the parameter range eNS   < eFLP :
For this range I want to show that for rH  r it follows that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP  0.
Furthermore, I want to show that for r  rH < r it follows that Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0
for  <  and Et=0PS   Et=0FLP  0 for    < eFLP :97
For this parameter range the originator chooses liquidation under PS and continuation
under FLP. With continuation under FLP, it follows immediately @E
t=0
FLP
@
= 0. Let
us rst assume that @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0 for this range: The threshold value r is derived by
setting the di¤erence in expected prots equal to zero at the upper limit eFLP , i.e.h
1+(1 )r
1+r
i h
qPS + (1  qPS)eFLPiD C(qPS)  eDFLPC +C(qFLP ) = 0; and solving for
r:With @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0 and @E
t=0
FLP
@
= 0 and
@[ 1+(1 )r1+r ]
@r
=   
(1+r)2
< 0 it follows immediately
97Note that with D

qPS + (1  qPS)(p+ (1  p)) > D qPS + (1  qPS)(p+ (1  p)) and (1 
) < 1 it follows immediately that r > r:
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that if rH > r, it can never hold that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP  0 in the range eNS   < eFLP :
However, if r  rH < r it follows from Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0 for  = eNS and Et=0PS  
Et=0FLP  0 if  approaches eFLP ; with @(Et=0PS  Et=0FLP )@ > 0 that there is one interception
point at which Et=0PS   Et=0FLP = 0: This interception point  is characterized by the
following equation: Et=0PS   Et=0FLP =
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i 
qPS + (1  qPS)D   C(qPS)  
qFLP + (1  qFLP ) [p+ (1  p) ]	D + C(qFLP ) = 0:
With @(E
t=0
PS  Et=0FLP )
@
> 0; it follows immediately that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP  0 for    <eFLP and Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0 for  < :
I still have to show that @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0 for  < eFLP .
The derivative of Et=0PS =
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i eDPSL   C(qPS) with respect to  is given by:
@Et=0PS
@
=
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i
(1  qPS)D + @qPS
@
nh
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i
(1  )D   C 0(qPS)
o
:
@qPS
@
can be derived from the monitoring FOC for PS by using the implicit function
theorem and is given by @q
PS
@
=   (1 )D
C00 (qPS) : Plugging the expression into the derivative
of the expected prot function yields
@Et=0PS
@
=
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i h
(1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)(1  )D
i
+ (1 )D
C00 (qPS)C
0
(qPS):
With
h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i
< 1 it holds thath
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i h
(1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)(1  )D
i
+ (1 )D
C00 (qPS)C
0
(qPS) >h
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
in
(1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)

(1  )D   C 0(qPS)o :
With the assumption
C
00
(qPS)
C0 (qPS) >

(1 qPS) for   p+ (1  p) it follows that
(1  qPS)D   D
C00 (qPS)
h
(1  )(1  )D   C 0(qPS)
i
| {z }
=0; as is FOC of PS
  D
C00 (qPS)C
0
(qPS) > 0:
Note that the LHS of the equation can be rearranged to
(1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)

(1  )D   C 0(qPS) :
As (1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)

(1  )D   C 0(qPS) > 0; it follows a fortiorih
1+(1 )rH
1+rH
i h
(1  qPS)D   (1 )D
C00 (qPS)(1  )D
i
+ (1 )D
C00 (qPS)C
0
(qPS) > 0:
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Considering Explicit Cost Functions
Note that the assumption C
00
(qPS)
C0 (qPS) >

(1 qPS) is only made, because I could not show
with an implicit cost function that @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0. In the following, I illustrate for two
di¤erent explicit cost functions that the assumption is not needed.
1) Cost function C(q) = q
1 q
With C
0
(q) = 1
(1 q)2 > 0 and C
00
(q) = 2
(1 q)3 > 0:
Even though C
0
(0) = 0 does not hold for this cost function, I ensure the existence of
an inner solution by setting (1  )(1  )D > 1:
The FOC for the optimal monitoring e¤ort under PS for liquidation, i.e.   eNS; is
given by
@Et=1PS
@q
= (1  )(1  )D   1
(1 qPS)2 = 0:
Solving for qPS yields, with qPS  1;
qPS = 1 
q
1
(1 )(1 )D :
As shown above, @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0; whenever (1 qPS)D  (1 )D
C00 (qPS)

(1  )D   C 0(qPS) > 0:
Hence, I have to show that (1  qPS)D   (1 )D2
(1 qPS)3
h
(1  )D   1
(1 qPS)2
i
> 0;
which is fullled, if
h
1  (1 )
2
(
 
1  qPS2 (1  )D   1)i > 0:
Plugging in qPS = 1 
q
1
(1 )(1 )D and simplifying yields 1 +
(1 )
2
  1
2
> 0;
which with  < 1 is always satised.
2) Quadratic cost function C(q) = q
2
2
With C
0
(q) = q > 0 and C
00
(q) = 1 > 0:
Even though limq !1C(q) = 1 does not hold, I ensure the existence of an inner
solution by setting D = 1.
The optimal monitoring e¤ort qPS under liquidation is given by
qPS = (1  )(1  ):
As shown above, @E
t=0
PS
@
> 0; whenever (1 qPS)D  (1 )D
C00 (qPS)

(1  )D   C 0(qPS) > 0:
Hence, it has to hold that [1  (1  )(1  )]  (1 ) [(1  )  (1  )(1  )] > 0:
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After some simplications, I obtain  + 2(1  ) > 0, which with ;  < 1 is always
satised.
A1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.7: The E¢ cient Resale Structure
The di¤erence in ex-ante total project values under FLP and PS is given by
EV t=0PS   EV t=0FLP =
8><>:
eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPL + C(qFLP ) if   eFLP ;eDPSL   C(qPS)  eDFLPC + C(qFLP ) if eNS   < eFLP ;eDPSC   C(qPS)  eDFLPC + C(qFLP ) if  < eNS;
with eFLP = p+ (1  p) and ePS = p+ (1  p)eDPSL = qPS + (1  qPS)D and eDPSC = qPS + (1  qPS)(p+ (1  p))D,eDFLPL = qFLP + (1  qFLP )D, and eDFLPC = qFLP + (1  qFLP )(p+ (1  p))D
For   eFLP it holds that EV t=0PS   EV t=0FLP < 0: The proof goes as in the proof of
Proposition 1.6 on page 102.
For  < eNS it holds that EV t=0PS   EV t=0FLP > 0: Again, the proof goes as in the proof
of Proposition 1.6 on page 103.
For eNS   < eFLP it holds that EV t=0PS  EV t=0FLP jeNS> 0 (argumentation as for the
case  < eNS). With @EV t=0PS@ = (1  qPS)D   (1 )DC00 (qPS) (1  )D + C 0(qPS) ; it follows
immediately with the assumption C
00
(qPS)
C0 (qPS) >

(1 qPS) that
@EV t=0PS
@
> 0:98
Together with @EV
t=0
FLP
@
= 0 this implies that EV t=0PS   EV t=0FLP > 0 also for the whole
range eNS   < eFLP :
A1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.8: Comparative Statics w.r.t.  for Incentives
Consider the liquidation decision rst.
With @
eNS
@
= 0 and @
eFLP
@
= 1   p > 0; it follows immediately that the threshold
value for e¢ cient liquidation eNS is not a¤ected, however the threshold value for liq-
uidation under FLP eFLP increases. Therefore, the range heNS; eFLPfor ine¢ cient
continuation under FLP increases.
98Again, this assumption is only needed for keeping the implicit form of the cost function. For
explicit cost functions I have shown above that D(1  qPS)  (1 )D
C00 (qPS)
(D(1 )+C 0(qPS)) > 0; which
is @EV
t=0
PS
@ > 0:
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Consider the monitoring decision next.
With the implicit function theorem, I obtain the following derivatives: @q
FLP
@
= 0 for
the range   eFLP = p + (1   p); and @qFLP@ =   (1 p)DC00 (qFLP ) < 0 for the range  <eFLP = p+ (1  p): Hence, the monitoring e¤ort equals the e¢ cient monitoring level
and is not a¤ected under FLP as long as   eFLP : For  < eFLP the ine¢ ciently low
monitoring e¤ort is further reduced by an increase in : Furthermore, with @
eFLP
@
> 0,
also the range for ine¢ cient monitoring under FLP is increased.
A1.8 Proof of Proposition 1.9: Comparative Statics w.r.t.  for E¢ cience
of Resale Choice
Note that in the following all parameters and thresholds with a dash indicate the values
after an increase in  to 0: E.g. eFLP is the initial threshold level for liquidation under
FLP and e0FLP the threshold after the increase in :
First, consider the derivative of the expected prots function Et=0FLP (which equals
EV t=0FLP ) under FLP with respect to  :
For   eFLP it is given by @Et=0FLP@ = h(1  )D   C 0(qFLP )i| {z }
=0
@qFLP
@| {z }
=0
= 0:
For  < eFLP it is given by
@Et=0FLP
@
=
n
[1  (p+ (1  p))]D   C 0(qFLP )
o
| {z }
>0; as (1 p)(1 )D>(1 p)(1 )D=C0 (qFLP )
@qFLP
@| {z }
<0
< 0:
With respect to the e¢ cient (second best) choice of the resale structure for   e 0FLP it
follows that EV t=0PS  EV t=0FLP  0 and for  < e 0FLP it follows that EV t=0PS  EV t=0FLP > 0.
Consider the originators choice of the resale structure as compared to the e¢ cient
structure next.
Independent of rH it still holds for   e 0FLP with @Et=0FLP@ = 0 and @Et=0PS@ = 0 that
Et=0PS   Et=0FLP < 0 is fullled (and the choice of FLP over PS is still e¢ cient).
1) rH  r
For  < eFLP ; with @Et=0FLP@ < 0 and @Et=0PS@ = 0; it follows immediately that Et=0PS  
Et=0FLP > 0 is a fortiori fullled (and the choice of PS over FLP still e¢ cient).
Appendix to Chapter 1 108
For eFLP   < e 0FLP the originator e¢ ciently chose FLP before the increase in  and
e¢ ciently chooses PS after the increase in :
2) r < rH  r
For  < eFLP with @Et=0FLP@ < 0 and @Et=0PS@ = 0; it follows immediately that @@ < 0
(and the choice of PS over FLP is still e¢ cient for this whole range). Hence, the range
for which FLP is ine¢ ciently chosen is reduced. Note that if  is reduced so much that

0
< eNS it follows that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP > 0 for the whole range, as the domain for 
is given by
heNS; eFLP and we switch to the case rH < r0.
For eFLP   < e 0FLP the originator e¢ ciently chose FLP before the increase in  and
e¢ ciently chooses PS after the increase in : Therefore the shift in eFLP does not have
any e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of the originators resale choice.
3) rH > r
With rH > r; it follows that Et=0PS  Et=0FLP > 0 for the whole range and the potential
interception point  lies outside the domain
heNS; eFLP at   eFLP : With @eFLP@ >
0, and   eFLP an increase in  initially leads to an increase of the range for which
FLP is ine¢ ciently chosen. Then, with @
@
< 0, as soon as 
0
< e 0FLP a further increase
in  begins to reduce the range for which FLP is ine¢ ciently chosen.99 Only if the
increase in  is so strong that 
0
< eFLP , it will reduce the range for which FLP is
ine¢ ciently chosen as compared to the situation before the change. Note further that
we switch to the case rH < r
0. If the increase in  is even larger, it follows that we
switch to the case rH < r0 and with 
0
< eNS the originator never ine¢ ciently chooses
FLP over PS.
99As for 
0
  < eFLP the originator e¢ ciently chooses PS a further increase in eFLP does not
a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the originators choice.
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A2.1 Derivation of Expected Prots
First, expected prots of the MNC depending on the interest rate required by external
investors for the di¤erent borrowing structures are given by
E(dd) = qddA (X  RddA D + F ) + qB(X  RddB D + F ) + (1  qddA )(1  p)F
+(1  qB)(1  p)F;
E(dc) = qdcA qB(2X  RdcAD  RdcBD + 2F ) + qdcA (1  qB)(X  RdcAD  RdcBD + 2F )
+(1  qdcA )qB(X  RdcBD + F + (1  p)F )
+(1  qdcA )(1  qB) [(1  p)F + (1  p)F ] ;
E(cd) = qcdA qB(2X  RcdAD  RcdBD + 2F ) + qB(1  qcdA )(X  RcdAD  RcdBD + 2F )
+(1  qB)qcdA

X  RcdAD + F + (1  p)F

+(1  qcdA )(1  qB) [(1  p)F + (1  p)F ] ;
E(cc) = qccA qB(2X   2RccD + 2F ) + [(1  qccA )qB + qccA (1  qB)] (X   2RccD + 2F )
+2(1  qccA )(1  qB)(1  p)F:
Secondly, interest rates are determined by the zero prot condition for investors and are
summarized for the di¤erent borrowing structures in the following table. The interest
rates in the left column indicate the borrowing for the foreign subsidiary A and in the
right column for subsidiary B.
A B
dd RddA =
D (1 qddA )pF
qddA D
RddB =
D (1 qB)pF
qBD
dc RdcA =
D (1 qdcA )pF
qdcA D
RdcB =
D (1 qdcA )(1 qB)pF
[qB+(1 qB)qdcA ]D
cd RcdA =
D (1 qcdA )(1 qB)pF
[qcdA +(1 qcdA )qB]D
RcdB =
D (1 qB)pF
qBD
(= RddB )
cc RccA = R
cc
B = R
cc =
D (1 qccA )(1 qB)pF
[qccA+(1 qccA )qB]D
Finally, plugging in the corresponding interest rates into the expected prot functions
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above yields after some algebraic simplication the expressions in section 2.3 on
page 54.
A2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2: Optimal Borrowing Structure with E = 0
First, we derive the conditions for the optimal borrowing structure:
With E = 0; it follows that qdcA = q
dd
A = pM and q
cd
A = q
cc
A = (1  qB)pM .
As pM(1  qB)  0 holds 8 qB [0; 1], the comparison of expected prots under dd and
dc yields: E(dc)  E(dd) 8 qB [0; 1].
Similarly, we also obtain: E(cc)  E(cd) 8 qB [0; 1].
Comparing expected prots for cc and dc yields the optimality conditions specied in
Proposition 2.2.
Secondly, we illustrate the existence of the full-set result with a numerical example:
For a full set of optimal borrowing structures to exist, i.e. that there are parameter
ranges for which for lower values of p up to p1 cc is optimal and starting from p1 dc is
optimal, the following constraints have to be fullled:100
1a) NPVB  0 : qBX  D + F  0;
1b) NPVA(dc)  0 : pMX  D + F  0;
1c) NPVA(cc)  0 : (1  qB)pMX  D + F  0;
2a) 0  qdcA  1 : 0  pM  1;
2b) 0  qccA  1 : 0  (1  qB)pM  1;
3) DRdcA  F [1  (1  p)] (no incentive to bailout A under dc),101
4a) For p  p1: X  2DRcc (coinsurance of both subsidiaries possible),
4b) For p > p1: X  D(RdcB + RdcA ) (debt repayment for A and coinsurance of B
possible).
Now consider the following parameter set: X = 2000;  = 0:1; M = 0:5; qB = 0:8;
D = 160, F = 220 and naturally E = 0. In this example, p1 = 0; 1739: Thus, for
100The conditions RijA  1 and RijB  1 with i; j = c; d do not have to be fullled with E = 0. It is
only relevant for the cases with small and large empire-building tendencies.
101This is the only condition with respect to the incentives to bailout, as with E = 0 decentralized
borrowing for subsidiary A occurs only if p  p1. The borrowing for subsidiary B is always centralized
and if p1 < p for subsidiary A as well.
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p < p1 = 0; 1739; it follows that E(cc) > E(cd) whereas for p  p1 = 0; 1739
it follows that E(cd)  E(cc). Consider the above listed constraints next: With
F > D the constraints 1a)-1c) are slack 8p 2 [0; 1]. With M; p  0 and qB  1
the left hand side of both conditions 2a) and 2b) are never binding. The right hand
side of condition 2b) holds as long as the right hand side of condition 2a) is fullled.
With @q
dc
A
@p
> 0 and qdcA (p = 1) = 0:5 both conditions are fullled on the whole range of
p 2 [0; 1]. As condition 3) becomes more binding with higher values of p (and hence c.p.
lower interest rates), it is again su¢ cient to check the condition for p = 1: At p = 1,
DRdcA = 298 > F [1  (1  p)] = 220. And nally, we have to check the coinsurance
condition: With the constraints 4a) and 4b) becoming more binding for lower values of
p, it su¢ ces to check them at the lowest relevant value of p.102 Under cc this value is
p = 0. For p = 0, 2DRcc = 400 < 2000 = X. The lowest relevant value for p under dc
is p1 = 0; 1739. For p1, D(RdcB +R
dc
A ) = 1994:8777 < 2000 = X. Both of the conditions
are hence fullled.
A2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3: Optimal Borrowing Structure with 0 < E <E
Expected prots as a function of creditor rights p are given by
E(dd) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F + E [X + (1  )F ]| {z }
Idd
+[X + (1  )F ]M| {z }
Sdd
p;
E(dc) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F + qBE [X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]| {z }
Idc
+[X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]M| {z }
Sdc
p;
102Strictly speaking the coinsurance condition only has to be fullled under the respectively optimal
borrowing structure. With the condition becoming more binding with lower p and cc optimal for
0  p  p1, 4a) has to hold on the whole range, whereas 4b) only has to hold for p  p1. If condition
4b) is binding for p < p1 no coinsurance can be realized for this range. Without the possibility of
coinsuring subsidiary A, the borrowing structure turns de facto into dd. If furthermore X is even
too low to meet required debt repayments in case of success, investors will not be willing to lend to
the unit and it will make zero prots. In both cases however, expected prots are a fortiori less than
under cc and therefore do not interfere with the optimality of cc.
Note further that the issue of a binding constraint with decentralized borrowing for subsidiary A
arises for very low values of p only due to our specic model set-up with a base-line probability of
success of zero for subsidiary A in the absence of managerial e¤orts. Allowing for a more complex
model set-up with a xed base-line probability of success for subsidiary A larger than zero releases
the constraints. However, introducing the base-line probability of success unnecessarily complicates
the modeling without adding to the main insights of our simpler model.
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E(cd) = qBX   2D + 2 [1  (1  qB)(1  )]F + E [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ]| {z }
Icd
+[X + (1  qB)(1  )F ] (1  qB)M| {z }
Scd
p;
E(cc) = qBX   2D + 2[1  (1  qB)(1  )]F + qBE[X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ]| {z }
Icc
+[X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ](1  qB)M| {z }
Scc
p:
First, we show that for p = 0 (thus the intercept) the following ordering:
A) Icd  Icc  Idd  Idc if X(1 )F 
qB (1 2qB+2q2B)E
(1 qB)E ;
B) Icd  Idd  Icc  Idc if X(1 )F >
qB (1 2qB+2q2B)E
(1 qB)E :
This ordering can be derived by comparing the intercepts:
Idc  Idd if
qB [X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]  X + (1  )F and can be rearranged to
 (1  qB)2(1  )F  (1  qB)X and thus
 (1  qB)(1  )F| {z }
0
 X|{z}
0
; which is fullled.
Idc  Icc if
 (2 qB)(1 )F+qBE(2 qB)(1 )F   2(1 qB)(1 )F+qBE2(1 qB)(1 )F
(1  )F (2  2qB   2 + qB)  qBE(1  )F (2  2qB   2 + qB)
 qB(1  )F  qBE(1  )F (2  2qB   2 + qB) and thus
qBE  1, which has to hold for an internal solution.
Idd  Icd if
 (2  qB)(1  )F + E(1  )F   2(1  qB)(1  )F + E(1  qB)(1  )F
E(1  1 + qB)  2  qB   2 + 2qB
EqB  qB.
As with the condition for an internal solution pM + E  1 it holds that E  1, it
follows that EqB  qB is satised.
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Icc  Icd if
qB[X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ]E  [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ]E
(1  )F (2qB   1)| {z }
1
 X:
Thus, if we can show that (1  )F  X this condition will be satised.
X  (1   )F is always true as long as net interest rates are positive, i.e. RijA  1
and RijB  1 with i; j = c; d: As is shown further down, the borrowing structure dc can
only be optimal for the highest values of p.103 Under dc, the condition "no incentive
to bailout subsidiary A", DRdcA  F [1  (1  p)] has to hold. Secondly, with @R
dc
A
@p
< 0
(proof see section A2.6), this relationship holds a fortiori for all lower values of p. With
RdcA  1 and (1   p)  1; we conclude that D  F (1   ) for all relevant values of
p. As returns have to be high enough to repay the debt under all optimal borrowing
structures, it follows with RijA  1 and RijB  1 that X  D holds for all relevant values
of p. Combining these two conditions yields X  (1  )F for all relevant values of p.
Idd  Icc if
 (2 qB)(1 )F+E[X+(1 )F ]   2(1 qB)(1 )F+qBE[X+2(1 qB)(1 )F ]:
This can be rearranged to the above condition
X
(1 )F 
qB (1 2qB+2q2B)E
(1 qB)E :
Secondly, we show that the following ordering holds for the slope of the expected prot
functions:
1) Sdc  Sdd  Scc  Scd if X(1 )F  2(1 qB)
2 1
qB
;
2) Sdc  Scc  Sdd  Scd if X(1 )F < 2(1 qB)
2 1
qB
:
Sdc  Sdd if
X + (2  qB)(1  )F  X + (1  )F:
Rearranging yields the condition (2  qB)  1, which is always fullled.
Sdc  Scc if
X + (2  qB)(1  )F  (1  qB)X + 2(1  qB)2(1  )F:
103This is due to the fact that it has the lowest interception point at p = 0 and the steepest slope
Sdc.
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Rearranging yields
qBX  (1  )F (2q2B   3qB)
X|{z}
>0
 (1  )F| {z }
>0
(2qB   3)| {z } ,
<0
which is always fullled.
Sdd  Scd if
X + (1  )F  (1  qB)X + (1  qB)2(1  )F:
Rearranging yields
qBX  (1  )F [(1  qB)2   1]
X|{z}
>0
 (1  )F| {z }
>0
(qB   2)| {z }
<0
, which is always fullled.
Scc  Scd if
[X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ](1  qB)  [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ](1  qB):
Rearranging yields 2  1, which is always fullled.
Sdd  Scc if
X + (1  )F  [X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ](1  qB):
Rearranging yields the above condition
X
F (1 )  2(1 qB)
2 1
qB
Next, by comparing expected prots under the di¤erent borrowing structures, we obtain
the following interception points. As expected prots are linear in p, there is only one
interception point between two expected prot functions.
E(cc)  E(cd) : p  p2 = [X+(1 2qB)(1 )F ]E(1 qB)(1 )FM ;
E(dc)  E(cc) : p  p3 = (1 )F (1 EqB)[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]M ;
E(dd)  E(cd) : p  p4 = (1 )F (1 E)[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]M ;
E(dc)  E(dd) : p  p5 = [X+(1 qB)(1 )F ]E(1 )FM ;
E(dd)  E(cc) :
p  (<)p6 = (1 )FfqB E[1 2(1 qB)qB ]g X(1 qB)EfqBX+(1 )F [1 2(1 qB)2]gM ; if qBX+(1 )F [1 2(1 qB)2]  (<)0:
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Based on these interception points and by applying the relationship X  (1 )F , we
derive that p2  p5.
Now consider the condition E < E = (1 qB)(1 )
2F 2
X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F 2
. This con-
dition only holds if p2 < p3 and ensures that there is a range [p2; p3] for which the
borrowing structure cc dominates cd but is not dominated by dc (yet) and hence can
be optimal. We nally have to show that for this parameter range cc is not dominated
by dd either. First note that with p2  p5 and p2 < p3 holding contemporaneously,
it follows immediately that cc cannot be "fully dominated" by dd; i.e. that together
with p2  p5 and p2 < p3, Scc  Sdd and Icc  Idd cannot hold contemporaneously:
Scc  Sdd with Icc  Idd implies that p4 < p2. This together with p2  p5 would
necessitate p3 < p2, which is a contradiction.
Thus, with p2  p5 and p2 < p3 the possible cases to be investigated reduce to three: 1)
Sdd < Scc ^ Idd < Icc, 2) Sdd < Scc ^ Idd  Icc and 3) Sdd  Scc ^ Idd < Icc. Under 1) cc
can never be dominated by dd as in this case the expected prots function for cc runs
above the expected prots function for dd 8 p  0. For 2) it follows with Sdd < Scc,
Idd  Icc and p2  p5 that p6 < p2 and thus for p2 < p < p3 dd will be dominated by
cc. And nally for 3) it follows with p2  p5 and p2 < p3 that dd is dominated by dc
from p5 on while cc dominates dc until p3. Hence with p2 < p3 dd cannot dominate cc
on the relevant interval.
Having derived the optimality condition for the sequencing cd! cc! dc we illustrate
existence of the full solution set cd ! cc ! dc with a numerical example: Consider
the parameter values  = 0:1; M = 1:2; E = 0:001; qB = 0:8; X = 2200; D = 160
and F = 220. As long as the necessary constraints positive NPVs and net interest
rates, the possibility of debt repayments and coinsurance, no incentive to bailout and
probabilities 2 [0; 1] hold, expected prots are given by the following prot functions:
E(dd) = 1644:7980 + 2877:6000p;
E(dc) = 1644:3501 + 2925:1200p;
E(cd) = 1803:0396 + 537:5040p;
E(cc) = 1802:6234 + 547:0080p:
As for the given parameter set: E = 0:001 < E = 0:0015; the sequencing range is
cd ! cc ! dc, with the interception point between cd and cc given by p2 = 0:0438
and the interception point between cc and dc given by p3 = 0:06655. Thus, cd is the
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optimal borrowing structure for p < p2, cc the optimal structure for p2  p  p3 and
dc the optimal borrowing structure for p > p3, if the above mentioned constraints hold.
We check the conditions in the following:104
First of all, the NPV of both projects is positive under all borrowing structures: As
the NPV of project A and B are given by NPVA = qA(p)X   D + F and NPVB =
qBX D+F respectively, this follows fromD < F for the numerical example. Consider
the constraint with respect to the e¤ort level next. For having an internal solution of the
optimization problem qA(p)  1 has to hold for the optimal borrowing structures. With
qddA = pM + E  1 as the tightest constraint in the full solution-range p is bounded
above by p = 0:8325:105 Next we consider the constraint "no incentive to bailout"
subsidiary A and B, which in general terms is given by DR(p)  F [1 (1  p)]. This
constraint can be rearranged to p  pcd = D qB(1 )F
F
= 0:0727 for subsidiary B under
cd and p  pdc = D qB(1 )FE
F+(1 )FM = 0:6157 for subsidiary A under dc.
106 While with
p2 = 0:0438 the condition is easily fullled under the optimal borrowing structure cd,
with p  pdc = 0:6157 it imposes an upper boundary on the feasible range for p. As
Rijk > 1 at p
dc
= 0:6157 and @R
ij
k
@p
< 0 8i; j 2 fc; dg ^ k = A;B for this example, the
constraint becomes less binding the higher p. And hence the condition for positive net
interest rates is fullled on the relevant range as well.
Finally, consider the coinsurance constraint.107 With @R
dc
A
@p
 0 (proof see section A2.6)
and @R
cd
B
@p
 0 (which is generally true as with RcdB  1; pF  D holds and hence
@RcdB
@p
 0) the constraints become less binding the higher p: Hence, if it is fullled for
the lowest relevant value of p, it will be fullled in the whole relevant range. For cd, the
lowest possible value of p is p = 0. At p = 0, D(RcdA + R
cd
B ) = 399:9600 < X = 2200.
The lowest relevant value of p for cc is p2 = 0:0438. At p2, D(RccA +R
cc
B ) = 399:9200 <
X = 2200. And nally, the lowest relevant value of p under dc is p3 = 0:06655. At
104Note that we only check that the constraints hold for the optimal borrowing structure at a given
p. However, this does not constitute a major problem. Even if the constraints for non-optimal bor-
rowing structures might be binding for some values of p, expected prots in this case never exceed
expected prots under the then optimal borrowing structure. Note furthermore that potential compli-
cations with respect to binding constraints would easily disappear in a setting with a certain baseline
probability of success (independent of managerial e¤ort) for subsidiary A as the constraints typically
become very slack. However, as complicating the analysis does not ad any major additional insights
to our analysis, we stick to the simpler and analytically clearer version of this paper.
105Note that relaxing this boundary would not change the results obtained in our model. Even with
a corner solution, the borrowing structure dc would still be optimal.
106In this case with weak empire-building tendencies, cd and dc are the only two borrowing structures
for which this condition has to be fullled.
107Note that the coinsurance condition, which has to hold for all three optimal borrowing structures,
ensures that the return X is high enough to meet debt repayments as well.
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p1, D(RdcA + R
dc
B ) = 2162:6645 < X = 2200. Hence, all of the relevant conditions are
fullled.
A2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4: Optimal Borrowing Structure with E >E
The rst part of the proof for Proposition 2.3 also applies for Proposition 2.4. Therefore,
we can directly turn to the proof of the sequencing cd ! dd ! dc. Consider the
condition E > E = (1 )
2F 2
X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F 2
. This condition only holds if
p4 < p5 and ensures that there is a range [p4; p5] for which the borrowing structure
dd dominates cd but is not dominated by dc (yet). In this case, we have to show
that for this parameter range dd cannot be dominated by cc. Along the lines of our
argumentation for case 2, it follows that with p2  p5 and p4 < p5; dd cannot be
fully dominated by cc, i.e. Scc  Sdd and Icc  Idd cannot hold contemporaneously.
For E > E, the possible cases reduce to the following: 1) Sdd  Scc ^ Idd  Icc , 2)
Sdd  Scc ^ Idd < Icc and 3) Sdd < Scc ^ Idd  Icc. Under 1) dd can never be dominated
by cc as in this case the expected prots function for dd runs above the expected prots
function for cc 8 p  0. Under 2) as p2  p5 and with condition E > E; p4 < p5 hold,
Sdd  Scc ^ Idd < Icc imply that p6 < p4. Hence, for p4  p  p5 cc will be dominated
by dd. And nally, under 3) with p2  p5 and p4 < p5 it follows with Icc  Idd that cc
cannot dominate dd on the relevant range [p4; p5].
Having proven the optimality condition for the sequencing cd ! dd ! dc; we again
illustrate existence of the full solution set with a numerical example:
Consider the parameter values  = 0:1; M = 1:2; E = 0:13; qB = 0:7; X = 2200;
D = 400 and F = 410. For the internal solution expected prots are given by
E(dd) = 1414:2700 + 3082:8000p;
E(dc) = 1324:1527 + 3215:6400p;
E(cd) = 1638:9910 + 831:8520p;
E(cc) = 1558:9474 + 871:7040p:
With E = 0:0215 < E = 0:13 the condition for the optimal sequencing of cd! dd! dc
is fullled. The interception points between cd=dd and dd=dc are given by p4 = 0:0998
and p5 = 0:6784 respectively. Again, with F > D; the NPV of both investment
projects is positive. The upper boundary due to the internal solution requirement for
the optimal e¤ort level under dd is given by p = 0:725. In this case, with @R
dc
A
@p
<
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0;
@RddA
@p
< 0, @R
dd
B
@p
< 0 and @R
cd
B
@p
< 0 all of the "no incentive to bailout" conditions are
slack: While the condition for subsidiary B is always satised for p  D qB(1 )F
F
=
3; 456; it is satised for A under dc for p  D qBE(1 )F
F+(1 )FM = 0:7574 and under dd for
p  D E(1 )F
F+(1 )FM = 0:7276. Again it can be shown that also the condition of positive
net interest rates, hence R > 1 is fullled on the whole relevant range of p  0:725.
And nally, the coinsurance conditions and hence the condition for su¢ cient returns
to meet debt repayments hold for cd at p = 0, which is the lowest possible value
for p in the optimality range of cd; as X   D(RcdB + RcdA ) = 1087:2994 > 0. And
for dd at p4,as X   D(RddB + RddA ) = 41:3424 > 0:108 And nally for dc at p5, as
X  D(RdcB +RdcA ) = 1350:0512 > 0. Hence, all of the relevant conditions are fullled.
A2.5 Proof of Corollary 2.1: Corner Solutions of Managerial Incentive Prob-
lem
Consider the optimization constraint 0  qA  1.
1) With E, M  0, the lower boundary is never violated. The probability of success
for subsidiary A is at most equal to zero. With qA = 0 expected prots reduce to
E(dd) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F;
E(dc) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F;
E(cd) = qBX   2D + [2  2(1  qB)(1  )]F;
E(cc) = qBX   2D + [2  2(1  qB)(1  )]F;
yielding E(dd) = E(dc)  E(cd) = E(cc) 8p 2 [0; 1].
2) The upper boundary can be binding if E and/or M are relatively large. If for a
borrowing structure the upper boundary is binding, i.e. qA = 1, project A is certainly
successful. A further increase in the e¤ort level would reduce the expected utility
of the subsidiary manager, as it causes additional e¤ort costs without increasing the
probability of success. Thus, as soon as qA = 1 is reached, the manager does not
further increase his e¤ort level. Consider the "strongest" corner solution, i.e. qccA =
(1   qB)pM + qBE = 1. As the incentives under cc are weakest, this implies that the
upper boundary is bind a fortiori for the other borrowing structures.109 In this case
108Note, that we do not need this condition under dd as no coinsurance takes place. However, if
even the coinsurance condition is fullled, than X is by far high enough to meet debt repayments in
both subsidiaries.
109If E and M are not as large the upper limit might not be binding for cc but only for dc. In this
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expected prots reduce to
E(dd) = (1 + qB)X   2D + [2  (1  qB)(1  )]F;
E(dc) = (1 + qB)X   2D + 2F;
E(cd) = (1 + qB)X   2D + [2  (1  qB)(1  )]F;
E(cc) = (1 + qB)X   2D + 2F;
yielding E(dd) = E(cd)  E(dc) = E(cc) 8p 2 [0; 1].
Thus, both with qA = 0 and qccA = 1 the borrowing structure cc yields at least as much
expected prots as any other borrowing structure and hence is optimal.
A2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5: Creditor Rights and Interest Rates
For RdcA =
D [1 (pM+qBE)]pF
(pM+qBE)D
:
@RdcA
@p
=
0z }| {
 F (1  qBE)(pM + qBE)
0z }| {
 M fD   [1  (pM + qBE)]pFg
D (EqB +Mp)
2| {z }
0
 0:
For RddA =
D [1 (pM+E)]pF
(pM+E)D
:
@RddA
@p
=
0z }| {
 
0z }| {
(1  E)F (pM + E)
0z }| {
 M
0; as RddA 1z }| {
fD   [1  (pM + E)]pFg
D (E +Mp)2| {z }
0
 0:
A2.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6: Comparative Statics X
p1 :
@
n
(1 )F
M [X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]
o
@X
=   (1 )F
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]2M  0:
case, independent of whether qdcA 7 qcdA the optimal borrowing structure is dc. With dc, the CEO can
realize highest possible prots as subsidiary A is successful with certainty: By coinsuring subsidiary
B, the CEO can eliminate bankruptcy costs, without a¤ecting the e¤ort level, as qdcA = 1.
Similarly, there might be a situation, in which the upper limit binds for cd. Now, two cases have
to be distinguished: Either it holds that pME  (1 qB)qB , than we are back to the situation in the case
above. Or pME <
(1 qB)
qB
. In this case, we have the trade-o¤s discussed in the main part of the paper.
Note however, that a fully decentralized debt structure will entail no advantages as compared to cd
anymore.
And nally, with the same argumentation, if the upper limit only binds for dd, we again face the
trade-o¤s discussed in the main part of the paper.
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With p2 :
@
n
[X+(1 )F (1 2qB)]E
M [(1 )F (1 qB)]
o
@X
= E
(1 qB)(1 )FM  0
and p3 :
@
n
(1 )F (1 EqB)
[X+(1 )F (3 2qB)]M
o
@X
=   (1 )F
M
0 for qA1z }| {
(1  EqB)
[X + F (1  )(3  2qB)]2| {z }
0
 0
) @(p3 p2)
@X
 0:
With p4 :
@
n
(1 )F (1 E)
[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]M
o
@X
=   (1 )F
M
0 for qA1z }| {
(1  E)
[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]2  0
and p5 :
@
n
E[X+F (1 )(1 qB)]
MF (1 )
o
@X
= 1
M
E
(1 )F  0
) @(p5 p4)
@X
 0:
E : @E
@X
=
@

(1 qB)(1 )2F2
X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F2

@X
=   (1  )2 F 2 (1  qB) 
4(1 qB)(1 )F+2X
[X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F 2]
2  0:
E : @E
@X
=
@

(1 )2F2
X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F2

@X
=   (1  )2 F 2
0z }| {
(1  )F
>0z }| {
(3  2qB) + 2X
[X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F 2]
2  0:
A2.8 Proof of Proposition 2.7: Comparative Statics F
p1 :
@
n
(1 )F
M [X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]
o
@F
= 1
M
X (1 )
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]2  0:
With p2 :
@

[X+(1 2qB)(1 )F ]E
(1 qB)(1 )FM

@F
=   1
F 2M
X E
(1 )(1 qB)  0
and p3 :
@
n
(1 )F (1 EqB)
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]M
o
@F
= 1
M
X (1  )
0 for qA1z }| {
(1  EqB)
[X+F (1 )(3 2qB)]2  0
) @(p3 p2)
@F
 0:
With p4 :
@(
(1 )F (1 E)
M [X+(2 qB)(1 )F ] )
@F
= 1
M
X (1  )
0 for qA1z }| {
(1  E)
[X+F (1 )(2 qB)]2  0
and p5 :
@(
E[X+(1 qB)(1 )F ]
(1 )FM )
@F
=   1
F 2M
EX
(1 )  0
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) @(p5 p4)
@F
 0:
E : @E
@F
=
@(
(1 qB)(1 )2F2
X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F2
)
@F
= 2FX (1  )2 (1  qB) 
2(1 qB)(1 )F+X
[X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3+3q2B 7qB)(1 )2F 2]
2  0:
E : @E
@F
=
@(
(1 )2F2
X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F2
)
@F
= FX (1  )2 
0z }| {
(1  )F
>0z }| {
(3  2qB) + 2X
[X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F 2]
2  0:
A2.9 Proof of Proposition 2.8: Comparative Statics E and M
The derivatives of the optimality threshold values with respect to E are given by
p2 :
@p2
@E
= 1
(1 qB)(1 )FM [X + (1  2qB)(1  )F ] :
With @[X+F (1 )(1 2qB)]
@qB
=  2(1 )F  0 the most negative value for (1 2qB)(1 )F
is  (1   )F . With X  (1   )F it follows that [X + (1  2qB)(1  )F ]  0
8qB 2 [0; 1] and hence @p2@E  0.
p3 :
@p3
@E
=   qB
M
(1 )F
[X + (3  2qB)(1  )F ]| {z }
0
 0:
p4 :
@p4
@E
=   (1 )F
[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]M  0:
p5 :
@p5
@E
= 1
(1 )FM [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ]  0:
) With @p2
@E
 0 and @p3
@E
 0 the optimality ranges for:
cd increases,
cc decreases,
dc increases.
) With @p5
@E
 0, @p4
@E
 0 the optimality ranges for:
cd decreases,
dd increases,
dc decreases.
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And nally, with higher values of E it is more likely that the MNC is in a situation
with strong empire-building tendencies as the condition E < E becomes more binding
and the condition E > E easier to be fullled.
The derivatives of the optimality threshold values with respect to M are given by
p2 :
@p2
@M
=   1
(1 )FM2
E
(1 qB) [X + (1  2qB)(1  )F ] :
With the same rationing as above for E it follows that
@p2
@M
 0:
p3 :
@p3
@M
=   (1 )F
M2
(1 EqB)
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ]  0:
p4 :
@p4
@M
=   (1 )F
M2
(1 E)
[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ]  0:
p5 :
@p5
@M
=   E
(1 )FM2 [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ]  0:
) With @p2
@M
 0 and @p3
@M
 0, the size of the e¤ects has to be compared:
@p3
@M
> @p2
@M
if
(1 )F
M2
1 EqB
[X+(3 2qB)(1 )F ] <
1
(1 )FM2
E
(1 qB) [X + (1  2qB)(1  )F ] :
Solving for E yields E > (1 qB)(1 )
2F 2
[X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3 7qB+3q2)(1 )2F 2] .
However, this is a contradiction to the condition for being in case 2 with weak empire-
building tendencies E < E = (1 qB)(1 )
2F 2
X2+4(1 qB)(1 )FX+(3 7qB+3q2)(1 )2F 2 . It follows that
@p3
@M
< @p2
@M
and the optimality range for
dc increases,
cc decreases,
cd decreases.
) Similarly, we have to compare @p5
@M
 0 und @p4
@M
 0.
@p5
@M
< @p4
@M
if E
(1 )FM2 [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ] > (1 )FM2 1 E[X+(2 qB)(1 )F ] :
Solving for E yields: E > (1 )
2F 2
[X2+(3 2qB)(1 )FX+(3 3qB+q2B)(1 )2F 2]
which is exactly the
condition E > E for case 3. It follows that @p5
@M
< @p4
@M
and the optimality range for
dc increases,
dd decreases,
cd decreases.
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A2.10 Proof of Proposition 2.9: Di¤erences in 
With P for the parental country and A for the foreign country of subsidiary A,
interest rates are given by the following table:
A B
dd RddA =
D (1 qddA )pAF
qddA D
RddB =
D (1 qB)pPF
qBD
dc RdcA =
D (1 qdcA )pAF
qdcA D
RdcB =
D (1 qdcA )(1 qB)pPF
[qB+(1 qB)qdcA ]D
cd RcdA =
D (1 qcdA )(1 qB)pPF
[qcdA +(1 qcdA )qB ]D
RcdB =
D (1 qB)pPF
qBD
(= RddB )
cc Rcc =
D (1 qccA )(1 qB)pPF
[qccA+(1 qccA )qB]D
Plugging these into the new expected prots functions gives after some algebraic sim-
plications the following expected prot functions
E(dd) = (qddA + qB)X   2D +

qddA (1  A) + A + P + qB(1  P )

F;
E(dc) = (qdcA + qB)X   2D +

2qdcA + (1  qdcA ) [A + P (1  qB) + qB]
	
F;
E(cd) = (qcdA + qB)X   2D +

2  (1  qB)(2  qcdA )(1  P )

F;
E(cc) = (qccA + qB)X   2D + [2  2(1  qccA )(1  qB)(1  P )]F:
Note that the optimal e¤ort levels qijA with i; j 2 fd; cg are independent of :
As we want to investigate the e¤ect of A " starting from a situation with  = A = P
we consider how expected prots react to an increase in A :
@E(dd)
@A
jA=P== (1  qddA )F  0;
@E(dc)
@A
jA=P== (1  qdcA )F  0;
@E(cd)
@A
jA=P== 0;
@E(cc)
@A
jA=P== 0:
With qdcA < q
dd
A it follows that
@E(cc)
@A
= @E(cd)
@A
= 0  @E(dd)
@A
 @E(dc)
@A
:
A2.11 Proof of Proposition 2.10: Di¤erences in p
With pP for creditor rights in the parental country and pA for creditor rights in the
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foreign country, the internal solutions for the optimal e¤ort levels are given by
qddA = pAM + E;
qdcA = pAM + qBE;
qcdA = (1  qB)pBM + E;
qccA = (1  qB)pBM + qBE:
Thus, expected prots under the di¤erent borrowing structures are given by
E(dd) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F + E [X + (1  )F ]
+ [X + (1  )F ]MpA;
E(dc) = qBX   2D + [2  (2  qB)(1  )]F + qBE [X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]
+ [X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]MpA;
E(cd) = qBX   2D + 2 [1  (1  qB)(1  )]F + E [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ]
+ [X + (1  qB)(1  )F ] (1  qB)MpB;
E(cc) = qBX   2D + 2 [1  (1  qB)(1  )]F + qBE [X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ]
+ [X + 2(1  qB)(1  )F ] (1  qB)MpB:
Starting from a situation with p = pA = pP we consider the e¤ect of pA " on expected
prots:
@E(dd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= [X + (1  )F ]M;
@E(dc)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= [X + (2  qB)(1  )F ]M;
@E(cd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= 0;
@E(cc)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= 0:
With (2  qB)  1 it follows that
@E(cd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p= @E(cc)@pA jpA=pP=p= 0 
@E(dd)
@pA
jpA=pP=p @E(dc)@pA jpA=pP=p.
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A3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2: Equilibrium in the Open Economy
In a rst step assume that all potential constraints are non-binding and that all rms
with costs of cross-listing Fi  F  decide to cross-list in t=0.110 This corresponds to
a cross-listing fraction F

F
of good rms and of F

F
of total rms. The share of good
rms remaining on the home market pool is
 F
F
1 F
F
:
If all remaining rms in the local pool borrow in t=2, investors require a pooling
interest rate which satises: EI =
 F
F
1 F
F
eR   R0 = 0. Thus, in t=1, investors o¤er
a pooling contract with eR(F ) = R0(1 FF )
 F
F
, if X  eR(F ). They do not o¤er any
pooling credit contract if X < eR(F ): Investors furthermore o¤er a credit contract at
R0 to all cross-listing rms, as these are correctly identied as good rms.
Next, consider the decision of a good rm to cross-list in t=0. Let us rst assume
that enough good rms remain in the local market, such that X   eR(F )  0: In
this case good rms cross-list whenever expected prots of cross-listing are higher than
on the home market pool. A good rms expected prots with cross-listing is given
by ECL(Fi) = X   R0   Fi: Fi is its individual costs of cross-listing drawn from
the uniform distribution on

0; F

: With the fraction of F

F
of all good rms cross-
listing, an individual good rms expected prots on the home market is given by
EH(F
) = X   eR(F ): Note that with a continuum of rms, a single rm does not
a¤ect the interest rate at the home market eR(F ). Hence, given the marginal rm F 
that cross-lists, prots on the home market can be seen as constant.
For the marginal rm to cross-list it has to hold that ECL(F ) = EH(F ): Note
that with @ECL(Fi)
@Fi
< 0 and @EH(F
)
@Fi
= 0; given that the marginal rm to cross-list is
110In the following analysis, Fi always refers to an arbitrary rm i, whereas F  and F i indicate the
marginal rm to cross-list.
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F ; rms with Fi < F  indeed prefer cross-listing, as for them ECL(Fi) > EH(F ).
Firms with Fi > F  indeed prefer the home market pool, as for them ECL(Fi) <
EH(F
): The indi¤erence condition for the marginal rm ECL(F ) = X R0 F  =
X  R0(1 
F
F
)
 F
F
= EH(F
) can be rearranged to F 2   FF  + F

R0(1  )  0; which
solving for F  yields the following two possible solutions:
F 1 =
F
2
h
 
q
2   4R0
F
(1  )
i
;
F 2 =
F
2
h
+
q
2   4R0
F
(1  )
i
:
Given the two equilibrium candidates, we rst control for possibly binding constraints:
A) Existence of an Internal Solution
For an internal solution to exist, it has to hold that 0  F i  F and
2   4R0
F
(1  ) > 0:
First, consider 0  F i  F :
With 2   4R0
F
(1   ) < 2 and hence  >
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ) neither the LHS nor
the RHS of the condition is binding.
Second, consider 2   4R0
F
(1  ) > 0 :
With the assumption F > max
n
4R0(1 )

;X  R0
o
; the condition 2  4R0
F
(1 ) > 0
holds throughout the paper.111
B) Non-Negativity Condition
The local pool breaks down as soon as the marginal rm with costs of cross listing
FMBD leaves the local market. FMBD is characterized by
X   R0(1 
FMBD
F
)
(1 FMBD
F
)
= 0:
Solving for the threshold marginal rm FMBD yields FMBD = F

X R0
(X R0) :
With
p 
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ); it follows that F 1  FMBD if
R0(1  12(  2
p|{z})
<
)
| {z }
>0;<1
 1
2
X(+
p)| {z }
>0
;
111Note that if 2  4R0
F
(1 ) = 0; we would have a unique solution and if 2  4R0
F
(1 ) < 0;
cross-listing would dominate borrowing on the home market pool. In equilibrium all good rms that
could realize positive expected prots by cross-listing would do so and the home market pool would
break down.
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which solving for X yields the condition
X  X1 = R0(2 +
p)
+
p :
Similarly, F 2  FMBD holds whenever
X  X2 = R0(2  
p)
 p :
Comparing X1 to X2 shows that X2 > X1 for all parameter ranges:
Note that with @ECL
@F i
=  1 < 0 and @EH
@F i
=   R0(1 )
F (1 F

i
F
)
< 0; expected prots for the
marginal rm are both decreasing in F i : While with
@2ECL
@F 2i
= 0, ECL(F i ) linearly
falls in F i , EH(F

i ) is a concave function in F

i , i.e.
@2EH
@F 2i
=  R0(1 )
(F F i )2
< 0.
This implies, with F 1 < F

2 ; that ECL(F

i ) > EH(F

i ) if the marginal rm to cross-
list is given by F i < F

1 , ECL(F

i )  EH(F i ) if the marginal rm to cross-list is
given by F 1  F i  F 2 and again ECL(F i ) > EH(F i ) if F i > F 2 :
Consider the di¤erent parameter ranges for X next:
1) X  X2:
For this parameter range the zero prot condition is neither binding for F 1 nor for F

2 :
Consider the equilibrium candidate F 1 rst: In t=2, all rms in the local pool invest
at the interest rate eR(F 1 ) and cross-listing rms invest at R0: None of the rms has
an incentive to deviate. In t=1, an investor observes the fraction of cross-listing good
rms and o¤ers credit at R0 for cross-listing rms and at eR(F 1 ) for non-cross-listing
rms. The investor makes expected prots of zero and does not have any incentive to
deviate. Consider the good rmsincentives to deviate in t=0 for F 1 : The marginal
rm to cross-list F 1 is indi¤erent between cross-listing and not cross-listing and does
not have any incentive to deviate from its cross-listing strategy. As with the fraction
F 1
F
of all good rms cross-listing, all other rms with costs of cross-listing Fi < F 1
realize higher prots by cross-listing and prefer cross-listing (remember that, as there
is a continuum of good rms, a single rm cannot inuence expected prots on the
home market). All other rms with Fi > F 1 realize higher prots by staying in the
home market pool and they do not have any incentives to deviate either. Hence, in
this case F 1 characterizes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Similarly it can be shown, that F 2 characterizes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
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2) X1  X < X2 :
For this parameter range the zero prot condition is binding only for F 2 :
With the same argumentation as for X > X2, we know that F 1 characterizes a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. However, as for F 2 the zero prot condition is bind-
ing, F 2 cannot characterize a Nash equilibrium. The alternative equilibrium candidate
for F 2 is the situation in which all rms with Fi < F

0 cross-list and the market breaks
down in the local pool. However this cannot be an equilibrium either: Assume for a mo-
ment, that indeed a fraction F

0
F
of good rms did cross-list. With F 0 > F

1 ;
@2ECL
@F 2i
= 0
and @
2EH
@F 2i
< 0; it follows that F 0 < F
MBD and hence X > eR(F 0 ): Thus, for the cross-
listing rm F 0 it holds that ECL(F

0 ) = 0 < EH(F

0 ) and it has an incentive not
to cross-list (and all other rms with Fi > F 1 as well). For this parameter range, the
only equilibrium is given by F 1 :
3) X < X1 :
For this parameter range the zero prot condition is binding for F 1 as well as F

2 :
Both for F 1 and F

2 the marginal rms prots under cross-listing as well as on the
home market would be negative. Thus, only good rms with cross-listing costs Fi 
F 0  X   R0(< F 1 < F 2 ) cross-list and invest.112 As with F 0 < F 1 , @
2ECL
@F 2i
= 0 and
@2EH
@F 2i
< 0; it follows that F 0 > F
MBD; investors anticipate that eR(F 0 ) > X and do
not o¤er any pooling credit contract. This is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as
neither the rms nor the investors have an incentive to deviate from their strategies.
A3.2 Elimination of the equilibrium F2 (for X  X2)
Recall that ECL(F i ) < EH(F

i ) if the marginal rm to cross-list was given by
F 1 < F

i < F

2 and ECL(F

i ) > EH(F

i ) if F

i > F

2 :
1) Instability of the Equilibrium:
Consider the equilibrium at F 2 : Now, assume that for some reason only a smaller
fraction of good rms F
0
2
F
<
F 2
F
decides to cross-list. As investors observe the cross-
listing decisions and are fully competitive, they o¤er an interest rate for the home
market pool of eR(F 02 ) = R0

1 F
0
2
F

 F
0
2
F
: At this interest rate, ECL(F 02 ) < EH(F
0
2 )
112The assumption F > max
n
4R0(1 )
 ;X  R0
o
assures the existence of an inner solution with
F 0 < F:
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for the marginal cross-listing rm F 02 : Thus it has an incentive to deviate and stay
on the home market pool. This rationing holds for all potential marginal rms with
F 1 < F

i < F

2 : A stable equilibrium is only reached when the marginal rm to cross-
list is F 1 : Similarly, it can be shown that if the marginal rm to cross-list was for some
reason given by F 002 > F

2 , more and more rms would like to cross-list and a corner
solution would arise. Thus, even though with F 2 we have a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium, it is not stable vis-à-vis small perturbations. The equilibrium with F 1 is
stable vis-à-vis small perturbations.
2) Pareto-Dominance:
As investors and bad rms make zero prots in both equilibria, it su¢ ces to com-
pare expected prots for good rms only. All good rms with Fi < F 1 realize the
same expected prots in both equilibria, as in both cases they do cross-list and realize
ECL(Fi). However, with @ECL@F i =  1 < 0,
@EH
@F i
=   R0(1 )
F

1 F

i
F
 < 0 and F 1 < F 2 ; it
immediately follows that the marginal rms expected prots are higher for F 1 as com-
pared to F 2 . As a consequence, also all other rms with Fi > F

1 realize higher expected
prots on the home market pool. Hence, the equilibrium with F 1 Pareto-dominates
the one with F 2 .
A3.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1: Comparative Statics Fraction w.r.t.  and X

@

F1
F

@
=   1
2
R0
[F 4R0(1 )]
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ):
With the assumption F > 4R0(1 )

it follows that
@

F1
F

@
< 0:
 As F 1
F
is independent of X, it follows immediately that
@

F1
F

@X
= 0:
 As F 0
F
is independent of  it follows immediately that
@

F0
F

@
= 0:
 @(
X R0
F
)
@X
= 1
F
> 0:
A3.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3: Comparative Statics X1 w.r.t.  and X:
 @X1
@
=  R0

F (+
p) 2R0(1 )
F (+
p) (1 )2R0(2+
p) ;
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with
p =
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ):
The derivate @X1
@
is negative if F (+
p) 2R0(1 )
F (+
p) (1 )2R0(2+
p) > 0:
With the assumption F > 4R0(1 )

it follows for the numerator that
F (+
p)  2R0(1  ) > 0, as F (+
p) > F and 2R(1  ) < 4R0(1  ):
The denominator is larger than zero if 2F   (1 )4R0 >
p(1  )2R0   F | {z }
<0; as F 4R0(1 )>0
;
thus if (F  (1  )4R0)| {z }
>0
> 0; which is fullled.
Hence, it follows that @X1
@
< 0:
 As X1 is independent of X, it follows immediately that @X1@X = 0:
A3.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4: Comparative Statics w.r.t. F

@

F1
F

@F
=   1
F
2R0
(1 )q
2  4R0
F
(1 )
< 0:
 @X1
@F
=   2
F
R20
(1 )2
F (+
p) 2R0(1 )(2+
p) ; with
p =
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ):
As  2
F
R20 (1  )2 < 0; it holds that @X1@F < 0 if F (+
p) 2R0(1 )(2+
p) > 0
By subtracting and adding 2R0(1  )
p on the LHS, we obtain the condition
F   4R0(1  )
| {z }
>0
(+
p) + 2R0(1  )
p > 0;
which is always fullled. Hence, it follows that @X1
@F
< 0:
A3.6 Derivation of Welfare Functions
1) Welfare for the First Best Case
WF FB = (X  R0)| {z }P
EG
+ (1  )0| {z }P
EB
+ R0   R0| {z }P
EI
= (X  R0) > 0:
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2) Welfare in the Closed Economy with Market Breakdown
WFMBDC = 0 (none of the rms invests)
3) Welfare in the Closed Economy without Market Breakdown
WFNMBDC =  (X  RC)| {z }P
EG
+ (1  )0| {z }P
EB
+ RC  R0| {z }P
EI
= X  R0:
With X   R0

 0 it follows that WFNMBDC > 0; .
4) Welfare in the Open Economy with Market Breakdown
WFMBDO = 
F 0
F
(X  R0)  
F 0Z
0
Fi
1
F
dFi| {z }
Cross-listing good rms
+ 
F 0
F
R0   F

0
F
R0| {z }
Investors
= 
F 0
F
(X  R0)  12 F F 20 :
with F 0 = X  R0 it follows that
WFMBDO =

2F
(X  R0)2 > 0:
5) Welfare in the open economy without market breakdown
WFNMBDO = (1  )0| {z }
Bad rms
+ (  F

1
F
)(X   eR(F 1 ))| {z }
Non-cross-listing good rms
+

F 1
F
(X  R0)  
F 1Z
0
Fi
1
F
dFi| {z }
Cross-listing good rms
+ 
F 1
F
R0 + (  F

1
F
) eR(F 1 ) R0| {z }
Investors
= X  R0   12 F F 21 :
With the condition X  R0(1 
F1
F
)
(1 F

1
F
)
for no market breakdown in the open economy,
it follows that X  R0 + (X  R0)| {z }b=F 0>F 1 
F 1
F
> R0 + F

1
F 1
F
> R0 +
1
2
F 1
F 1
F
:
Hence, it holds that WFNMBDO > 0:
A3.7 Comparative Statics Welfare w.r.t.  and X
 The derivatives of the welfare functions with respect to  are given by
Appendix to Chapter 3 132
@WFMBDC
@
= 0
@WFNMBDC
@
= X > 0;
@WFMBDO
@
= 1
2F
(X  R0)2 > 0;
@WFNMBDO
@
= X  
h
F 21
2F
+ 
F
F 1
@F 1
@
i
:
With @F

1
@
=   F
22
R0q
F
2
4
 FR0

(1 )
< 0; it follows that @WF
NMBD
O
@
> 0; if X  F 21
2F
> 0:
As in the case without market breakdown it holds that F 1 < F

0 = X  R0,
the above condition is a fortiori fullled if 2FX > (X  R0)2:
As F > X  R0, this condition holds and @WF
NMBD
O
@
> 0:
 The derivatives of the welfare functions with respect to X are given by
@WFMBDC
@X
= 0
@WFNMBDC
@X
=  > 0;
@WFMBDO
@X
= 
F
(X  R0) > 0;
@WFNMBDO
@X
=  > 0:
A3.8 Proof of Proposition 3.5: Comparative Statics Welfare w.r.t. F
 @WFMBDO
@F
= 0
 @WFMBDO
@F
=   1
2F
2 (X  R0)2 < 0:
 @WFNMBDO
@F
= 1
8

 
q
2  4R0
F
(1 )
2
q
2  4R0
F
(1 )
> 0:
A3.9 Proof of Proposition 3.6: Welfare Financial Market Liberalization
Recall that there is market breakdown (MBD) in the closed economy for X < R0

and
in the open economy for X < X1 =
R0(2 +
p)
+
p with
p =
q
2   4R0
F
(1  ):
It holds that R0

< X1 if 0 < ( 
p)(1  )| {z }
>0
;
which with 4R0
F
(1  ) > 0; p < p2 and therefore p < ; is fullled 8 [0; 1] :
It follows that for X < R0

; there is MBD in the closed and open economy.
Appendix to Chapter 3 133
For R0

 X < X1, there is MBD in the open but not in the closed economy.
And, for X  X1, there is no MBD neither in the closed nor in the open economy.
Comparing Welfare:
1)X < R0

:
WF = WFMBDO  WFMBDC = F

0
F
(X  R0)  12 F F 20   0 = 2F (X  R0)2 > 0:
2)R0

 X < X1:
WF = WFMBDO  WFNMBDC = F

0
F
(X R0)  12 F F 20  (X R0) = 2F (X R0)2 
(X  R0):
At the minimum value for X, which is given by X = R0

; it holds that WF =
R2(1 )2
2F
> 0:
With the assumption F > X   R0, it follows that the derivative is given by @WF@X =
  1
F

 
F  X +R0

< 0:
Solving 
2F
(X  R0)2   (X  R0) = 0 for X yields the two threshold candidates
XWF1;2 = F +R0 
q
F
2   2FR0(1 )

:
The solution candidate with +
p can be excluded as it contradicts the condition F >
X  R0:
Thus the candidate for the threshold level is XWF = F +R0  
q
F
2   2FR0(1 )

:113
We nally have to check that XWF does lie in the parameter range [R0 ;X1):
Consider the lower threshold rst.
XWF  R0 if
F   R0(1 )

>
q
F
2   2FR0(1 )

:
As both sides are positive, squaring both sides yields after some algebraic simplications
(1 )2R20
2
> 0:
Hence, it holds that XWF  R0 .
Consider the upper threshold next.114
113With the condition F > (1 )4R0 the term under the square root is always positive.
114Note that X1 can also be written as X1 = F2  
q
F
2
4   FR0(1 ) +R0: This is derived by setting
F 0 = X  R0 equal to F 1 which in equilibrium holds at X1:
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XWF < X1 if F2  
q
F
2
4
  FR0(1 )

<
q
F
2   2FR0(1 )

:
Again as both sides are positive, squaring yields after some algebraic simplication
 
q
F
2
4
  FR0(1 )

< F
2
  R0(1 )

:
With F > 4R0(1 )

this is denitely fullled.
It follows thatWFMBDO  WFNMBDC > 0 for X < XWF ; andWFMBDO  WFNMBDC  0
for X  XWF :
3)X1  X:
WF = WFNMBDO  WFNMBDC = X  R0   12 F F 21   (X  R0) =  12 F F 21 < 0:
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